309. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[memorandum number
not declassified]
Washington, August 8, 1980
THE STATE OF THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY ([classification marking not declassified])
Our information on the status of the insurgency—[2 lines
not declassified]—is extensive but uneven in quality and far from
complete. We have difficulty getting enough good information on such basic
questions as how the insurgents are organized, how many there are, how they
cooperate, and how many casualties there have been. The limits on such
information have made it difficult, for example, to arrive at confident
judgments about the insurgents’ ability to stand up over time to increasing
Soviet pressure. (See Annex A [1 line not
declassified])
Insurgent Activity
Perhaps our best information comes indirectly through the Soviet and Afghan
reaction to insurgent activity. [1 line not
declassified] we can establish that the insurgency has spread to
every Afghan province since the Soviet invasion. Insurgents harass traffic
on the main roads, attacking military and civilian convoys and sometimes
setting up their own checkpoints. They attack isolated Soviet and Afghan
army units, occasionally slipping inside security patrols to hit garrisons.
Although they usually attempt to avoid clashes with large units, the
insurgents have inflicted heavy casualties on them in a few engagements.
They have organized strikes and demonstrations in cities, particularly
Herat, Qandahar, and Jalalabad, but also Kabul. They have killed numerous
Soviets and Afghan officials on the streets of Afghan cities. Sabotage and
arson—particularly the burning of schools—are common. In rural areas, their
threats and killings have disrupted civil administration and prevented the
implementation of government programs. In some areas, except for a few
isolated garrisons, the insurgents are in complete control, dispensing
justice and raising taxes.
The insurgent hold is strongest in some mountainous areas where terrain
inhibits Soviet military operations. These areas are generally
[Page 823]
also the least important to the
Soviets and the Afghan Government, and no serious counter-insurgency
operations have been attempted in some of them. Even less remote areas where
the insurgents have eliminated government authority, government garrisons
still hold the main towns. On the other hand, there is resistance in areas
where Soviet troops are concentrated and the government has a fair degree of
control.
The insurgents have not taken over a major Afghan city or even a provincial
capital for more than a few days, although they are a pervasive presence in
most urban areas. The Soviets have shown in Kabul that they will deal firmly
with any popular uprising, and the threat of Soviet reaction has almost
certainly been important in keeping the urban areas from getting totally out
of control.
There is some evidence that the Soviets believe the situation is improving in
Afghanistan—perhaps stabilizing—and they clearly show no sign of withdrawing
from Afghanistan. The evidence shows that they are there for a long haul and
are beginning to emphasize political consolidation as well as military
operations. Although only a very small part of the population supports the
government and insurgency continues at a high level, the Soviets may have
been successful, at least temporarily, in keeping the insurgence from
getting worse. (In Annex B, we discuss the level of insurgency province by
province.)
Insurgent Organization
The insurgents in Afghanistan are organized into a large number of distinct
groups, probably several hundred. [less than 1 line not
declassified] reports that there are 79 insurgent leaders among the
Pathan tribesmen alone, each presumably heading an independent band. There
are probably as many more in the remainder of the country. A few of these
insurgent groups—primarily in urban areas—are based on political ideologies
or programs. The overwhelming majority, however, represent tribes or
geographic areas, and ridding their areas of the foreign invader is their
principal motivation.
The first loyalty of most Afghans is to their villages or extended families.
The basic insurgent unit is headed by a village or family leader and rarely
consists of more than 50 men. Such units, however, seem to cooperate closely
when necessary with others from neighboring villages and frequently coalesce
in large insurgent groups numbering several hundred men. The membership in
the basic units fluctuates; men leave the battlefield because they have more
important business at home, but may return when fighting becomes more
intense. One insurgent leader in Konarha province, for example, reportedly
has 200 to 300 men under his command most of the time, but for a major
operation can count on 1,000.
[Page 824]
Cooperation among the larger groups is inhibited by the difficulties of
communication and travel in a rugged country, by suspicion of outsiders—even
men from the next valley—and by the reluctance of most Afghans to take
orders from anyone, especially another local leader with no greater claims
to leadership.
