Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

209. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 15, 1980

SUBJECT

• India/Soviet

In an interesting and very frank discussion with Mr. Nathan of the Indian Embassy, he made the following points:

—Although the Gromyko visit to New Delhi was not the “disaster” it was reported to be in the Western media, he said he could assure me that what Gromyko heard from Mrs. Gandhi was the strongest opposition to the continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan that he was likely to hear from any country outside the U.S.² The Indian line, reportedly, was that they were not prepared to pass judgment on the Soviet motives in sending troops into Afghanistan in the first place, but that they cared very deeply about their continued presence there and the dangers which this posed to Indian security. The Soviets were urged to pull back their forces to about the 6,000–10,000-man presence they had prior to the invasion.

—The Indians have made a comparable approach to Karmal via a special emissary who had known him in the past. Nathan suspected that Karmal’s subsequent statement that there were only 10,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan reflected his understanding that that would be a more acceptable level of Soviet force presence.

—In a very delicate reference to the Post story about support for the Afghan resistance, he noted that one of the dangers of the Soviet presence was the inevitable temptation to go after rebel sanctuaries.³ That would mean a widening of the war and raise additional fears in India.

—If the Soviets do cross the border, the loudest voice of concern and opposition will be the Indians who do not want to see the Pakistani buffer removed. In their view, however, it is best not to tempt fate by mounting a major and organized resistance effort from Pakistan which will perpetuate the Soviet presence in the name of self-defense and which will eventually draw them into a wider conflict in the Subcontinent. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1–3/80. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Brement and Thornton. “ZB has seen” is stamped in the upper right corner of the memorandum.
2. Gromyko was in India February 12–14. The characterization of the visit as a “disaster” is likely a reference to several news stories that reported India’s “failure” to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan. See, for example, Tyler Marshall, “India Apparently Fails to Sway Soviets on Afghanistan Pullout,” Los Angeles Times, February 14, 1980, p. B8; and Stuart Auerbach, “Soviets Reject Indian Plea to Withdraw Troops,” Washington Post, February 14, 1980, p. A24.
3. A likely reference to Michael Getler, “U.S. Reportedly is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents,” Washington Post, February 15, 1980, p A1. Referring to this and other news stories, telegram 1487 from Islamabad, February 19, summarized a conversation between Hummel and Shahi, during which Shahi conveyed Zia’s “very deep concern about these evident leaks,” which raised his concern about whether Pakistan “can confide in U.S. officials and leaders and take their word in return for face value.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 2–3/80) In a memorandum to Vance and Brzezinski, February 27, Turner relayed similar comments made by Lieutenant General Akhtar, who was instructed by Zia to convey the following message regarding the Afghan covert action program: “President Zia and I are greatly incensed at leaks by U.S. officials about support to Afghan tribesmen. Our future cooperation will be jeopardized if there are similar leaks in the future. Some advisors close to General Zia have suggested that the U.S. Government has done this deliberately to turn Moscow completely against Pakistan and force Pakistan to accept U.S. aid on U.S. terms. I find it difficult to believe after recent talks with Dr. Brzezinski that this is possible. However, my own position and credibility are being undermined by such leaks and my efforts to improve U.S.-Pakistani relations cannot succeed under such circumstances. President Zia and I request your understanding and cooperation to prevent any further leaks.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 2, 1979 ES Sensitive, February 1–29)