318. Editorial Note
On the morning of September 15, 1980, Soviet Army Private Alexandr V. Kruglov arrived at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan apparently requesting that the Embassy provide him asylum until he could depart either for the United States or another country. At the time, no Russian-speaking officials were on hand to communicate with Kruglov. During a meeting in Washington later that day, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom told Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin that the United States wanted to be responsive to the Kruglov case, while at the same time it sought to ensure that the matter would not “unduly aggravate U.S.-Soviet relations.” Newsom further noted that the issue should be resolved under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and that the United States held the Soviet Union responsible for the overall security and safety of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. Newsom reported that the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, Fakriat Tabeev, and U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Hawthorne Mills were meeting in Kabul regarding the situation, and should the Ambassador request a meeting with Kruglov, the United States would be amenable under appropriate circumstances. Dobrynin responded that he knew nothing of the Kruglov matter, but would check in with Moscow. (Telegram 245452 to Kabul, September 15; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 2, Afghanistan: 5/80–1/81)
On the evening of September 17, Newsom and Dobrynin met again to discuss the Kruglov matter. Newsom asked Dobrynin to relay the [Page 853] request that the Soviet Union use its influence to compel the Afghan Government to remove a blockade of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and cease subjecting Embassy personnel entering and exiting the premises to searches, in an apparent effort to ensure that Kruglov would not leave surreptitiously. Dobrynin protested that this request should be made directly to the Afghan Government. Newsom repeated his earlier desire that this issue need not damage U.S.-Soviet relations, which in his assessment were “already strained.” Newsom reported that once a Russian-speaking U.S. officer arrived in Kabul it would be possible to arrange a meeting between Kruglov and Soviet officials. (Telegram 248878 to Kabul, September 18; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brement, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 7–12/80)
An item in the President’s Daily Brief, September 19, noted that [text not declassified] either Soviet paratroopers or a Soviet-trained Afghan counterterrorist group might attempt to shoot or capture Kruglov if he was observed outside the U.S. Embassy. The CIA Station in Kabul thought any military response would be limited to preventing Kruglov’s removal from Embassy grounds; Chargé Mills believed an assault on the Embassy was unlikely because Kruglov was not “important enough to warrant such a blatant violation of diplomatic immunity.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—September 1980, PDBs)
In preparation for the meeting between Kruglov and Soviet officials, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Kabul that it should “not lead Kruglov in any direction” and should remind him that any decision he made was his alone. The Department further instructed that a meeting should not take place if it was possible that Kruglov would attempt to bargain for his safety in exchange for his pledge not to reveal Soviet military secrets. Such a bargain was “extremely dangerous not only to him but also to the future of the Mission” because such a bargain would only “increase Soviet determination to get him back at all costs.” Should a meeting occur, Kruglov should be made aware of his options: he could remain in the Embassy, leave with the Soviet officials, or delay until he made his decision. Kruglov should be permitted to leave with the Soviets, the Department instructed, only if Embassy officials were convinced he was doing so on his own accord and was willing to provide a handwritten statement attesting to this fact. (Telegram 250588 to Kabul, September 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0346)
On September 21, Kruglov met with Robert F. Ober, a senior Political Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who had travelled to [Page 854] Afghanistan to deal with the matter. Kruglov agreed to a meeting with Soviet officials later that day. He agreed he would not attempt to make a bargain for his safety in exchange for withholding military secrets, and Ober assured him that U.S. insistence on this point was of benefit to both Kruglov’s well-being and the security of the Embassy. Kruglov shared that he was considering bargaining for Soviet assurance that he would be allowed to emigrate from the USSR subsequent to serving whatever sentence the authorities handed him. Ober counseled that Kruglov should attempt to publicize whatever assurances he received for his emigration to ensure they would be met following his sentence. (Telegram 252721 to Moscow, September 21; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 9/80)
Kruglov’s meeting with Soviet officials took place as scheduled, September 21, in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The U.S. side was led by Chargé Mills, and Ambassador Tabeev led the Soviet side. Before Kruglov was brought in, the Soviets produced a tape recording of a woman they claimed was Kruglov’s grandmother, as well as letters from friends and relatives of Kruglov. Finding nothing objectionable, Ober approved their presentation to Kruglov. When Kruglov was brought in, Ambassador Tabeev addressed him: “We are surprised by your actions. Please tell us what happened.” (Telegram 252736 to Moscow, September 21; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 9/80)
Kruglov responded: “What prompted me was the bad relations between our officers and enlisted men. Before I came into the army I was convinced by what I had read and seen on the television program ‘Serve the Soviet Union,’ that it would be a wonderful life. It all sounded good. But it turned out to be difficult in fact. It is difficult for me to discuss this, but I could tell you lots about the humiliations and indignities forced upon Soviet troops.” (Ibid.)
Noting that he too served in the military, Tabeev empathized with Kruglov’s complaints and promised that he could return to the Soviet Union and resume his academic studies without punishment, on the basis that he had not actually deserted the army, nor had he sought asylum. Tabeev further offered to personally correct abuses Kruglov had suffered while serving in Afghanistan, and both Tabeev and Kruglov expressed their appreciation for the U.S. Embassy’s assistance in allowing the meeting to occur. (Ibid.)
Upon reflection, Kruglov decided that he would leave with the Soviet officials. Mills asked: “Was the decision made without pressure, of your own free will?” Kruglov replied affirmatively and committed his response to a handwritten statement. Following this exchange, Mills asked Tabeev what could be done about the Afghan Government’s blockade of the Embassy. Tabeev gave a “double guarantee” of his [Page 855] pledge to Kruglov and expressed his “hope that the blockade issue would improve following a talk with his Afghan counterparts. (Ibid.)
In telegram 2670 from Kabul, September 23, the Embassy reported that the Afghan Government’s barricades surrounding the Embassy were “magically” removed less than an hour after Kruglov’s departure on September 21, thus concluding the episode.(National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800456–0260) No telegrams reporting on Kruglov’s subsequent treatment by Soviet authorities were found.