310. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
8306. Subject: (S) Chemical Warfare Allegations in Afghanistan: Need for Reflection? Ref: State 220611.2
1. (S) Entire text.
2. I do not wish to appear the Cassandra on this issue, but I would like to introduce a note of caution into our planning to exploit allegations of Soviet use of chemical warfare agents in Afghanistan, as illus [Page 839] trated in reftel. I would like nothing better than to be able to see the Soviets nailed on this matter in a way which would not only condemn them for their use of chemical weapons but dramatize their butchery of Afghans/Muslims in Afghanistan. But we must be sure of our ground lest our planned campaign backfire and discredit other activities aimed at keeping Soviet aggression in Afghanistan prominently before the conscience of the world.
3. Thus, although we were not asked for comment by reftel, I would like to offer the following thoughts:
—Reports of the use of chemical agents in Afghanistan have never been conclusive, at least those we have seen. Our own sourcing and that of our Consul in Peshawar has never been direct or first-hand; we have relied heavily on the nearly identical accounts by refugees who have come across the border from different places, all of which point to some sort of canisters dropped by Soviet aircraft and the emission from those canisters of some gas or cloud which appears to debilitate those in the area for several hours. Deaths, if any, seem an accidental by-product for those too close to the source of the emission, and thus far we have no hard evidence of burning or other longer-term effects.
—We have had no such reports recently, i.e., in the last two months; moreover, our efforts to obtain a canister have borne no fruit.
—We have proposed to the GOP the despatch of a team of medical specialists whose efforts will be directed at attempting to document such use of chemical agents by the Soviets; that documentation effort, if successful, is not likely to be available for some time.
4. I have also some concern that the Pakistan Representative in Geneva may not fully reflect the position of his government on Pakistan’s willingness to play a prominent role in international forums on the chemical warfare issue or be willing to co-sponsor resolutions in the UNGA or elsewhere on this subject. I would feel somewhat more confident were I to be instructed to approach the Foreign Ministry here for general review of this subject before we seek active Pak cooperation.
5. Given the lack of conclusive evidence, at least in the public domain, I think we (and the Government of Pakistan) should reflect hard about how wise it is to push this subject so that we do not, by the deficiencies of our public case on chemical warfare in Afghanistan, undermine the more persuasive case we have on aggression, brutalties, and atrocities perpetrated by the Soviets during their Afghan adventure.
6. Dept please pass Geneva, USUN, Kabul and Moscow.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 8/80–1/81. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 220611 to USUN and Geneva, August 19, the Department informed the posts that the United States, working in concert with both allies and non-aligned countries, was interested in co-sponsoring a resolution on chemical warfare at the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting. The telegram directed the recipients to explore this proposal with their counterparts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) For an overview of UN activity relating to the control of chemical and biological weapons, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, pp. 70–74.↩