76. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee
Meeting1
Washington, October 23, 1979, 4:30–5:30 p.m.
SUBJECT
PARTICIPANTS
-
State
- David Newsom, Under
Secretary for Political Affairs
-
OSD
- Secretary Harold
Brown
- W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy Secretary
-
JCS
- Lt. Gen. John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman
-
DCI
- Admiral Stansfield
Turner
- Frank Carlucci, Deputy
Director
- [name not declassified] Deputy
Chief/LA/DDO
- [name not declassified] Deputy
Chief/NE/DDO
- [name and title not
declassified]
-
Justice
- Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
-
OMB
- Dr. John White, Deputy Director
-
White House
- Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Chairman
- Donald Gregg
- Hedley Donovan
-
NSC
[Page 207]
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Afghanistan.]2
The proposals on Afghanistan were discussed in
detail.3
CIA representatives pointed out that they
followed naturally on the actions that had already been undertaken as a
result of the Presidential Finding of 3 July 1979.4 The State Department representative suggested that all
further actions supporting the Afghan rebels be deferred until spring so
that we could see how the insurgency fared through the winter months, but
all other members of the committee felt the need to act now was urgent. The
Chairman stressed the political importance of demonstrating to Saudi Arabian
leaders that we were serious in opposing Soviet inroads in Afghanistan and
the likelihood that a substantial commitment of assistance on our part would
result in increased Saudi willingness to provide support. CIA representatives pointed out that delays of
various kinds were bound to occur even under the best of circumstances but
that decisions made now greatly improved the possibility that some of our
aid could reach rebel forces in time to help them through the strains of the
winter. (S)
The committee concluded by endorsing unanimously a proposal for [amount not declassified] of additional aid for Afghan
rebels, to be provided primarily through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the
form of cash, communications equipment, non-military supplies and
procurement advice. No more than [amount not
declassified] of this sum will be for communications equipment. An
amendment to the Presidential Finding of 3 July 1979 will be prepared. The
Chairman directed CIA to undertake at an
early date a briefing of senior Saudi leaders (specifically Prince Sultan
and Prince Fahd) on Afghanistan and
our decisions on aid for the insurgents. (S)
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
[Page 208]
Tab E5
Option No. 1
Washington, undated
OPTION NO. 1
Provide additional funds to the Afghan insurgents,
jointly (with the Saudis and Pakistanis) and unilaterally, for the
procurement of non-military supplies; and provide additional funds
for the continuation and expansion of propaganda
activities.
1. A 3 July 1979 Presidential Finding authorized CIA to expend up to $695,000 to support the Afghan
insurgents, either unilaterally or through third countries, by providing
cash or non-military supplies; and also authorized CIA propaganda operations in support of
the insurgency. At the time the SCC
discussed this proposal, it was agreed that consideration would be given
in the future to increased support should circumstances indicate
additional funds were warranted.
2. Since receiving this authorization, CIA has expended or obligated $575,000 in FY 79, and has programmed the remaining
$120,000 for FY 80. These funds have
been or will be expended as follows:
—[amount not declassified] in cash payments to the
insurgents and the provision of a limited amount of medical
supplies.
—[amount not declassified] for propaganda
operations.
Pakistani liaison has begun to disburse some of these funds and medical
supplies to insurgents inside Afghanistan. Unilateral assets have
separately transferred funds into Afghanistan, and to insurgent leaders
in Pakistan. Propaganda activities have included the procurement of two
complete radio broadcasting stations which are now in Pakistan awaiting
onward shipment into Afghanistan. A support mechanism to produce
propaganda material, including tapes for broadcast on insurgent radios
and for hand-to-hand passage inside Afghanistan, has been created and is
in operation.
3. The Afghan insurgency has intensified and spread, and Afghan
Government forces are increasingly stretched thin in their efforts to
suppress it. At the same time, it is clear that the insurgents continue
to lack funds and as yet are uncoordinated. The Soviets appear to have
stepped up their support to the Afghan Government. It is likely that
this winter will see something of a hiatus in military operations by [Page 209] both sides—a result of the
insurgents’ shortage of supplies and the DRA’s likely desire to reorganize in the wake of both a
long spring/summer campaign and recent political changes in Kabul.
4. It is too early to estimate precisely what effect the limited funding
may have had on the insurgency. Indeed, some of the funds are still in
the pipeline and have not yet reached the insurgents. The creation of a
production mechanism to prepare propaganda materials, and the delivery
of two radio transmitters to Pakistan to give the insurgents their “own
radio” are significant steps. However, the effect of a propaganda
operation is incremental and is part of a larger effort. The
intensification of the insurgency will be abetted by these support
efforts.