There have nevertheless been some operations involving more than one
insurgent band, sometimes even bands from different ethnic groups. On
occasion, the failure of such operations has led to fighting between the
bands, each blaming the other for defeat. Since the Soviet invasion, there
has been growing cooperation both among insurgents in Afghanistan and
between Afghan insurgents and exile groups in Pakistan. Some of the
insurgents engaged in the fighting outside Kabul in June reportedly came
from provinces near the Pakistani border. The fighting probably would not
have extended over as large an area had a number of insurgent groups not
coordinated their activities. Predominant Pathan exile organizations and the
Hazaras of central Afghanistan are establishing contact with each other. New
weapons and tactics seem to pass quickly to tribes in the interior. In
general, however, each insurgent group continues to operate with little
reference to others fighting in the same cause.
The degree of cooperation also seems to vary by ethnic group. It may be least
among the fiercely independent Pathans along the Pakistani border. Among the
Nuristanis of Konarha province, however, there was considerable cooperation
even before the Soviet invasion. The Hazaras of central Afghanistan may even
have a rudimentary overall organization, comprising two umbrella groups over
several smaller insurgent organizations.
The best known—but perhaps the least important—of the insurgent groups are
the exile organizations. There are six main groups (five of them united in
the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan) and a number of
smaller groups, most of them based in Pakistan. The exiles have served as a
channel for aid to those fighting in Afghanistan, their propaganda has
probably encouraged the resistance, and some of them have men actually
engaged in fighting. There is however, little basis for their claims that
they have large followings in Afghanistan, that they speak for the
insurgents, or that they have much control over insurgent activities. (See
Annex C for a fuller treatment of the exiles.)
Insurgent Strength
There is no reliable information on which to base an estimate of insurgent
strength. Our guess is that it lies somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000.
Most of the country’s 15 million people resent the Soviet occupation, but
only a small percentage is actively engaged in the fighting.
[Page 825]
We probably have more complete reporting about insurgent strength in Konarha
province than in any other part of the country. Even so, the information
available does not permit us to estimate insurgent strength there more
precisely than several thousand.
[1 line not declassified] there are as many as several
hundred thousand insurgents in the country. [5½ lines not
declassified]
[less than 1 line not declassified] put the number of
insurgents in “main groupings” at about 28,000. [1 line
not declassified] had unconfirmed reports of a similar number in
the Kabul area alone. [less than 1 line not
declassified] reported the destruction of the main insurgent groups
in Badakshan, Baghlan, Qonduz, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Qandahar, Helmand, Herat,
and Bamian provinces, and may no longer include still active insurgents
there in the strength estimated for the main groupings. Soviet pressure has
broken some of the larger groups into smaller bands, but these might
actually be more effective in guerrilla warfare.
Other methods of estimating insurgent strength are equally unsatisfactory. We
do not know the number of insurgent bands nor the average size of a band.
Some groups are well over 1,000, others less than 100, and almost nothing is
known about most. Assuming, however, that there are around 200 insurgent
groups, and that the average size of each is about 300—groups of this size
appear to be fairly typical—there would be on the order of 60,000
insurgents.
Estimates of insurgent strength also depend on the definition of an
insurgent. At any given time few of the insurgent bands are at their
greatest possible strength, and in large areas of the country potential
insurgents have no Soviets to fight. Although there might be about 50,000
men opposing the Soviets at any one time, this strength could double if the
Soviets were to conduct simultaneous military operations throughout the
country. The number of men who have participated at one time or another in
fighting against the Soviets or Afghan Communists during the past two years
may be several times greater.
Estimating insurgent casualties is also difficult. Afghan military claims are
clearly exaggerated, [less than 1 line not
declassified] deal with only a few engagements, and even [less than 1 line not declassified] are suspect. Those
based on body counts are probably no more valid than US reports from
Vietnam, [2 lines not declassified]. The Soviet
Ambassador in Kabul told other ambassadors that 25,000
“counterrevolutionaries” have been eliminated since the invasion. Our
extrapolations from [1 line not declassified]
indicate that casualties have been on the order of 20,000, but the reports
may inflate insurgent losses. [2 lines not
declassified] forces in Afghanistan to go out on the battlefield
and actually count bodies. Civilian casualties probably have been higher,
although not 200,000 as one exile spokesman has charged.
