Office of the Historian

257. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, April 23, 1980, 4–4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—IX

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
    • Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
    • Reginald Bartholomew, Director of Political/Military Affairs

  • Defense

    • Secretary Harold Brown
    • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
    • Robert Komer, Under Secretary for Policy
    • David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International & