Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

270. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Muskie’s Delegation in Vienna¹

Washington, May 15, 1980, 0105Z

127465/Tosec 30031. For Secretary’s party—pass Amb Shulman before 7:00 a.m. local. Subject: March [May] 14, Afghan Statement on Political Solution.

1. (Confidential—Entire text).

2. TASS has broadcast text of March [May] 14 Afghan Government statement on elements of a regional political solution to Afghanistan crisis. You will be receiving text septel.²

3. Analysis: Our preliminary analysis of new proposal is that it contains main points of April 17 “Babrak” plan with embellishments along the lines of Dobrynin’s April 19 comment to Secretary Vance (your briefing material contains background on the “Babrak plan”).³ Specifically, the statement contains the following “new” elements:

—explicit identification of the U.S. and USSR as guarantor of any political settlement; and

—recognition of the need to resolve “in the context of political settlement . . . the question of withdrawal from Afghanistan’s territory of the Soviet limited military contingent.”

4. On withdrawal, the statement repeats standard Soviet and Afghan formulation that “an end to armed invasions and guarantees that neither invasions nor any other forms of interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs will be resumed would eliminate the causes which made Afghanistan turn to the USSR.” The statement also notes that “in concrete terms, the withdrawal . . . will depend on the resolution of the question of effective guarantees of bilateral agreements” with Pakistan and with Iran. Thus, as in previous proposals, withdrawal is made contingent on a prior end to hostilities in Afghanistan on Soviet/DRA terms and on prior direct negotiations with and hence legitimization of the Babrak regime.

5. The timing of the statement suggests its purpose is to take the heat off Kabul at the Islamic Conference meeting starting today in Islamabad and running through May 21.⁴ The DRA is doubtless aware of the intent of Conference Secretary General Chatti to introduce at the meeting a “new” neutrality proposal along the lines of the Carrington plan previously shrugged off by Moscow.⁵ The Soviets may also intend to push the new Afghan formulation at the Warsaw Pact meeting.

6. Press guidance—Following press guidance is being used by the Department:

Q. What is your reaction to the Afghan Government’s proposal that it hold talks with Pakistan and Iran regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan?

A. We have seen press reports of the proposal. Our initial assessment is that it is not substantially different from previously articulated positions, is aimed at the legitimization of the Babrak regime rather than anything else, and is obviously timed to attempt to influence discussions at the Islamic Conference.

7. We regard this initiative as a propaganda device designed to affect the outcome of the Islamic Conference and prevent condemnation of the Soviet action and the actions of the puppet Babrak government. While we think it important to downplay this new proposal and Soviet efforts to describe it as a means of reaching an acceptable political solution to the problem of Afghanistan, we recognize the importance of allied support for our position. This is particularly true regarding the French, British and Germans who have been discussing possible neutrality proposals with us. We suggest the following talking points which could be used with key Islamic countries by ourselves and allies who have been in touch with attendees at Islamic Conference.

—We welcome this first explicit mention of the withdrawal of Soviet troops which in our view must be the central focus of any acceptable political settlement of the Afghan problem.

—Unfortunately, withdrawal element appears to be only cosmetic in nature, following as it does recognition of Babrak government, legitimization of Soviet invasion and an end to the resistance of the Afghan nationalists.

—This first Afghan mention of withdrawal in the context of a political settlement may indicate that they and the Soviets are feeling the costs of their action. If so it is important all concerned countries keep political pressure up to attain prompt and complete Soviet withdrawal.

—In our view this can best be achieved by continuing to emphasize Soviet responsibility for the crisis and by continuing to insist that only proposals which focus on withdrawal deserve discussion.⁶

8. For Jidda, Rabat and Islamabad: You should make available foregoing analysis and draw on the talking points in para 7 in discussions with host governments and suggest in the case of Jidda and Rabat that they may wish to convey our thoughts to their delegations at the conference.

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Afghanistan: Current—7/80. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Also sent Immediate to the Embassy in Vienna for Watson, Jidda, Rabat, and Islamabad. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow, Kabul, and the White House. Drafted by Parris and Barry (EUR/SOV); cleared in S/MS, EUR, NEA, S/P, EUR/SOV, S/S, and S/S–O; and approved by Newsom.
2. The text was transmitted in telegram 127922 to the Secretary’s delegation, May 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800006–0345)
3. See Document 255.
4. The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, which met May 17–22 in Islamabad, adopted a resolution that condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and established a committee to consult with all concerned parties and resolve the situation on the basis of Soviet troop withdrawal; recognition of the Afghan people’s right to choose their own form of government; respect for the independence, integrity, and non-aligned status of Afghanistan; and creation of conditions that would allow the refugees to return. (Marvine Howe, “Islamic Conference Ends; Afghanistan Talks Proposed,” New York Times, May 23, 1980, p. A10) An article in the President’s Daily Brief, June 11, reported that the USSR “quickly rejected” the proposals on Afghanistan arising from the conference. The brief characterized the proposals as calling for the formation of a “broad-based” government that could still be headed by Karmal, followed by Soviet withdrawal to be monitored by an international force; and selection of a national committee of tribal leaders to determine the future form of Afghan government. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—June 1980, PDBs)
5. See footnote 4, Document 225.
6. An article in the National Intelligence Daily, May 16, assessed the Afghan statement as follows: “The new plan does not substantially change Moscow’s longstanding position that Soviet forces cannot be withdrawn until the insurgency has ended and a government friendly to the USSR is firmly in power. Moscow recognizes that a pro-Soviet regime could not survive after a Soviet withdrawal, and the proposal is little more than a Soviet-sponsored attempt to promote international acceptance of the Afghan regime and Soviet intervention.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—May 1980, NIDs)