[Page 826]
Insurgent Arms and Supplies
Although outside help has become increasingly important, the insurgents rely
primarily on weapons they had when the Marxists took over in April 1978 or
have since captured from the Afghan military, obtained from deserters, or
purchased on the local black market. (The sale of ammunition and
occasionally arms is widespread in the Afghan Army, and some Soviet troops
reportedly have also been involved.) We have no statistics on the number of
weapons the insurgents have obtained from sources in the country, but there
have been tens of thousands of deserters and defectors from the Afghan Army,
many of them taking their weapons with them, and we know of many raids on
garrisons, police posts, and convoys in which the insurgents captured
weapons.
The insurgents appear to have sufficient small arms, but frequently run short
of ammunition. Because of its range and the availability of ammunition, the
British World War II Lee-Enfield is their favorite weapon. Large numbers of
Soviet-made AK–47 assault rifles have come into insurgent hands since the
Marxist takeover, as have a growing number of West German designed G–2
rifles (manufactured in Pakistan under license for the Pakistan Army and
also a standard Iranian Army weapon). The insurgents have also captured
machine guns, mortars, anti-aircraft weapons, and even tanks and artillery
from the Army, but these are generally in short supply. The difficulty of
moving and maintaining heavy equipment such as tanks and artillery severely
limits their usefulness. The insurgents also produce some of their own
material—for example they convert plumbing pipe and pressure cookers into
landmines and refill old shell casings to make new ammunition.
The insurgents have used their weapons effectively, quickly adapting their
tactics to new arms—such as antitank rockets—and using unfamiliar captured
heavy weapons with some effect (partly because soldiers trained in their use
defected). They have even had a technical advantage over the Soviets in one
area—rifle accuracy and range. Although the Lee-Enfield’s rate of fire is
much slower than the AK–47s, its accuracy and range makes it superior in the
typical clash in which only a few shots are exchanged.
Some of the most effective insurgent weapons—notably antitank rockets and
modern landmines—can only be obtained abroad. In addition, the gradual
drying up of the Afghan Army as a source of weapons—controls on weapons and
ammunition seem to be tightening, and desertions are slowing down as the
army becomes smaller—has made foreign sources more important even for small
arms and ammunition.
Pakistan has been the major outside source of arms. The gun markets in tribal
areas near the border have supplied weapons to both Afghan and Pakistani
tribesmen for decades. Most of the weapons
[Page 827]
made by the tribal gun makers are rifles and pistols,
but they also produce mortars and heavy machine guns in small quantities.
Weapons produced in foreign countries—including captured Soviet weapons sold
to gun dealers by insurgents—and weapons presumably stolen from the
Pakistani military and police are also available.
The insurgents have been supplied with arms by private Pakistanis and
Pakistani religious organizations, although the tribal gun markets have
apparently been the source of much of this equipment as well.
The Pakistani Government has furnished limited quantities of ammunition,
rifles, antitank rockets, and mines. Saudi Arabia and several of the smaller
Gulf oil producers have provided funds for purchasing arms, although
apparently not the arms themselves. Egypt has also offered help to the
insurgents, and some Egyptian-made weapons reportedly are being used in
Afghanistan. There are persistent, but unconfirmed, reports of Chinese
assistance, either directly or through the Pakistani Government.
Some military supplies—most from stocks sold to Iran by the US—have been
supplied through Iran. Despite its announcements of support for the
insurgents, the role of the Iranian Government appears to be slight. The
weapons apparently are supplied primarily by religious organizations.
Hundreds of passes are available to the insurgents to move weapons into
Afghanistan over the mountainous border with Pakistan. The border with Iran
and the western part of the Pakistani border are largely inhospitable
desert, most of it unpatrolled. The government forces have firm control of
only the few main border crossings, such as the paved road from Iran to
Herat, and the road through the Khyber Pass. Soviet mining efforts along the
border in Konarha province have made cross-border movement there
considerably more difficult, but so far at least, most of the border remains
virtually unpatrolled.
Within Afghanistan, military supplies move slowly, by animal or man, over
mountain trails, the same ones used before the war by smugglers, or
sometimes by bus or truck. The process can be slow—insurgents in Vardak
province report it takes two weeks to a month to receive arms from Pakistan.
Despite efforts to impede movement in some provinces, government and Soviet
forces do not seem to have much success in interrupting insurgent arms
shipments in the country. Only rarely do government reports reflect the
interception of an arms shipment.
