Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

31. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, September 29, 1978, 1848Z

23479. Subject: Soviet Policy and Attitude Toward Afghanistan. Ref: State 240411 (Notal).²

Begin summary: Soviet policy toward Afghanistan continues to be directed toward drawing Afghanistan into ever-increasing dependence on the USSR. Brezhnev’s September 22 Baku statement that Moscow intends “to develop and deepen” Afghan-Soviet ties suggests a hope for more formal links at some future stage.³ While Moscow is assisting the Taraki regime in consolidating and widening its power base, we doubt that Soviet support for Taraki personally is irrevocable.⁴ That support could be switched to others if dissatisfaction and opposition to his leadership should mount in the future. End summary.

1. While the Soviets no doubt have the evolving situation in Afghanistan under constant review, we see no evidence that Soviet policies toward the DRA are in the process of revision. These policies continue to fall broadly into two categories: (A) assisting the pro-Soviet Afghan regime to consolidate the “revolution” and to eliminate its opponents; and (B) drawing Afghanistan into closer dependence on the Soviet Union in economic, military, administrative, and other areas while maneuvering to reduce Western and Chinese presence and influence in Afghanistan. As expressed by Brezhnev in his September 22 Baku statement, the Soviet Union—like the DRA—intends to “widen and deepen” Soviet-Afghan relations.

2. The sensitivities of regional powers, particularly India, concerning Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the constant drumbeat of PRC charges that the Soviet Union is attempting to spread its hegemony in the world, and the potential for instability in Afghanistan will influence some degree of caution in Soviet decision-making on tactics. The Soviets would prefer to see the Taraki regime’s support base broadening rather than (as seems to be the case) narrowing, and would not like to become over-committed as the only benefactor and protector of a leadership whose domestic political situation is worsening and not improving.

3. Nevertheless, barring a real turn for the worse in the Taraki regime’s domestic political position, the widening and deepening process in Soviet-Afghan relations will continue apace. It will presumably include exchanges of high-level delegations and an expansion of trade and aid, perhaps leading eventually to an umbrella agreement with CEMA similar to those concluded with Finland and Iraq.⁵ At some future stage, it is also conceivable that the DRA may sign a “declaration of principles,” followed by a peace and friendship treaty. This pattern was followed with Angola, for example.⁶ (We note, however, that the Afghan desk officer in the Soviet Foreign Ministry carefully avoided responding to questions from EmbOff last month on possible consideration of a Soviet-Afghan peace and friendship treaty. He observed merely that the 1921 Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty and 1931 Neutrality and Non-Aggression Treaty provided an ongoing foundation for Soviet-Afghan relations.) Meanwhile, we expect that the Soviet presence and advice in Afghanistan will also be directed toward institutionalizing and progressively strengthening the DRA and PDPA’s organs of administration and control in Afghanistan.

4. As Brezhnev did in his Baku speech, the Soviets will also seek to assure other regional powers, particularly India, that the growing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan will be beneficial rather than harmful to regional peace and security. At the same time the Soviets will overtly and covertly play up threats from external “reaction” (the U.S., China, Muslim interests based in Pakistan and Iran) in order further to buttress Soviet-Afghan ties. Soviet diplomacy toward Afghanistan’s South Asian neighbors will encompass:

—stressing to the Indians the common aspects of New Delhi’s and Moscow’s policies toward Afghanistan;

—exploiting Pakistani and Iranian fears by urging them to accommodate to the new realities in the region and to forge closer relations with the USSR;

—insisting to all three that Soviet-Afghan relations pose no threat to their own interests or to regional peace and security (a point Brezhnev also emphasized in his Baku speech).

5. Under present circumstances, we believe that the Soviets consider that a rekindling of the Pushtunistan issue could be potentially unhelpful and possibly dangerous to the DRA’s most important mission—consolidating and broadening its domestic power base.

6. Our Soviet contacts have been very close-mouthed on Moscow’s attitude toward the domestic performance of the Taraki regime, including the purge of Parcham leaders and the pace of socio-economic programs in Afghanistan. As previously reported, some of our Soviet sources and Soviet press articles have implied that Taraki’s “cocktail socialism” (perhaps like Allende’s reforms) lack decisiveness and drive, and that Taraki should not have purged Parcham leaders. In general, it appears from here that currently the Soviets intend to stick with Taraki “for better or for worse” as the best bet to preserve and widen the over-all course of the Afghan “revolution.” This situation could change if opposition to his regime reached serious proportions and his personal position became increasingly tenuous. In such event, we believe that Moscow would not hesitate to abandon Taraki and to look for other leadership options.

7. If the Afghan “revolution” survives the consolidation period, the Soviets will probably then move more boldly to make the direction of Afghan-Soviet relations irreversible. Over the long run, if Afghanistan should move onto the “Socialist path,” Moscow will conceive of Afghanistan increasingly as a state entitled to Soviet protection, consistent with the Soviet Union’s self-proclaimed duty to use its power in the common defense of “Socialist gains.”

Garrison

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780400–1081. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Bonn, Dacca, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Leningrad, London, New Delhi, Paris, USLO Peking, Rome, Tehran, and USNATO.
2. See footnote 2, Document 30.
3. Brezhnev’s speech, which touched on a number of issues, was summarized in telegram 243631 to Moscow, September 25. Regarding Afghanistan, the telegram noted that Brezhnev’s decision to single out the country “can probably be taken as an expression of support for the new Afghan regime, which is beset by problems on several fronts.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392–0429)
4. On August 24, the Embassy reported in telegram 20305 from Moscow that it had picked up “unconfirmed rumors” from a Pakistani Embassy Minister in Moscow who was in contact with a “Soviet Afghan specialist.” The Minister relayed that Taraki was unable to foster a “true” Afghan revolution and that it was “inevitable” the Parcham faction, rivals to the ruling Khalq Party, would “return to power.” Conversely, the Embassy also reported that, according to an Indian Embassy official, the Soviets considered Taraki “as best situated to guide the Afghan ‘revolution’ between the extreme Left and Right poles in Afghan politics.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780346–1069)
5. The USSR created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in 1949, originally to oversee economic activities in Eastern Europe.
6. Angola signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in October 1976.