5. The insurgents have a continued critical need for funds. Timing is
important. The current need is particularly relevant in view of both the
expected hard winter, which will impede any resupply efforts, and an
anticipated increase in Afghan Government pressure on the
insurgents—possibly this winter, almost certainly in the spring.
Specific proposals on expending this sum are:
—An approach to the Saudis stating that we have already provided aid to
the insurgents—citing funds, medical supplies, and radio broadcast
transmitters. We would tell the Saudis that we wish to provide
additional aid—[amount not declassified] for
non-military support—and would inform the Saudis of our interest in
discussing what support they may wish to provide in concert with our
efforts. (This step is intended to accomplish several ends: to spur
significant Saudi contributions, thus increasing the total amount of aid
provided; to give evidence to the Saudis of the U.S. Government’s determination, expressed in concrete
terms, to oppose communism; and to meet a recent Pakistani liaison
request for our assistance in coordinating external support for the
insurgents.) [less than 1 line not declassified]
informal discussions with the Saudis indicated Saudi receptivity.
—Depending on our discussions with the Saudis, we may subsequently
participate in joint discussions with the Saudis and Pakistanis on
coordinated support to the insurgency.
—[amount not declassified] would be reserved for
unilateral passage to insurgents or for subsequent passage to
liaison.
—[amount not declassified] would be utilized to
continue and expand propaganda activities, including support for
insurgent clandestine radio broadcasts.
Risk: Operational risks are low. However, the insurgency has placed great
strain on the Afghan Army and challenges the continued survival of the
Government. To counter this, the Soviets have gradually augmented their
military advisory presence, and the role of Soviet troops has
increasingly changed from an advisory one to active partici[Page 210]pation in and supervision of
anti-insurgent military operations. It is possible that further
insurgent successes might prompt still greater Soviet involvement, which
could range from still more advisors and equipment to the use of Soviet
combat units. (TAB D)
Cost: [amount not declassified] (for breakdown,
see above)
Tab F6
Option No. 2
Washington, undated
Option No. 2
Provide tactical military communications
equipment to the insurgents
1. Discussion:
Prince Turki Ibn Faysal,
Director of the Saudi Arabian General Intelligence Service, recently
recommended to [2 lines not declassified].
Prince Turki expressed concern at
what he perceived as U.S. failure to
defend its own (and by implication, Saudi Arabia’s) interests in such
areas as Zaire, Iran, Somalia and Afghanistan. At the same time,
Turki recognized the
difficulties which the U.S. would have
encountered in intervening in these areas overtly. He implicitly
recognized that U.S.-Saudi collaboration
could provide a means for masking U.S.
support of friendly elements in Middle East crisis areas.
2. Turki suggested a number of
areas for such collaboration, including Afghanistan. He stated that his
government was providing limited support to the insurgents. In addition,
he mentioned that their insurgent contacts reported that lack of radio
communications was seriously hampering the coordination of their
military activities.
3. It is believed that approaching Turki with a proposal that CIA provide communications equipment to the insurgents,
possibly through Saudi channels and attributable to the Saudis, would
allow us to propose that the Saudis, in addition to our radios, provide
significant funds from their own resources to support the insurgency. If
the Saudis agreed to the proposal, but indicated that they would
prefer—for logistical or other reasons—not to act as “middle-men,” we
would give the radios directly to the Pakistanis, and advise the Saudis
of our action.
4. In addition, this proposal would have the following benefits:
[Page 211]
a. It would reassure the Saudis of the USG’s interest in resisting the spread of communism in
the Middle East;
b. It could develop a precedent for using the Saudis as an
intermediary, concealing U.S.
involvement, to support friendly political elements or other covert
assets elsewhere in the area.
5. The lack of radios to coordinate their activities has placed the
insurgents at a tactical disadvantage vis-à-vis the DRA. It compels the insurgents to operate
on a piece-meal, local basis, and consequently the DRA is able to deal with their raids one
at a time, bringing preponderant strength to bear on the area of the
insurgent attack. Coordinated simultaneous attacks in several areas
would force the DRA to stretch its
forces much more thinly in dealing with these attacks and significantly
improve insurgent chances of success. Radios would also permit rapid
transmission of intelligence on DRA
activities from one insurgent unit to another, and could also be used to
spread propaganda.