[Page 828]
Annex A2
[2 pages not declassified]
Annex B3
Insurgency in Afghan Provinces
Badakshan
Government control of Badakshan, perhaps the most remote of Afghanistan’s
provinces, has always been tenuous, and the government and the Soviets
appear to control only the main road from Qonduz to Feyzabad, the
provincial capital, and the valley from Feyzabad south to Jorm. Even
this degree of control, however, represents an improvement from the
government position at the time of the Soviet invasion. The government
then controlled only Feyzabad, where the garrison was surrounded and
close to surrendering before Soviet troops came to their relief in early
February. A major clearing operation in June—possibly the largest staged
so far by the Soviets—extended control beyond the Feyzabad area.
Konarha
At the time of the invasion, the government position in Konarha was
desperate. The few isolated posts it held were besieged and in danger of
falling. The major garrison in the province—at Asmar—had defected in
August after being besieged intermittently for six months. The
Nuristanis of the province resisted the government primarily out of
religious beliefs, although cultural differences with most other Afghans
probably made them even more resentful of control from Kabul than most
tribesmen.
Since that time, at least two major Soviet sweep operations in March and
May in the Konar Valley in the southern part of the province have
improved the situation. Asmar has been retaken, and the main villages in
the province are in danger from insurgents. In the main valley, movement
along roads is still hazardous but is at least possible for armed
government convoys. Although insurgent activity resumed quickly after
each Soviet sweep, the insurgents have not been able to regain their
complete control in the countryside. The more rugged and
[Page 829]
less important northern part of the
province has been untouched by Soviet or government forces.
Laghman
Much of the fighting in Laghman province has been a spillover from other
provinces. For example, during the Soviet sweeps in the Konar Valley,
there were parallel operations by Afghan and Soviet forces in Laghman.
Although the government controls the provincial capital and most main
towns, the bulk of the province is in rebel hands. Rebel fortunes have
fluctuated there, depending on the degree of government pressure. The
main significance of the province has been its use by the insurgents as
both a base and a supply route for operations in the Kabul area. The
Alisang Valley has been particularly important as a route for insurgents
moving to the Panjshir Valley, from which they can threaten important
installations—the main road to the USSR and Bagram air base—in the northern Kabul basin.
Parvan
The Soviets have been able to maintain control over the most important
areas of Parvan province—the northern part of the Kabul basin and the
Salang tunnel on the road from Kabul to the USSR. The insurgents have failed to block or destroy the
tunnel, the most vulnerable part of the Soviet supply line, and their
attacks on Bagram air base as well as mutinies by Afghan airmen there
have not seriously interfered with Soviet operations.
Elsewhere in the province, the insurgents have more than held their own.
According to one Afghan official, they control nine of the province’s 10
districts. Several Afghan and Soviet efforts to clear the road running
west into Bamian province have brought no lasting benefits. Attempts to
eliminate the threat to the Kabul basin posed by insurgents at the
Panjshir Valley in the eastern part of the province have been
unsuccessful. In April, [less than 1 line not
declassified] the insurgents—perhaps for the only time since
the invasion—were able to force Soviet troops to retreat.
Kabul
Insurgents have been active in the mountains around the Kabul basin, but
the basin itself has been under firm control of Soviet and government
forces. Clearing operations in the mountains in June seemed to have
removed the threat of an insurgent attack on the nation’s capital, if
any such threat ever existed. The Soviets may have reacted quickly and
forcefully because they feared that increased raids from the mountains
would inspire new outbreaks in the city.
The capital was fairly calm before the Soviet invasion, although the
first stages of an insurgent assassination campaign had already
[Page 830]
begun a few weeks earlier.
Since December, assassinations have become commonplace, some estimate 10
to 15 every day, and there have been a number of significant civil
disturbances. The most serious was a six-day general strike in late
February which involved serious rioting and forced the Soviets to move
troops into the city. Student demonstrations in May and June were less
serious, and the Soviets left most of the responsibility for putting
them down to Afghan police and soldiers. Adding to the unsettled
conditions in the city is the fighting between the two factions of the
ruling party, and a fair proportion of the incidents are probably
attributable to their feuding, rather than to the insurgents.
Vardak
Except for a few main towns and the Kabul-Qandahar road, almost all of
Vardak province is under control of the insurgents. Soviet operations
there seem to be increasing, probably both to ensure control of the road
and to weaken the threat to Kabul. Insurgents from the province almost
certainly were involved in the fighting around Kabul in June.
