Much of the future of our relationship to the Soviet Union and to Europe
hinges on the evolution of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The marker
has been laid down by us, by the Europeans, and by the Islamic countries
that the Soviets must withdraw their troops.
The Soviets, however, have made it clear that they will not withdraw their
troops as long as the Parchamist government is threatened. Some type of
compromise will ultimately be necessary if we are to avoid a long-term
Soviet presence and a gradual erosion of the policies we have adopted in
response to the Afghan invasion.
I would appreciate your comments and your recommendation on whether we should
get a small group together to look further at this issue.2
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of State4
A Possible Way Out for Afghanistan
Here, for consideration, is a possible approach to resolving the Afghan
crisis. It would propose the establishment of a four power commission
with two non-aligned Islamic states and two Warsaw Pact states as
members, the withdrawal of Soviet troops and their replacement by troops
of non-aligned Islamic and Warsaw Pact nations, the establishment of a
more broadly-based government under a Parchamist president, and a
guarantee of Afghanistan’s non-alignment by the states of the commission
and the U.S. and the USSR.
Assumption:
—The primary U.S. interest is to get
Soviet troops out of proximity to the Persian Gulf in southern
Afghanistan and to reduce Soviet influence in that country.
—Sanctions and other measures against the Soviet Union are not likely to
result in their withdrawal from Afghanistan. The US faces an erosion of
support for Afghan-related sanctions against the Soviet Union and of
opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the Third World
unless there is genuine momentum toward a solution.
—The Soviets would probably like to find a way to reduce their direct
involvement in Afghanistan, but they are not likely to withdraw if it
means the destruction of the Parchamist revolution. A compromise
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solution which protects Soviet
interests as they see them is, therefore, necessary.
—A direct US initiative is likely to be rejected by the Soviet Union. A
successful initiative must not have a U.S. label.
—An accommodation between the Parchamists and at least some of the
Islamic revolutionary forces in Afghanistan cannot be ruled out.
(Intelligence suggests that Babrak may already be in touch with some
Islamic leaders.)
Elements of a Solution
1. A four power commission consisting of two non-aligned nations which
are members of the Islamic Conference, two Warsaw Pact nations, and, as
non-voting members, Pakistan and Iran. All member nations should have
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. (One possible composition:
Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, and Sudan.) The functions of the commission
would be to:
—Bring about an immediate cease-fire
—Supervise the replacement of Soviet troops by Warsaw Pact troops north
of the Hindu Kush and non-aligned Muslim troops south of the Kush with
mixed forces in Kabul. Such replacement to be completed within six
months.
—Supervise the retraining and reforming of the Afghan army and their
replacement of both Warsaw Pact and non-aligned forces; this to be
accomplished within one year.
—Supervise the return of refugees.
—Oversee the establishment of and functioning of a broadly-based
acceptable government.
—Oversee the resumption of international development aid to
Afghanistan.
2. A government under a Parchamist (Babrak or another) as President with
a Prime Minister and at least one-half of the cabinet to be appointed
from non-Parchamist Islamic elements acceptable to the commission. The
nominees for Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister,
Interior Minister and Minister of Information must be agreed to by all
members of the commission.
3. Creation of an Afghanistan rehabilitation fund by the Islamic
nations.
4. Guarantee of Afghanistan’s non-alignment and neutrality by the powers
in the commission, plus the Soviet Union and the United States.
Procedure
1. The United States would float the idea with a friendly power which
would then carry it forward without a U.S. label. We could
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do this either directly to an Islamic country
(Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Tunisia) or with one of our European
allies which would, in turn, discuss the question with the Islamic
countries directly concerned.
2. The idea would be proposed and adopted by the council of the Islamic
nations which would choose a group to present it to Babrak.
(Supplementary approaches would be made to the USSR.)
3. When agreement is reached on an approach by all parties concerned, it
would then be put before the Security Council for approval. The
four-nation commission would report to the Security Council.
Arguments
Pro
—If approved, it would expedite the departure of the Soviet forces from
Afghanistan.
—It would remove the Afghan matter as a major obstacle to cooperation
with the Soviet Union in other fields. (e.g., arms control)
—It would avoid the almost certain erosion of support for our present
policies on Afghanistan.
—It would remove Warsaw Pact military presence to north of the Hindu
Kush.
Con
—Communist influence would clearly be established and recognized in
Afghanistan by the international community.
—Such a solution would mean the end of the open armed opposition to the
Parchamists and of international support for that opposition.
—The proposal contains elements difficult to achieve, such as the
introduction of non-Parchamist elements into the government and the
agreement of the Soviets to permit non-communist forces to replace
theirs in the South.
—A proposal of this kind at this time could conceivably undercut the
recent resolutions of the Islamic Conference which called for the
complete and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces.5
