328. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Possible European Assistance to the Afghan Resistance
1. At the outset of our program of covert assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, we judged it best that, to maintain secrecy, we should not involve other Western powers. We were constantly warned by both the Pakistanis and the Saudis that leaks about this assistance were very harmful and could prove fatal to the program. The Pakistan intelligence chief, Gen. Akhtar, said he wanted no other parties involved.
2. During the course of discussions with [1 line not declassified] in the first half of 1980, we discussed our Afghan assistance program with them, and they offered to be of help. They assisted in the matter of sending journalists to Pakistan and Afghanistan and, using press outlets, were able significantly to augment, in articles and photographs, [Page 873] our own efforts to publicize the Afghan resistance. In the matter of arms, we decided to accept their offer of help, provided it was channeled through our own pipeline. These weapons would appear to the Pakistanis to come from us, and we would be adhering to their dictum of not bringing any more parties into the program. In September 1980, [less than 1 line not declassified] provided 400,000 rounds of .303 ammunition which was sent in through our supply channels. They are in the process of contributing 3,000 Enfield .303 rifles—a weapon with which the Afghan tribesmen are very familiar and which is very popular with them. [less than 1 line not declassified] say they expect to provide at least another 5,000 Enfields in the near future. (NOTE: The bulk of our weapons supply has been of Soviet or Bloc manufacture.)
3. Also in recent months we have been discussing in general terms with [1½ lines not declassified] our program of assistance to the Afghan resistance. [less than 1 line not declassified] has shown a willingness to help; but because of the Pakistani restrictions, we have limited our response [less than 1 line not declassified]. We have told them we would like them to explore means of supplying arms covertly to the Afghan freedom fighters through Iran. In making this recommendation we had two things in mind: a) Pakistani territory would not be used; and b) eventually some of the heat would be taken off the Pakistanis, as the Soviets would realize that arms were coming in not only through Pakistan but also through Iran. [less than 1 line not declassified] promised to help and said they would send an officer to survey possible clandestine supply routes and assess the freedom fighters’ needs. We are awaiting the results of this survey.
4. All this changed during the visit of President Zia to Washington, when he told the President he would welcome assistance to the freedom fighters from the West Europeans, and he told the President that he would like U.S. help in arranging such assistance.2 While this takes the wraps off the Pakistani restrictions under which we have been operating to date, this Agency must continue to be concerned about the overall security of the weapons supply program to the Afghan insurgents. The Saudis are particularly sensitive about any potential security breaches, and because they are instrumental in providing financing and logistics support, we must continue our efforts to maintain the strict security of the program. Therefore, if there is to be an approach at the policy level [less than 1 line not declassified] about assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, it would be useful to make a parallel approach [less than 1 line not declassified] so the background to this change during President Zia’s visit to Washington can be explained [Page 874] to them.3 (Our previous discussions of this program [less than 1 line not declassified] have been limited [1 line not declassified].) Additionally, we would suggest that in the policy-level approach, the sensitivity of this arms supply program be stressed and [less than 1 line not declassified] be urged to coordinate any covert arms support through us.4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 10–12/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. In the top right corner, Carter wrote: “Zbig” and initialed “C.” Although the memorandum is undated, attached but not printed is a memorandum from Brzezinski to Turner, October 15, in which Brzezinski reported that Carter “approved a positive response to Zia’s request for U.S. help in arranging European assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters.”↩
- See Document 326.↩
- Carter drew a vertical line in the left margin beside this sentence.↩
- At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote: “Let us move to carry out Zia’s request, maintaining requisite secrecy” and initialed “J.” In his attached October 15 memorandum to Turner, Brzezinski noted that messages from Carter requesting this assistance on behalf of Zia had been sent to Giscard and Thatcher; [text and 1 line not declassified]. Also attached but not printed is a draft message to Giscard and Thatcher; Carter made two minor corrections and crossed out a sentence that read: “I think we agree that it is important for the Soviets not to conclude that the Afghans can be easily crushed, and it is also important for the Pakistanis not to feel isolated.” In the upper right corner of the draft, Carter wrote: “Zbig, ok” and initialed “J.”↩
- Turner signed “Stan Turner” above his typed signature.↩