In February, the US Embassy acquired far more detailed information about
the insurgency in Vardak than has been available for any other province.
Insurgent leaders—calling themselves governors—were in complete control
there; the population supported the fight against the Soviets as a holy
war. The Soviet invasion had ended the longstanding rivalry between the
Hazaras in the west and the Pathans in the east. There was, however,
apparently little thought of cooperation with insurgents elsewhere in
the country, despite a belief that all Afghans would rise and drive out
the invaders. Arms and ammunition were obtained from Pakistan by
Vardakis dispatched to the tribal gun markets. Afghan exile
organizations evidently did little more than act as middlemen in the
sales.
Lowgar
Insurgents in Lowgar province have been able to block roads there, and
have probably contributed to forces operating in Kabul province. Aside
from some road clearing operations—designed to keep open communications
with Gardez in Paktia province—there has been little significant
fighting there.
Nangarhar
Prior to the Soviet invasion, insurgency in Nangarhar was limited
primarily to the northern and southern fringes of the province, where
fighting in Konar, Laghman, and Paktia provinces spilled over. The
situation was growing more critical late last year, however, with
insurgents for the first time able to block traffic on the road from
Kabul to the Khyber Pass for extended periods. (The main insurgent
activity
[Page 831]
against the road,
however, was near Sarubi in eastern Kabul province.) Conditions in
Jalalabad had also begun deteriorating, and part of the Jalalabad
garrison mutinied in October 1979. Nevertheless, Nangarhar was the most
peaceful of the provinces along Afghanistan’s eastern border and the
scene of one of the few unqualified Afghan Army successes, the defeat of
a large band of Pathan Mohmand tribesmen who had invaded the province
from Pakistan in June 1979.
The Soviet invasion brought a major increase in insurgency both in
Jalalabad and in the countryside. Jalalabad airport was attacked several
times, the city was unsafe for Soviet or Afghan soldiers for weeks at a
time, and rural insurgents seized control from government officials in
most districts. The Soviets stationed troops permanently on the
outskirts of Jalalabad to keep the main road to Pakistan open, to assist
Afghan troops in rural districts, and to support operations in the Konar
Valley. Insurgents have been driven from some districts, and the road is
now usually open. Government authority in Jalalabad city has increased,
but unrest in the province is greater than before the Soviet
invasion.
Paktia4
The first resistance to the Marxists broke out among the Mangal tribe in
eastern Paktia province within a week of the coup in April 1978.
Fighting quickly spread, and prior to the Soviet invasion, the
government’s counterinsurgency problems were more serious in Paktia than
in any other province except Konarha. Control was limited to a few
garrisons. In October 1979, Afghan troops—apparently commanded by Soviet
officers—staged the only major Afghan offensive of the war. Although
Afghan units reached their geographic objectives, they established no
permanent control. Within days the insurgents were once again in control
of most of the province, and government forces were besieged in a few
isolated posts. Some analysts have argued that the failure of this
offensive was one factor in Moscow’s decision that Afghanistan could be
saved only by Soviet troops.
Since the invasion, there has been little military activity in the
province. Government garrisons are isolated and seem to do their best to
avoid actions likely to bring an insurgent response. In June, however,
there was a significant Soviet incursion into the province, probably in
battalion strength, in an apparent effort to open roads to the main
garrisons. The Pathans responded by ambushing Soviet columns at
[Page 832]
several places and inflicting
some casualties. Since then, the province has remained fairly calm.
Ghazni
The Pathans of Ghazni province did not become a serious problem for the
government until the spring of 1979, but by late that year the city of
Ghazni was besieged, and several smaller garrisons in the southern part
of the province were forced to surrender or defect. The insurgents were
able to block the main road from Qandahar to Kabul at will; some
government officials traveling on the road did so only after buying
passes from insurgent representatives.
Since the invasion, the Soviets have staged two major clearing operations
in the province aimed primarily at securing the road. The first was in
April and May, and the second is still under way. The first, according
to Afghan exiles, inflicted severe casualties on innocent villagers in
the southern part of the province. The current operation, both larger
and with a larger proportion of Soviet troops, began in mid-July, and
its initial stages were apparently complicated by a mutiny in the Afghan
garrison at Ghazni. The Soviets have been able to keep the road open for
convoys most of the time, and there has been no serious insurgent threat
to Ghazni city since the invasion.
