308. Letter From Senator Moynihan to Secretary of State Muskie1
At our lunch Tuesday we talked about the problem of maintaining the security of information in foreign affairs.2 I told you I had become deeply depressed by our seeming inability to maintain any confidences and our further inability to see what this tells us about the condition of our principal institutions. I promised to send you the specifics of the Afghanistan example which I cited.
In the course of 1979 the President began to move toward supporting the low-level insurgency that appeared to have developed against the pro-Soviet Amin government in Kabul. In July and again in November, Presidential Findings directed that small amounts of nonmilitary aid be passed to these groups.
On December 19, 1979, Izvestiya charged that “U.S. is stepping up interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, supporting the insurgents who are waging an armed struggle against this country’s legitimate government.” Izvestiya cited “the latest issue of the magazine COUNTERSPY.” (I am informed by staff of the Intelligence Committee that this journal is or was associated with the Institute for Policy Studies.)
On December 24 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, overthrowing Amin. As it happens a Presidential Finding was then making its way through the bureaucracy calling for a stepping up of the earlier program directed against Amin, providing some $2 million in lethal military equipment. This Presidential Finding was signed December 28. It had begun as a project directed against the previous regime, but now of course took place in the context of the full-scale Soviet intervention.
On January 1 Izvestiya charged that, “The CIA is directly involved in training Afghan rebels in camps in Pakistan and maintains contacts with counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries in Afghanistan itself.” The journal Counterspy is mentioned.
On January 5 the Boston Globe reports that the Carter administration has undertaken an unannounced “hush-hush decision that the U.S. . . . will do everything possible to slip weapons to the Moslem [Page 820] insurgents in Afghanistan to ensure the Russian invasion there will be long, bloody and expensive.”3
On January 9 the Presidential Finding of December 28 was presented to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The date and subject of this meeting was reported in the New York Times Magazine on April 6, 1980.4
On February 15 the Washington Post reported that “the U.S. is supplying weapons to rebel forces battling Soviet troops. . . .” The report is attributed to “reliable sources.”5 On February 16 the New York Times reported, “The U.S. began an operation to supply light infantry weapons to Afghan insurgent groups in mid-January, White House officials said today. . . .”6 On February 17 the New York Times reported from Moscow that, “The Soviet press gave prominent display today to American newspaper reports confirming the Soviet contention that the U.S. was supplying arms to the Afghan rebels.”7
And so through the spring and summer. I remarked to you that the July 21st edition of the New York Times reported on page 2 that Hodding Carter accused the National Security Council staff of leaking to the Times, a matter which no doubt distressed the White House,8 and on page 3 carried a story “Aides Disagree on Level of U.S. Arms Aid to Afghans” which included the paragraph:
“White House officials said on Feb. 15 that the United States had begun an operation to supply the insurgents with light infantry weapons. . . . The CIA, the White House source said, had been assigned to carry out the covert mission.”9
And so why ought Mr. Gromyko not be berating you with these charges? I think it may be agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a decisive moment in modern history: the first such event since the Second World War. It had the potential to restore a measure of clarity and balance to American views of the present world situation. [Page 821] In particular it made it possible for almost anyone to see the elemental mendacity of Soviet statements about their activities and intentions. They lie. But then what happened? Almost immediately the United States Government (evidently the White House itself) gave out information to the press which supported, even confirmed, the Soviet lie.
Could there have been a greater disservice to our nation? What is to be said of those who did it?
More importantly, what is to be said of the state of our institutions when such things can happen? What does it mean when men charged with the responsibility for this information find it more rewarding to break the confidence than to keep it? This goes to profound questions of institutional loyalty and morale. An organizational theorist, observing such symptoms, would almost certainly judge that such institutions were in deep trouble.
This surely is my view. After almost four years on the Intelligence Committee I have come to the conclusion, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is practically defunct and is in many ways a liability. (I mentioned to you that earlier this year I placed the National Intelligence Estimates in the Congressional Record,10 by which I mean the reports of them that had by then appeared in the Post and the Times.) Clearly we need an intelligence system that can keep its secrets and, in a general way, its identity to itself. We have neither.
Nothing will avail less than running about with lie detectors looking for leakers. If I were the President, I would look upon this as a problem of institutions, not people. It is a profoundly serious problem. (Thus: if it is impossible to keep secrets, perhaps the government should not try to do anything that depends on secrets being kept.) This is a subject about which political scientists, for example, might very well have something useful to say. It is a subject that can be studied. If you would like to pursue the matter, I am at your disposal, as nothing troubles me more just now.11
Best,
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Official Files of Edmund Muskie, 1980–1981, Lot 82D100, folder 1. Secret; Sensitive; Not for the System. Muskie initialed the letter, indicating he saw it. Moynihan’s letter is on the stationery of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, of which he was a member.↩
- The previous Tuesday was July 29. No record of that meeting was found.↩
- See William Beecher, “News Analysis: What He Didn’t Say,” Boston Globe, January 5, 1980, p. 1.↩
- See Tad Szulc, “Putting Back the Bite in the CIA,” New York Times, April 6, 1980, p. SM7.↩
- See Michael Getler, “U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents,” Washington Post, February 15, 1980, p. A1.↩
- See David Binder, “U.S. Supplying Afghan Insurgents with Arms in a Covert Operation,” New York Times, February 16, 1980, p. 1.↩
- See Craig R. Whitney, “Soviet Press Plays Up U.S. Reports on Help For the Afghan Rebels,” New York Times, February 17, 1980, p. 10.↩
- See “Hodding Carter Says U.S. Aides See Press as Enemy,” New York Times, July 21, 1980, p. A2.↩
- See Drew Middleton, “Aides Disagree on Level of U.S. Arms Aid to Afghans,” New York Times, July 21, 1980, p. A3.↩
- See, for example, Senator Moynihan speaking on “The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency,” 96th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record—Senate, 126, pt. 9:11371.↩
- Muskie replied to Moynihan on September 19. Regarding the problem of leaks, Muskie wrote: “I doubt we will ever be entirely free of the problem, for as you would agree, the Draconian measures necessary to ensure total security of information would be basically incompatible with our system. We could improve, however. We continue to look for ways to ensure better security, and would welcome any additional thoughts you may have.” (National Archives, RG 59, Official Files of Edmund Muskie, 1980–1981, Lot 82D100, folder 1)↩
- Moynihan initialed “DM” above his typed signature.↩