6. To establish a basic communications net for the insurgents, we would
provide 16 transceivers with power supply and related equipment: 12 to
serve as active units, and four to be held for spare parts; We would
also provide 100 walkie-talkies for tactical use. All equipment would be
of foreign manufacture or sterile U.S.-made equipment.
Risk: The provision of foreign-made (or marked) radio equipment should
involve relatively little risk of exposure.
Cost: 16 transceivers and related equipment (including delivery)
100 Walkie-talkies [amount not declassified]
[amount not declassified]
Tab G7
Options 3-a, 3-b, and 3-c
Washington, undated
Option No. 3-a
Broker Saudi agreement to pay for
munitions for the insurgents, with the Pakistanis actually making
the purchases abroad
1. Discussion: The Saudis, once made aware of our
willingness to expend significant sums of money aiding the insurgency
(See TABS C & D), could be asked to provide funds for use by the
Pakistanis to purchase munitions. If the Saudis are amenable to this, we
could [Page 212] attempt to broker
meetings between a foreign arms dealer and the Pakistanis (who would
make the actual purchases), and attempt to monitor Pakistani purchases
through this arms dealer.
2. The bulk of the purchases would be ammunition for Soviet-made weapons
captured by the insurgents from Afghan Government forces, although it
may be deemed wise to purchase some ammunition for vintage weapons in
the hands of the insurgents.
3. In addition to ammunition, a small amount of explosives, and perhaps a
limited number of Soviet-made antiaircraft weapons, be purchased.
4. The insurgents are critically short of weapons for use against
Soviet-supplied helicopters and aircraft and are beginning to suffer
significant losses to the weapons systems, which they cannot counter.
Shortages of both light small arms/ammunition and heavier weapons, in
the face of increased pressure from the DRA, may cause the insurgents to lose heart and result in
their being destroyed piecemeal.
RISK: Brokering Saudi payment for lethal military
supplies should involve relatively little risk of exposure.
COST: -0-
Option No. 3-b
Provide the Pakistanis with funds to
purchase munitions abroad for subsequent passage to the
insurgents
1. Discussion: The Pakistani Inter-Service
Intelligence Directorate (ISID) has
advised the CIA Chief of Station that,
in ISID’s opinion, despite the fall of
Asmar and other recent favorable developments, the insurgents remain
very much in need of weapons, ammunition and demolitions. According to
an ISID representative, President
Zia endorses this view and is
anxious that CIA provide this equipment
through the ISID. We have thus far
advised the ISID that we do not have
authorization to provide weapons or ammunition. Nevertheless, the ISID asserts that there are areas in
Afghanistan where the insurgents’ weapons needs are very real. Reporting
indicates that the insurgents are trying to secure new weapons.
Moreover, the insurgency continues to spread, involving a greater number
of irregular forces, while, correspondingly, Soviet aid to the DRA is steadily increasing.
2. If the Saudis do not indicate a willingness to pay for weapons for the
insurgents (Option 3-a), we would attempt to place the ISID in contact with a foreign arms
dealer, and, [less than 1 line not declassified]
monitor Pakistan purchases to verify that funds provided are properly
used. Funds to cover the purchases of ordnance supplies would be
provided by CIA to the Pakistanis.
Comments on the types of munitions involved are noted above and in
Option 3-a.
[Page 213]
RISK: While the risks of exposure are somewhat
higher than in merely brokering Saudi funding of these arms/ammunition
purchases, the Pakistanis are the ostensible purchasers, and thus the
USG can plausibly deny
involvement.
COST: The cost of ammunition/weapons would be
approximately [amount not declassified].
Option No. 3-c
Provide the Pakistanis with munitions
from CIA stocks, and with munitions
purchased by CIA from foreign arms
dealers, with CIA arranging
delivery of these munitions to Pakistan
1. Discussion:
CIA can provide, from its own stocks,
ammunition for Soviet small arms. The advantage in supplying this
ammunition is the speed with which it can be assembled and delivered (in
approximately two weeks). In addition to stocks on hand, supplies of
specialized Soviet-made ammunition and weapons can be purchased by
CIA and shipped to Pakistan,
possibly within two months. CIA could
also provide supplies of demolitions, suitably disguised as to origin,
from its own stocks.
2. Supplies from CIA stocks could be
moved with relative speed to Pakistan and turned over to the Pakistani
service for transfer into Afghanistan.
RISK: This is somewhat more risky than either of
the above options in that CIA is
directly involved in providing the equipment.
COST: [amount not
declassified].