Zabol
The Soviets have made little effort to deal with insurgency in most of
Zabol province and have left most of the responsibility for keeping the
Kabul-Qandahar road open to Afghan forces. As a result, insurgents
control most of the province and have been able to block the road in the
Qalat area repeatedly.
Qandahar
Insurgency in rural Qandahar has been less serious for the Soviets than
unrest in the provincial capital, the country’s second largest city. For
much of the time since the invasion, the city has been unsafe for
government officials and has been virtually under control of the
insurgents, especially after dark. At least twice, despite Soviet
reluctance to engage in urban fighting, Soviet troops have been sent in
to restore some semblance of government control. Elsewhere in the
province insurgency has been greatest along the Pakistani border north
of Spin Baldak and along the border with Oruzgun province. The
government has tended to ignore the desolate southern part of the
province.
Bamian, Oruzgun, and Ghowr
Bamian, Oruzgun, and Ghowr provinces in central Afghanistan are inhabited
largely by Hazaras, a Mongolian Shiah minority long the
[Page 833]
object of discrimination on both ethnic
and religious grounds. The area originally fell to the insurgents almost
by default. The Afghan military, concentrating on Pathan insurgency in
the east, could spare few troops to hold the Hazara area, and since the
summer of 1978, all of the area except for the main towns has been in
insurgent hands. Government operations were largely confined to the
relief of threatened posts and a few half-hearted efforts that opened
the road between Kabul and Herat for only brief periods.
There has been little change since the invasion. The Hazaras have kept up
pressure on government forces. For their part, the Soviets have left the
area primarily to the Afghan Army. Their one major incursion into the
area, a multibattalion offensive in late April, may have been designed
partly to demonstrate that the Soviets could move into the area. Within
a few days after the end of the clearing operation, the Hazaras appear
to have regained all they held previously.
Despite their control of the countryside, the Hazaras have been unable to
take major towns. Tarin Kowt in Oruzgun has been under pressure for well
over a year, Chaghcharan has been isolated as long, and insurgents have
penetrated Bamian’s defenses, but none of the three provincial capitals
has been taken and held.
The motivation of the Hazaras in fighting the government and the Soviets
is somewhat different than that of other Afghans. It results in part
from past discrimination, and from their resentment of the dominance of
the Marxist governments (as well as all their predecessors) by Sunni
Pathans. The Hazaras also have probably been inspired and influenced
more by the Iranian revolution than other Afghans, apparently gaining
renewed pride in their Shiism. Iran has, however, been an inspiration to
Sunni Afghans, too; pictures of Ayatollah
Khomeini have been posted in Sunni cities such as Qonduz.
Hazara resentments have played a part in urban unrest in Kabul, where
Hazaras have been in the forefront of anti-government activity.
Baghlan
In Baghlan province the insurgents have staged sporadic attacks against
Soviet convoys and, despite Soviet clearing operations, they control the
relatively unimportant eastern part of the province. The Soviets,
nevertheless, have been able to keep the main road open—their major
objective in the province—to control all major towns, and to establish a
major logistic base at the important crossroad at Pol-e-Khomri.
Takar
Takar province was not a serious problem for the government prior to the
Soviet invasion, but insurgency has increased there since. In
[Page 834]
late June, the provincial
governor reported that most districts were in insurgent hands and that
an attack on the provincial capital was imminent. Judging by military
operations there, the situation has not been quite so critical
recently—the Soviets have been able to rely largely on Afghan troops—and
insurgency is strongest in the remote southern part of the province.
Qonduz
There was only minor insurgency in Qonduz province before the Soviet
invasion, but since then it has been a serious problem for the Soviets.
Although the province is important because it contains the major river
port at Shir Khan on the Soviet-Afghan border and the road south toward
Kabul, the Soviets initially left security there to Afghan forces. By
March, insurgents had taken control of most of the countryside, and
urban dissidents were in virtual control of the provincial capital. In
April Soviet troops moved into the capital, conducted clearing
operations in the province, and restored some semblance of order.
Insurgency, nevertheless, is at a considerably higher level than before
last December. At no time does there appear to have been a threat to
Shir Khan.
