320. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
COUNTRY
- Pakistan/Afghanistan/USSR
SUBJECT
- 1. Views of President Zia as to Reason for Soviet Helicopter Attack Against Pakistan Border Post
- 2. Report of Wreckage of Downed Soviet Helicopter Involved in This Attack [less than 1 line not declassified]
SOURCE
- [1 line not declassified]
1. Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq believes that the attack of 26 September 1980 by Soviet helicopter gunships against the Pakistan border post in the Mohmand Agency east of the Konar River is a deliberate attempt to intimidate Zia just prior to his departure for the United Nations and his talks with President Carter.2 Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence Directorate commented that the attack might also have been stimulated by Zia’s recent interview with a New York Times correspondent, in which he predicted the Soviets would take advantage of the Iraq-Iran fighting.3
2. The Directorate also commented that the Afghan insurgents had achieved a major success a few days ago in an attack on Khandahar airfield, when a dozen Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground and many Soviets killed. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: This incident may have influenced the Soviet decision to hit at Pakistan.) (Headquarters comment: There is no independent evidence that this insurgent attack took place.)
3. The wreckage of a helicopter downed during the attack is located only a few hundred yards from the Ghakhai border post (3450N 7117E). It appears that the Soviet helicopters tried to remain on the Afghan side of the border while firing on the border post on the Pakistan side [Page 858] of the border. (See [less than 1 line not declassified] for a previous report on the Soviet attack.)4
4. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]
5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [6 lines not declassified]
- Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Cross-Border Operations—Pakistan. Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
- The memorandum of conversation of Carter’s meeting with Zia is printed as Document 326.↩
- See Michael T. Kaufman, “Pakistan Predicts Gains By Soviets in a Long War,” New York Times, September 25, 1980, p. A18.↩
- Not found. An article in the National Intelligence Daily, September 27, characterized the incident as the “most serious” on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border since the Soviet intervention. The article also included information from [text not declassified] who claimed the attack was undertaken by six Soviet-built MI–24 helicopters, which inflicted “several casualties.” Anti-aircraft fire downed one of the helicopters, which landed in Afghan territory. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, NIDs) In telegram 9982 from Islamabad, September 28, the Embassy relayed comments from a senior official in Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs casting doubt on the possibility that Afghanistan had a sufficient number of pilots to carry out the attack and indicating that, whether the pilots were Soviet or Afghan, the official had “no doubt” the attack was intentional. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Cross-Border Operations—Pakistan) A report, September 29, noted that evidence based on sensitive communications intelligence “strongly suggested” that the attack was undertaken by Soviet pilots. (Ibid.) A CIA intelligence information cable, September 27, was attached to a memorandum from Thornton to Brzezinski, September 30, which responded to a tasking order to determine the Pakistani reaction to the helicopter attack. Thornton noted that Pakistan was taking the incident “in stride” and was “pleased that they shot down a Soviet gunship.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 9/80)↩