Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

315. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1980, 1–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Alexander Bessmertnykh, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
• Marshall Brement, NSC Staff Member

The Elections. After some mutual comparison of recent vacation travels—his in the Baltic and mine in California and Arizona—the conversation turned to the current campaign. As far as the USSR was concerned, it made little difference who won in November, Bessmertnykh said. When I expressed surprise at this statement, given Governor Reagan’s position on the Soviet Union and on a whole range of security issues, Bessmertnykh conceded that the President was logically the preferable candidate for Moscow because of his approach to arms control questions. “Reagan directly opposes SALT, Carter does not,” Bessmertnykh said. But as seen from Moscow the difference between the two candidates on defense matters is unimportant. Soviet defense analysts feel that the Carter Administration has done as much as any American government can do to increase defense expenditures and strongly doubt that Reagan would allocate more for defense over the next two fiscal years than Carter has, Bessmertynkh said, and particularly if he cuts taxes. (C)

It is true, Bessmertynkh continued, that a sober and straightforward comparison of the positions which the two candidates have adopted would seem to make Carter preferable for us. But speaking entirely informally and off the record, it is simply a fact that the President is viscerally disliked in Moscow and that this dislike is widely shared both by the general Soviet public and by official circles. There were two recent events that strongly influenced this Soviet attitude. The first was the decision to try and implement a world-wide boycott of the Olympics. This was very bad, and it was deeply resented because it was not seen as a serious way for the superpowers to do business. In fact, it engendered a feeling of national resentment within the Soviet populace, who were then extremely gratified at the great success of the Olympics. The other matter which was a subject of great irritation within the USSR was the President’s statement that Brezhnev had lied to him over the hot line.² It received attention at high levels. It was only after this that the Soviet media was allowed to portray the President any way it chose. (C)

This was extremely shortsighted, I replied, and was not appropriate behavior for a great power. I have been reading the Soviet press for twenty years and I had never seen Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, or Ford castigated in such terms as the Soviet press has adopted toward the President. This was foolish not only because of the umbrage which American officials feel when we read such distortions, but in terms of the effect which such tendentious reporting can have within the USSR itself. I find it really deplorable, I said. (C)

Bessmertnykh answered that he entirely agreed with me. Within his memory he also had never seen anything like it. It was unnecessary and gratuitous and he had personally complained about it to Moscow, characterizing it as an unwise policy. But once Soviet journalists are given their head in a matter like this, they can really go to extremes. And the constant barbs and pricking points which have been directed at the USSR since this administration took over have had their effect, he added. (C)

I asked whether the Soviet Embassy keeps in touch with Reagan’s foreign policy advisers. They had made no attempt to do so, Bessmertnykh replied, although a Soviet diplomat had attended Richard Allen’s briefing for the diplomatic corps. The point of the briefing, according to Bessmertnykh, was to reassure foreign diplomats that the Reagan administration would adopt a responsible course of action in world affairs. In any case, the Soviet embassy had been in contact with a great many Republicans during previous administrations and was sure that such acquaintanceships could be renewed in short order. US-Soviet relations are the most important elements of international relations, Bessmertnykh said, and the Soviets were confident that they could work with any American administration, no matter who was President. (C)

Afghanistan. Turning to Afghanistan, Bessmertnykh stressed that the image being conveyed in the United States of the Soviets being “mired” in a hopeless Vietnam-like mess in Afghanistan was totally incorrect and very unfortunate. It leads to a widespread hope that Soviet forces would soon be withdrawn and all talk of a Soviet withdrawal is illusory, he said. It will simply not take place, except perhaps in the very distant future. To base United States policy on the hope of achieving a near term withdrawal was, to say the least, ill-advised. Such a policy has the effect of freezing US-Soviet relations for the indefinite future. Furthermore, the repeated insistence on a “transition” period in various letters from Washington to Moscow on this subject really raises hackles in the upper levels of the foreign ministry, including Gromyko. By “transition” you obviously mean the replacement of the Babrak Karmal government. But Babrak is stronger every day. There is not the slightest chance of the Soviet Union abandoning him. If you think otherwise, then the intelligence you are receiving is highly suspect. (S)