Samangan
Samangan was one of the country’s quieter provinces before the Soviet
invasion. By June, faced with weak Afghan forces, the insurgents were
strong enough to attack the provincial capital twice in a single day.
Insurgent control appears to be strongest in the south, in part because
of the presence of Hazaras from neighboring Bamian.
Balkh
Balkh has been among the quietest of Afghanistan’s provinces despite
sporadic dissidence, especially in the southern part of the province.
There have been assassinations, strikes, and sabotage in Mazar-i-Sharif,
the provincial capital and the country’s fourth largest city, but much
less unrest than in Kabul, Herat, or Qandahar.
Jowzjan
In Jowzjan, like most of the northern provinces, the most serious
insurgency has been in the south. The weakness of government forces,
however, has allowed the insurgents to gain control of much of the
province and on occasion threaten the provincial capital.
Faryab
The situation is much the same in Faryab, where the government’s main
military concerns have been with insurgency along the southern part of
its border with Jowzjan province, and the threat from insurgents in
Badghisat.
[Page 835]
Badghisat
A sudden burst of insurgency in Badghisat province in March 1979 caught
the small government forces off guard. Since then the insurgents have
controlled much of the province, but not the major towns. They
apparently tried to advance on Meymaneh, in Faryab province, but troops
rushed from Mazar-i-Sharif stopped them near the provincial border. A
Soviet clearing operation in July 1980 appears to have won some ground
for the government, but the gain may be only temporary.
Herat
In March 1979, the city of Herat was the scene of the first major urban
uprising against the Afghan Marxists. Crowds using tactics patterned
after those that brought down the Shah were joined by part of the local
Afghan Army garrison. Although the rising was suppressed in a few days,
calm never returned completely to the city. Following the Soviet
invasion, it was reduced to anarchy by strikes, demonstrations,
assassinations, and armed clashes. Soviet troops have held important
installations there, such as the airport, but have moved into the city
only on a few occasions to prevent insurgents from gaining complete
control.
Insurgency has been less a problem in the remainder of the province.
Small bands—some operating from Iranian territory—have clashed with
government forces, sometimes taking isolated posts, but Afghan forces,
with only some help from the Soviets, have prevented significant
insurgent success.
Farah
The Soviets have established a major military base at Shindand air base,
and have some degree of control in the central part of the province.
Nevertheless, insurgent attacks on convoys on the Herat-Qandahar road
have become so serious that most Afghan truckers refuse to use it.
Soviet control is more tenuous along the Iranian border, and Soviet
clearing operations in the eastern part of the province have met strong
resistance.
Nimruz
Sparsely settled Nimruz experienced almost no insurgency before the
Soviet invasion, but in March the insurgents—opposed mainly by
demoralized police—gained control of most of the countryside and almost
seized the provincial capital. The dispatch of a few companies of Afghan
troops and a smaller number of Soviets prevented further insurgent
gains. The Soviets apparently are planning a more ambitious clearing
operation, but it is unlikely they consider the province important
enough to spare enough troops to do more than relieve pressure on a few
posts.
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Helmand
The settled farmers along the Heland river have engaged in little
antigovernment activity. Although they are Pathans, their tribal martial
tradition is much weaker than among mountain dwellers. Because they
depend on government irrigation projects—largely funded by the US—they
are among the few Afghans who regard the central government as a
benefactor instead of an enemy. Since the Soviet invasion, attacks on
government installations have increased, the government has lost control
of many of the non-riverine districts, and local officials fear that the
provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, may be attacked.
Annex C5
Afghan Exile Organizations
There are dozens of Afghan exile organizations, most of them based in
Pakistan, some in Iran, and the rest scattered throughout the world (the
US, Western Europe, Egypt, India). Apart from those in Pakistan and
Iran, they have a very limited impact on the insurgency.
Pakistan-Based Organizations
Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan
(IALA). This umbrella organization
was formed by the six most important exile groups in Peshawar in January
1980 to enable the exile groups to present a united front at the special
Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held in Islamabad in late January.
It also hoped to encourage aid from Muslim countries that objected to
the fragmentation of the insurgent movement. One group, the Islamic
Party, left the Alliance while it was being established. The IALA is headed by Abdul Rasoul Saif, who
was apparently chosen because he posed no threat to the ambitions of the
leaders of the five remaining member organizations.
