277. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
8339. Special encryption. Subject: Ambassador Watson’s Call on Foreign Minister Gromyko. Ref: (A) State 135799, (B) State 137543.2
1. (S—Entire text)
2. Summary: I had a wide-ranging discussion with Gromyko on various issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations and, drawing on Department’s instructions, made a general presentation of our views on these subjects. On the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, Gromyko repeated the Soviet position that responsibility for normalization of relations and repairing the damage is that of the United States administration. He took an uncompromising line on the Afghanistan question and urged the U.S. to “be more or less objective” so that “a common language can be found” to resolve this issue. He said the U.S. underestimated the significance of the May 14 Afghan proposal.3
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
5. Afghanistan4
You emphasize that Afghanistan is the main event which has brought about the deterioration in relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and which is responsible for the general deterioration in the international situation. We categorically reject this. We believe that the problem has been artificially exaggerated. Afghanistan is not the main problem, especially if it is viewed factually. In any event, Afghanistan should not be viewed as a problem resulting in negative consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations and for international relations in general. The U.S. completely distorts the meaning of Soviet actions and the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan. We introduced those [Page 742] forces to help Afghanistan repel aggression and did so according to the UN Charter and our treaty with the Government and leadership of Afghanistan. We have not violated anything by that action and have acted in accordance with international law. We categorically reject all these distortions of the situation which are made by Washington. We shall withdraw our forces after we are requested to do so from the Afghan Government and, of course, if there is such a request. Also, our withdrawal is dependent on whether or not interference and intervention cease from Pakistan and Iran and they stop fighting against the legitimate Government of Afghanistan. The withdrawal of our forces will be accomplished also when an agreement is reached and it is guaranteed. The question of a withdrawal of our forces before that is beside the point. Those who raise such questions are wasting not only their time but our time. We have expressed our position publicly and Leonid Brezhnev has done so on more than one occasion. Our position has been explained to the United States and I repeated it the last time in my meeting with Secretary Muskie.5 Our position should be clear to you. Why does the U.S. continue to take such an unrealistic position on Afghanistan after all these explanations? We are aware of what Washington and the West wish to see happen (in Afghanistan) but are you prepared to take a realistic position? If the U.S. were prepared to be more or less objective, a common language can be found but, I repeat, only if you are prepared to look objectively at the situation and take an objective position.
Concerning the Afghan proposal which was recently made and which the U.S. has been critical of, it seems to us that the U.S. underestimates the significance of that proposal. If you do wish to settle the situation around Afghanistan, your attitude would be different. The Afghan proposal is aimed at normalizing the situation around Afghanistan, including Pakistan. It is a good basis for normalizing the situation.
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
14. Upon the completion of Gromyko’s remarks I told him that I would, of course, communicate what he said to my government and that it would be useless at this point to try to address each point he had made, many of which I took strong objection to. I then singled out some of his key statements for rebuttal and made the following comments.
15. Since the beginning of our relationship with the Soviet Union we think there has not been anything that parallels the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan which was recognized as a non-aligned state. I stressed the importance of the historical implications of the Soviet [Page 743] Union’s actions and that they had endangered international stability and peace. The Soviet Union must understand this. It is now necessary to find a way to make some progress in removing tensions lest the world situation become even more dangerous. In this respect the Soviet Union must live up to its responsibilities as a world power.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Watson-Gromyko meeting, 5/26/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. For the full text of this telegram, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 279.↩
- Telegram 135799 to Moscow is dated May 23. In telegram 137543 to Moscow and other posts, May 24, the Department provided policy guidance for discussions with Eastern European governments in response to a “tough speech” delivered by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petar Mldanov that was highly critical of U.S. policy. With regard to Afghanistan, the Department emphasized: “There should be no doubt about the cause of the current heightened tension in the world. It is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which has challenged the premise of international relations and had a profoundly negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–2034 and D800255–0782, respectively)↩
- See Document 270.↩
- The following is a continuation of Gromyko’s remarks.↩
- See Document 272.↩