Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, September 25, 1978, 1010Z

9262. Subject: Assessment of Evolving GOP Attitudes/Policy Toward Afghanistan. Ref: (A) State 240411 (Notal), (B) Kabul 7370,(C) Tehran 8927 (Notal), (D) Islamabad 8841, (E) Islamabad A–98 (Notal).²

1. Pakistan’s attitudes, and consequently its policies toward the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) are in the process of subtle revision. The state of shock and alarm which we found (and reported) during the spring, in the immediate aftermath of the Kabul coup,³ is giving way to a more measured assessment and concern over the long-term threat. Indeed, it would have been difficult to sustain the fever pitch of May and June in the absence of direct Afghan (or Pakistani) provocation.

2. We do not suggest there has been any lessening of anxiety about the future course of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan among policy-makers and opinion molders on this side of the Durand Line. Most Pakistanis we meet expect the future of the relationship to be one of tension, even struggle. Concern over more recent events in Iran has done little to lessen the long-term Pakistani sense of foreboding about the Russian threat to this part of the world and the evident (to them) weakening of Western resolve to meet it. But no immediate crisis has come, and events suggest more of the same.

3. The evolution of Pakistani attitudes is perhaps best illustrated by General Zia-ul-Haq’s decision to stop off briefly in Kabul earlier this month enroute to Tehran to meet personally with DRA’s Taraki.⁴ As best we can determine, this was a typically spontaneous Zia move. Accepting that there would be little gain on substance, the General appears to have over-ruled [garble—his?] MFA advisers in order to have a chance to take the personal measure of the new Afghan leadership as well as perhaps get for himself a little breathing room in the relationship. On both fronts, he appears to have been successful. He came away from the visit—according to a senior member of his personal entourage—with a new appreciation for Taraki’s abilities and the regime’s toughminded deputy, Foreign Minister Amin; and he is exploiting the exchange of peaceful homilies to take a bit of the edge off the tensions in the state-to-state relationship.

4. We know, from the Foreign Secretary, for instance, that the visit reinforced Pakistan’s conclusions about the Communist character of the regime; we know also, however, that the Paks came away believing that Taraki and company have their hands full at present with the difficult job of sorting out their own leadership problems and of establishing their writ inside the country. GOP officials thus do not now anticipate an early crisis in their relations with the DRA.

5. This also suits General Zia’s political imperatives. Pakistan also has domestic preoccupations in the short term, foremost among them a resolution of the Bhutto situation.⁵ The new President must also cope with the pressures of a re-awakened political system, the byproduct of his gradual relaxation of martial law restrictions on press, assembly, and political activity, his formation of a political government, and his fostering thereby of a political opposition (refair). Pent-up pressures are slowly being released, among them concerns over the erosion thus far of the 1973 Constitution and concerns also about resurgent regionalism. The verities of martial law are slowing giving way to the uncertainties of a less ordered political process which may be the harbinger of promised elections. These concerns—plus a difficult economic situation—must engage his full attention over the next few months, making more than ever welcome the prospect of at least a pause in Pak-Afghan relations.

6. There are, of course, potential pitfalls which could undo the current desires on both sides for a period of tranquility. One of these is the refugee situation; we have commented (septel) on reports of a recent rise in the number of refugees coming across, especially in areas not tribal.⁶ Continuation of such a flow, or a marked increase, could strain Pakistan resources and patience and become a matter of public concern despite GOP efforts for now to downplay the issue. This is an area of the world where memories of large refugee flows are painful and have been volatile. Continuing unrest on the Afghan side could encourage tribal brethren on the Pakistan side—especially in tribal areas where GOP control is less than perfect—to join in, creating the specter of border clashes and bringing the confrontation to more immediate crisis proportions.

7. For the moment, however, we see the GOP willing to join in the apparent desire to avoid an early crisis which they sense among the Afghans and to do whatever is in their power to minimize frictions and to restrain their forces and the tribals in the border areas from undertaking actions which could move the confrontation to the front burner.

Constable

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780393–0458. Secret; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USLO Peking, and Tehran.
2. Telegrams 240411 to Kabul, September 21; 7370 from Kabul, September 14; 8927 from Tehran, September 18; and 8841 from Islamabad, September 13, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780387–0192, D780377–0326, D780379–0810, and D780372–0313, respectively. Airgram A–98 was not found.
3. See Document 18.
4. The meeting between Zia and Taraki was reported in telegram 7312 from Kabul, September 12, which characterized the meeting as a friendly first encounter between the two leaders that did not delve into pressing bilateral problems. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780371–0979)
5. A reference to the fate of former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was overthrown in a military coup by Zia on July 5, 1977. He was sentenced to execution on March 18, 1978, and was hanged April 4, 1979. Documentation on U.S. policy regarding Bhutto’s ouster and execution is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South Asia.
6. In telegram 9243 from Islamabad, September 25, the Embassy reported that the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was growing, but that Pakistan was reluctant to publicize the situation so as not to further disrupt relations with Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391–0802)