—The Afghan Islamic League
(Jamiat-Islami-Afghani). The League is headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a
former professor at Kabul University. The organization reportedly
receives financial support from a small, conservative political party in
Pakistan and is closer to the Afghan National Liberation Front than to
the other members of the Alliance. Rabbani’s group reportedly has a
military arm, but its capability is unknown.
—The Afghan National Liberation Front
(Jabhe-i-Negat-i-Melli). The group’s leader, Sebqatullah Mojededi, is a
member of an important religious family that has a following in Kabul
and other urban centers
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of
eastern Afghanistan. An Islamic scholar, Mojededi reportedly has good
contacts in Saudi Arabia and Libya. He claims to represent the Front’s
“real” leader, Prince Abdul Wali, cousin and son-in-law of King
Zahir, currently in exile in
Rome. Abdul Wali’s insurgent activities, however, are centered in
Western Europe.
—The Afghan Islamic and National Revolutionary
Council (Surah-i-Melli-Inqilabi-Islami-Afghanistan), also known
as the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. It is headed by Sayed Ahmed Gailani, an important
religious leader who traces his family from the prophet. He claims to
have a large following in the eastern provinces. Although he is probably
the exile Muslim leader with the most modern outlook, Gailani’s political strength is based
on his religious following.
—The Islamic Party (Hezbi Islami—Khalis Faction)
is a splinter group of Hekmatyar’s organization (see below). Its tough, combative
leader, Younis Khalis, is reported to be admired by other exile leaders
for his courage in leading his band in cross-border operations into
Afghanistan. Conservative and reputedly without political ambitions, he
has prodded other groups to become more involved in the fighting in
Afghanistan.
—Movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan
(Harakat-i-Inqilabi-Islami-Afghanistan), led by Maulana Mohammad Nabi
Mohammedi, a mullah, from the Khowst area of Paktia province.
Mohammedi’s base of operations is at Miram Shah in North Waziristan. The
other members of the Alliance have their headquarters in Peshawar.
The Islamic Party (Hezbe Islami), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, broke away from
the IALA soon after its formation.
Hekmatyar is fiercely
ambitious and independent and has been conducting guerrilla operations,
with the aid of the Pakistan Government, since before the Marxist
revolution in 1978. One report alleges that he has 15,000 guerrillas in
Afghanistan. This is probably an exaggeration, but the Islamic Party is
one of the best organized and most active exile organizations. Hekmatyar’s group has its roots in the
area between Ghazni and Qandahar, and it is active there as well as in
the Kabul area and in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan. The
Islamic Party has an office in Tehran, as well as its main office in
Peshawar. Hekmatyar rejects the
monarchy and is reportedly impressed by the fundamentalist revolution in
Iran.
The Revolutionary Council, established by the
Afghan Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly) that met in May in Peshawar prior to
another Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference, is the closest Afghan
equivalent to a government-in-exile. For centuries, the Jirgah has been
convened by rulers to legitimize their political authority. The group
that met in Pakistan in May claimed to represent all parts of the
country, although it most likely did not. In late July Hassan Gailani,
nephew of Sayed Ahmed Gailani,
was appointed President of the Council, indicating that it will probably
become little more than an arm of the IALA.
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Iran-Based Organizations
The Islamic Revolution Liberation Front of
Afghanistan (Jabhe-Azadibakshi-Inqilabi-Islami-Afghanistan),
led by Sheikh Mohammed Asif Mohsini. At the Islamic Foreign Ministers
conference in Islamabad in May, Iran’s Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh included Mohsini (as well as
five leaders from the IALA) in the
Iranian delegation. Mohsini’s front is a grouping of some 10 smaller
bands, primarily Hazaras, that operate in the central provinces of the
country. Some of the Front’s groups may also belong to one of the two
Hazara umbrella organizations, the National United Front of Afghanistan
(Jabhe-Mujahed-Melli-Afghanistan) and the United Front of Freedom
Fighters in Afghanistan (Jabhe-Mobarazin-i-Mujahed-Afghanistan), which
together subsume some 15 insurgent bands, operating in the central and
northern provinces.
Thunder (Radh) is led by Sheikh Zadeh, based in
Qom. It is a revolutionary organization comprising Hazaras operating in
the mountains of central Afghanistan. It probably has ties with other
Hazara organizations.