Everything we receive, from whatever source—including various statements made by the Kabul Regime itself—contradicts the assertion that Babrak is growing stronger, I replied. Not only did he not seem to be in control of the country, but his dominance of the Party was very much in doubt. Our intelligence analysts believe that the Khalq faction of the Party clearly outnumbered Babrak’s Parchamists. It was therefore our assumption that if the Soviet Union withdrew its support, Babrak would immediately be thrown out on his ear. In any case, it seems apparent to us that Babrak entirely lacks a popular base, and only has the support of a miniscule percentage of the population. (S)

People used to say the same thing about the Bolsheviks, Bessmertnykh rejoined. I am no expert in this area, but I can assure you that the intelligence we receive is encouraging. We control a great deal more of the countryside than your press would have you believe. It is obvious to us that the United States will have to accept this sooner or later. In order to achieve a resolution of the situation, you will have to stop supporting rebel elements through some of your Muslim friends. Once the rebels stop receiving outside assistance the problem is resolved. During the Vietnam War the USSR adopted a wise policy of initiating and continuing on with an era of detente no matter what was taking place in Southeast Asia. (S)

The Soviet Union should recognize, I replied, that we are exercising enormous restraint in Afghanistan. If the United States wished to upgrade the equipment, the training, and the overall effectiveness of the Muslim forces over what they are at present, it could do so easily. As for the Vietnam War, it was the USSR which supplied the wherewithal for the Vietnamese to inflict enormous casualties, including 45,000 dead, on United States forces. It was therefore not the Soviet Union which exercised restraint in carrying on with detente during the Vietnam War, but rather the United States. (S)

In any case, in Afghanistan all we ask is that you accept reality and not base policy on wishful thinking, said Bessmertnykh. There may be those within the United States bureaucracy who argue that it is in your interest to see the Soviets “mired down” in Afghanistan. We had people like that in Moscow who made the same argument regarding the United States during the Vietnam War. But the whole thrust of our policy was nevertheless to end that war. We behaved as a superpower should, Bessmertnykh said. You think that you will be able to get these people to work together. But it cannot be done. We had to deal with our own Basmachi rebellion, which lasted all through the 20’s.³ These are the same people. One simply cannot trust them or get them to work together. They will lie to you. They will take your money and they will not keep a bargain. We know that. We could use money to buy them out if we wanted to. But we do not intend to do so because we have great experience with them and know they are totally untrustworthy. We have told you repeatedly that our action in Afghanistan is limited in time and in scope and that it is unrelated to any other country or any other region. You should accept our statements and work constructively to find a solution to the current impasse between us. Afghanistan in no sense infringes on the interests of the United States. (S)

What many observers, and not just those within the United States, fear about the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, I replied, is that if it is successful, if it is regarded by the Soviet leadership, and the Soviet military, and the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy as having been a great success, then it will inescapably become a precedent for the USSR and an argument to encourage similar actions in other places. Several Soviet officials have asserted in the context of Afghanistan that there will be “no more Allendes.” Given the Soviet military buildup, the marked increase in its ability to project its forces to distant places, and the volatility of the world of the eighties, this type of irresponsible statement must give any observer of the USSR pause. If Moscow could contemplate taking the same kind of action in a place as far away as Chile as it did in Afghanistan, then this will inevitably lead to the kind of confrontation that neither of us desires. (S)

Soviet policy has been clearly enunciated, Bessmertnykh rejoined. You should not place too much significance on isolated remarks taken out of context. We realize, of course, that you have painted yourself into a corner on Afghanistan and that it is very difficult for the Carter Administration to take the kind of actions that will lead to a constructive resolution of the problem of restoration of US-Soviet relations. This is true for us as well. Nevertheless, we cannot remain isolated from each other forever, and if we cannot return to business-as-usual, then at least let us return to business. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 9/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Soviet Embassy.
2. For the exchange of hotline messages, see Documents 113 and 114. In his press conference on April 13, Carter, noting several nations’ calls for Soviet troop withdrawal, said: “We would support this effort. But the Soviets, contrary to the assurance given to me by Brezhnev and given to, I know, at least, President Giscard by Brezhnev, have not withdrawn their troops. In my judgement, they have no inclination to withdraw their troops; they’ve shown no evidence of that.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. 674)
3. See footnote 2, Document 275.