319. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie’s Delegation to the Department of State1
Secto 8020. Subject: (C) Muskie-Gromyko Bilateral.
1. C—Entire text.
2. The Secretary’s bilateral meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York took place the morning of September 25 at the Soviet Mission.2 Late that afternoon Ambassador Shulman provided a [Page 856] briefing at USUN for Allied Reps from NATO, ANZUS, and Japan. (All were represented except the Turks, who were unable to attend because of schedule conflicts.) Highlights of the briefing follow:
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
Afghanistan
8. What Gromyko said was basically no different from his earlier statements on Afghanistan. He expressed support for the May 14 Afghan proposals and stressed the importance of getting talks going between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran.3 There was some uncertainty as to whether he was still referring to two sets of bilateral talks as previously, or whether he was suggesting tri-lateral negotiations. He stated that, if an agreement proved possible between those three countries and there were an end to outside interference and guarantees, then and only then would there be a withdrawal of Soviet forces. Gromyko also commented that large groups of invaders from outside had been eliminated but that there were still small groups which were infiltrating into Afghanistan and committing acts of terrorism.
9. Referring to possible UN initiative on Afghanistan, Gromyko said he saw no need for an international conference. He said that if Pakistan was willing to enter into direct negotiations with the Babrak regime, he had the impression—while he could not speak for Afghanistan—that the Afghanis might be prepared to move in the disputed border regions—thus implying a possible Afghanistan willingness to recognize the Durand Line.
10. The Secretary made the appropriate responses. He pointed out that, so long as Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan, the situation was not only dangerous for the stability of the region but also contributed to international tensions. It also made ratification of SALT II more difficult.4
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 9/80. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Moscow, Canberra, Tokyo, Wellington, USNATO, USUN, Brussels, Copenhagen, Bonn, London, Paris, Oslo, Reykjavik, Athens, Ankara, Ottawa, Rome, Luxembourg, The Hague, and Lisbon. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Muskie was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly meeting.↩
- A summary memorandum of conversation of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 302. In preparation for his discussion with Gromyko, Muskie exchanged memoranda with Carter concerning a range of issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations. He wrote Carter, September 13, regarding Afghanistan: “I intend to emphasize the continuing damage the invasion is doing to the international environment and to the prospects for relieving bilateral tensions. I will stress that Moscow should be under no false illusions that we will be prepared to return to business as usual as long as the occupation continues. I will review with Gromyko our exchange of letters on Afghanistan, making clear that, for us, the central element in any satisfactory settlement must be a complete Soviet withdrawal. I will nonetheless reiterate our continued preparedness to explore the possibilities for a peaceful settlement which takes into account the legitimate concerns of all parties.” In the left margin of that memorandum, Carter wrote: “Neutral—No dealing {{c¯}} Babrak = transitional arrangements, ok.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, ES Super Sensitive 1980 (4)) In a memorandum to Muskie, September 22, Brzezinski wrote: “The President would like you to register that our objective is a neutral Afghanistan; that to achieve that end we would be prepared to consider some ‘transitional arrangements,’ designed to ensure stability as Soviet forces withdraw; and that we cannot deal with the Babrak regime since it is a regime artificially maintained by a foreign power.” (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 275.↩
- A memorandum from Brement, September 26, called two items to Brzezinski’s attention regarding the meeting. Brement was “struck” by Gromyko’s statement that “large scale gangs no longer cross the border” in Afghanistan, which Brement took as a sign that the Soviets were “relatively satisfied at the efficacy of the measures they have taken to seal off the Pakistan border and are pleased at the improving security situation in Kabul and other population centers.” Characterizing Gromyko’s points as “predictable propaganda,” Brement also noted the only “modestly new departure” in Soviet policy with respect to Southwest Asia: Gromyko’s assertion that “Pakistan should have no apprehensions about Afghanistan territorial claims against them.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brement, Subject File, Box 61, Afghanistan: 11/79–1/80)↩