Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

114. Hotline Message From General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

Moscow, December 29, 1979

Dear Mister President,

In answer to your message of 29 December I consider it necessary to inform you of the following.

It is impossible to [One can in no way] agree with your evaluation of what is occurring in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. We have already sent through your Ambassador to Moscow in a confidential manner to the American side and to you personally a clarification [an explanation] based on facts of what is actually occurring there, as well as the reasons which caused us to respond favorably to the request of the Government of Afghanistan for the introduction of limited Soviet Military contingents.²

The attempt taken in your message to cast doubt on the very fact of the request itself of the government of Afghanistan for sending our forces to that country seems strange. I am compelled to note that it is certainly not a question of anyone’s perception or lack of perception of this fact, or agreement or disagreement with it which determines the actual state of affairs, which consists of the following.³

The Government of Afghanistan during the course of nearly two years has numerous times turned to us with this request. In point of fact one of these requests was sent to us on 26 December of this year. This is equally known by us and by the Afghanistani Government which sent us these requests.⁴

I want to once more stress that the purpose of the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan has only one goal—to provide assistance in repulsing the acts of external aggression, which have been taking place for a prolonged time and have now taken on even greater scale.⁵

It is absolutely impermissible, [Also entirely unacceptable] and not in conformance with actuality, is the claim (accusation) [assertion], which appears in your message that the Soviet Union allegedly did something to overthrow the Government of Afghanistan. I must with all certainty [definiteness] stress that the change in the Afghanistani government was the result of [carried out by] the Afghanistanis themselves and only by them. Ask the Afghanistani Government itself [about this].⁶

Also not corresponding to reality is that which is said in your message in relation to the fate of the families of the former leaders of Afghanistan.⁷ We have at our disposal information contradicting [Information at our disposal refutes] the information you have received.

I must further clearly state to you that the Soviet military contingents did not take any military action against Afghanistan and we clearly do not intend to do so.⁸

You have reproached us in your message that we did not consult with the USA Government in reference to the Afghanistani matter before introducing our military contingents into Afghanistan.⁹ Permit us to ask you—did you consult with us prior to beginning the massive concentration of naval forces near Iran and in the region of the Persian Gulf, about which it would have been necessary as a minimum to notify us?¹⁰

In connection with the content and spirit of your message I consider it essential to again clarify the point [explain that] that the request of the Afghanistani Government and the satisfaction of this request by the Soviet Union are exclusively a matter for the USSR and Afghanistan, which regulate their mutual relations themselves, by mutual agreement, and naturally cannot permit any sort of interference from without in their [these] mutual relations. They, as any member states of the UN, enjoy [have] the right not only to individual self-defense, but to collective defense as well, which is envisioned by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which the USSR and USA formulated themselves. And this was approved by all member states of the UN.

There is, of course, no basis for your assertion that our actions in Afghanistan allegedly threaten the peace.

In light of all of this, the immoderate tone of certain formulations in your message hit us squarely between the eyes [is striking]. What is the purpose of it? Would it not be better to evaluate the situation more calmly, keeping in mind the supreme [higher] interests of the world [peace] rather than, ultimately, the mutual relations of our two powers.

Concerning your “advice”, we already informed you, and here I repeat again, that as soon as the reasons which prompted the Afghanistani request to the Soviet Union disappear, we fully intend to withdraw the Soviet military contingents from Afghanistani territory.

And here is our advice to you: the American side could make its contribution toward ending the armed incursion from without into Afghanistani territory.¹¹

I do not believe that the work to create more stable and productive relations between the USSR and USA can be in vain. Unless, of course, the American side wants this to be. We do not. I think it would not be to the benefit of the United States of America itself, either.¹² It is our conviction that the way relations develop between the USSR and the USA is a joint matter. We believe that they must not be subject to vacillations under the influence of some kink of attendant [chance] factors or events.

Despite disagreements on a number of issues in [of] World and European politics, which we understand quite clearly [accord clear account], the Soviet Union is an advocate of conducting affairs in the spirit of those understandings and documents which were adopted by our countries in the interests of peace, equal cooperation, and international security.

L. Brezhnev

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Carter/Brezhnev Hotline Afghanis 12/29/79. Top Secret; Sensitive; Specat. Copy received in the Joint Staff of the JCS. This message was sent via the Direct Communications Link between Washington and Moscow. Unless otherwise noted, bracketed insertions in the text and footnotes below reflect alternate translations written on the copy by an unknown hand. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Shulman to Vance, December 31, in which Shulman characterized the Department of Defense translation of Brezhnev’s message as a “quick, rough initial translation,” which carried the risk “that the President will misinterpret a high-level Soviet communication and respond inappropriately.” Noting the importance of Brezhnev’s message, Shulman advised Vance: “We also need to sensitize the White House to the importance of having qualified Department Russian language speakers review the translation of all future incoming hotline messages.” Also attached but not printed is Brezhnev’s message in the original Russian.
2. In the left margin at the end of the paragraph, Carter wrote: “The leaders who ‘requested’ SU presence were assassinated.”
3. The alternate translation of the last sentence reads: “I am compelled to note that is certainly not anyone’s perception or lack of perception of this fact, or agreement or disagreement with it, which determines the actual situation. The situation consists of the following.”
4. The alternate translation of the last sentence reads: “We, the Soviet Union, know this; it is known in equal measure by the Afghanistani side, which sent us such requests.”
5. The alternate translation of this paragraph reads: “I want to once more stress that the sending of limited Soviet contingents to Afghanistan has only one goal—to provide help and assistance in repulsing acts of external aggresion, which have been taking place for a prolonged time and have now taken on even greater scale.” In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote: “from where?”
6. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “SU brought in [illegible] invasion force, the new puppet leader.”
7. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “They’re dead or they’re new SU puppets.”
8. The alternate translation of this paragraph reads: “I must further clearly inform you that the Soviet military contingents have not taken any military action against the Afghanistan side and we of course do not intend to take such action.”
9. The alternate translation of this sentence reads: “You have reproached us in your message for our not consulting with the USA Government on Afghanistani matters, prior to introducing our military contingents into Afghanistan.”
10. The alternative translation of this sentence reads: But permit us to ask you—did you consult with us prior to the beginning of the massive concentration of naval forces near Iran and in the region of the Persian Gulf, as well as in many other cases about which you should, as a minimum, have informed us. Carter wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “We’ve sent in no invasion forces.”
11. The alternate translation of this paragraph reads: “And here is our advice to you: the American side could make its contribution to cessation of armed incursions from without into Afghanistani territory.” In the left margin, Carter wrote: “The only incursion is from the SU.”
12. The alternate translation of these sentences reads: “I do not believe that work to create more stable and productive relations between the USSR and USA can turn out to have been in vain, if, of course, the American side does not want this to be the case. We do not. I think that this would not, indeed, be to the benefit of the United States of America itself.”