Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, August 16, 1978, 1205Z

6649. Subj: Foreign Minister Amin Accuses Pakistan of Providing Support for Subversion in Afghanistan. Ref: A) State 204821 (Notal),² B) State 203315 (Notal),³ C) Islamabad 7625 (Notal),⁴ D) Kabul 6240,⁵ E) Kabul 4802.⁶

1. Summary: Afghan Foreign Minister Amin claims that he has evidence that Pakistan is providing cross-border support for subversive operations against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). End summary.

2. During a call on Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin on Aug 14 to discuss multilateral issues, I informed him that I had conveyed to Washington and Islamabad the concern he expressed on July 31 over the state of Afghan-Pakistani relations (ref D). I told him that Amb Hummel had discussed this matter with Minister of State Agha Shahi, who stated that Pakistan was following a definite policy, rigidly applied, to restrain and naturalize [neutralize?] any elements or individuals who might want to make trouble in Afghanistan (ref C).

3. Amin retorted that Pakistan was “not putting that policy into practice.” He claimed that Kabul has evidence of Pakistani complicity in a large number of anti-Afghan cross-border operations to support subversion against the DRA Govt. Amin explained that his govt was not making this evidence public at this time because it does not want to bring out into the open any conflict with Pakistan if it can avoid it, and, besides, the Afghan Govt had contained such threats. If pushed too far, however, warned Amin, the Afghans are prepared to publicize their complaints and take necessary countermeasures.

4. When I asked what part of the Afghan-Pakistani border was involved in this alleged infiltration, Amin retorted, “all of it—from China to Iran.” He hurriedly added that Afghanistan was not making similar charges against Iran, which, he noted, has been controlling its side of the Afghan-Iranian border “in a friendly fashion.” I observed that there are many regions along the international boundary over which neither Islamabad nor Kabul appear to exercise complete control. Amin responded that his govt could easily allow trouble to exfiltrate over into Pakistan from its side, but, until now, has ensured that this has not happened.

5. When I described the recent Pakistani return of the Afghan MIG–17 as a cooperative, friendly gesture of good will, Amin acknowledged that Islamabad had indeed handled that affair well, and commented, “we appreciated it.” However, this single act did not, in his mind, outweigh the Pakistani machinations of which he complained earlier.

6. While on the topic of Afghan-Pakistani relations, I reminded Amin that, as Amb Eliot had informed him earlier, the USG “recognizes the existing boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan as the legitimate international border” (ref E). This, I explained, was implicit in our initial recognition of Pakistan in 1947. Without making any specific reference to the information conveyed in ref B, I alerted Amin to the possibility that he might see this USG position reaffirmed publicly. Amin made no comment. I also once more suggested that the best way of discussing concerns which he expressed was through discussions with the Pakistanis.

7. Comment: Amin is continuing to use us to convey Afghanistan’s tough line to Pakistan while his govt apparently avoids any direct confrontation with Pakistani officials at Kabul or Islamabad. Perhaps this is to establish Afghanistan’s case with us, should Kabul eventually elect to undertake some countermeasures. In spite of everything the Pakistani Govt might be trying to do, anti-DRA operations are probably still being supported through the traditionally porous frontier. Such activities as exist may well be undertaken by Afghan dissident elements who might, from time to time, seek sanctuary in Pakistani territory. The Afghans presumably want to hold Islamabad accountable and force the Pakistanis to increase their control efforts.

Dubs

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780335–0359. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Dacca, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, USLO Peking, Tehran, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Telegram 204821 to Islamabad, August 13, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780331–0555.
3. In telegram 203315 to Islamabad, August 11, the Department provided guidance following a meeting in Islamabad between Newsom and Zia, July 16, in which Zia “stated that Pakistan needed firm USG support with unmistakable guarantees of territorial integrity that would be credible as a deterrent against Afghan encroachments.” The telegram instructed the Embassy that it was authorized to advise Zia that the “U.S. position with respect to Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan remains unchanged from that set forth in the SEATO Council communiqué of March 8, 1956. The relevant portion of that communiqué reads as follows: ‘Insofar as these (Soviet) statements referred to ‘Pakhtoonistan’, the members of the Council severally declared that their governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780328–1136) The telegram, which was also sent to Moscow and Kabul, stated that it was not necessary to repeat the assurance to Zia either to the Soviet Union or the DRA.
4. Telegram 7625 from Islamabad, August 6, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780322–0413.
5. Telegram 6240 from Kabul, August 1, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780314–1010.
6. Telegram 4802 from Kabul, June 13, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780246–1035.