Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

29. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 11, 1978

SUBJECT

• Afghanistan

As you are probably aware, things in Afghanistan are deteriorating rapidly: the regime is devouring its children with amazing speed; its base of support is narrowing; Soviet influence is probably growing; and there appears to be quite a bit of spontaneous opposition outside of Kabul (not enough, presumably, to topple the regime). We don’t know what kind of coup plotting is going on; previous attempts ended in disaster, but certainly some Afghans must be giving thought to it.

There is a serious possibility of Soviet intervention in case things unravel too badly. Toon’s view, reflected in the recent INR assessment, seems too sanguine.² I think the Soviets are likely to assert their position in Afghanistan forcefully if they see a counter-coup coming; they would be too fearful that a reactionary take-over would be anti-Soviet and put a regime friendly to the US right on their borders. Given the composition of the population on their side of the border, this is an especially distressing thought.

State, with NSC clearance, has done some modest contingency planning in terms of demarches to be made, etc., should the Soviets intervene. Nobody has been able to come up with ideas on what we should or could actually do in that contingency. Short of that, we can move cautiously to capitalize on the one bright spot in the picture—India’s recognition that the Kabul regime means trouble for them too. (A separate memo is enroute on this.)³

Another issue also arises: how long can we, in good conscience, continue AID programs on the assumption that Afghanistan is not a Communist-controlled state? I hope that we can continue to do so since, if there is to be a break, I would like Kabul to bear the blame. If I were asked about this under oath, however, I would be very uncomfortable.

I have no recommendation that you do anything at the present time. Mainly, I want to make sure that you are keeping this unfortunate situation in mind.

You could, however, decide that you want to have an inter-agency meeting (mini-SCC?) to consider two points:⁴

—How close are we to a situation where Taraki’s control breaks down and the Soviets intervene? Are there any more imaginative ways of responding than we have come up with so far? (The responses will almost inevitably be negative since State and CIA claim to have been giving serious thought to this.)

—How close are we to a situation in which we have to accept the fact that Taraki is beyond redemption and for one reason or another we should begin to pull back? (This, however, would be a dangerous question to ask; we could find ourselves morally and probably legally bound to stop our AID programs.)⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1978. Secret. Sent for action. Initialed by Blackwill in the upper right corner. At the top of the first page, an unknown hand, likely Thornton’s, wrote: “No meeting necessary per DA.” The reference is to David Aaron.
2. Not further identified and not found. No cables from Moscow were found conveying the Ambassador’s “sanguine” view regarding the possibility of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
3. Not further identified.
4. Inderfurth drew a line under “mini-SCC” and wrote in the margin: “good idea.”
5. Two handwritten comments appear at the end of the memorandum. Blackwill wrote: “Question is the forms Soviet intervention might take—are we talking regular units crossing into Af.? Direct combat air support? Those are hard. But there’s more available if it’s heavy supply/advisors. I personally doubt intervention by regular units and don’t think Soviets would feel that they could not work out an acceptable position without it.” Under Blackwill’s comment, Gates wrote: “I agree. The Soviets have been extraordinarily cautious for three decades about use of their troops outside the USSR. Outside the Soviet ‘bloc’ they have not used regular units to intervene in the internal affairs of another country since the late 40s. Afghanistan isn’t worth that much to them. But expect every means of intervention short of combat units if they see this friendly regime in real trouble. RG.”