Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

267. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Spiers) to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, May 9, 1980

SUBJECT

• Afghanistan Covert Action Program

On December 28, 1979—two days after Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan—we expanded the already initiated U.S. covert action program there to include for the first time the supply of lethal weapons to the insurgents.² Prior to that date, our program had consisted essentially of covert media efforts (radio broadcasts and leaflet distribution within Afghanistan), as well as of the provision of some food, medicine, and tactical radio equipment (for field combat use) to various guerrilla groups.

The arms being furnished currently are Soviet-made rifles, submachine guns, machine guns, ammunition, mines, and anti-tank launchers and rockets. These items, at first drawn from CIA reserve stocks, but now bought by CIA on the international arms market, move in USAF C–141 aircraft [less than 1 line not declassified] to Saudi Arabia, and then by Saudi C–130s to Pakistan. No American personnel in Pakistan are in any way involved in the logistics machinery or in training Afghans, though a few Egyptian Specialists may be present. The training function is performed by Pakistani personnel, who, if necessary, have received special training from Americans in Saudi Arabia. The CIA Station Chief in Islamabad works out all of the operational details with Pakistani intelligence and President Zia.

The most critical gap in Afghan rebel armament has been the absence of means to shoot down Soviet helicopters and aircraft. Egypt has now donated 15 Soviet-made SA–7 shoulder-held anti-aircraft rocket launchers, with a small supply of missiles. CIA is purchasing additional such weapons on the international market, through devious cut-outs, from a Bulgarian source. As of one week ago, Pakistan had not yet taken the final decision on whether to transfer the SA–7s, because Zia recognizes that this would be a major escalation of outside support to the insurgents, which could trigger a sharp Soviet reaction. However, CIA believes that Zia will bite this bullet too.

Pakistani cooperation in the program has been exemplary—and completely divorced from the troubles that bedevil the US-Pakistani political relationship. However, this collaboration was put into jeopardy in mid-January [mid-February] by reports on the program, attributed to White House officials, which appeared in the Washington Post and New York Times. Zia was outraged and has made it perfectly clear that Pakistan will stop all participation if there are any further leaks.³

Background. Interagency consideration of covert action in support of Afghan elements in opposition to the Marxist Taraki regime first took place in the Special Coordination Committee for Intelligence (SCC–I) on April 6, 1979, when the regime was one year old.⁴ The first two Presidential findings and notifications to the Congress under the Hughes-Ryan Act were dated July 3.⁵ One covered media activities, the other propaganda operations and provision of cash or non-lethal supplies in a total amount of $695,000. Further SCC–I reviews on July 31 and in mid-October led to a Presidential finding, dated November 7, authorizing cash, communications equipment and procurement advice worth [amount not declassified].⁶ The December 28 finding on lethal weapons related to another [less than 1 line not declassified] authorization, and an additional [amount not declassified] to be matched by a like sum from the Saudis, was authorized in February.

Notification of Congress. Congressional notifications pursuant to Hughes-Ryan were made for each finding. A Subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings on the program on December 20, at which the Department was represented.⁷ The [amount not declassified] authorized after the February 27 SCC–I meeting necessitated replenishing [less than 1 line not declassified] which led to hearings before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee at which a Department representative appeared.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989 (Not for the System, Evening Reading, Personnel Sensitive), Lot 92D630, Box 1, Not for the System: Jan–Jun 1980. Secret; Sensitive; Not for the System. Drafted by Mark. Sent through Newsom. The memorandum was presumably meant to brief Muskie, who became Secretary of State May 9, on the Afghan covert action program.
2. See Document 107.
3. See footnote 3, Document 209.
4. See Document 48.
5. See footnote 5, Document 53.
6. See Document 76.
7. Not found.
8. Not found.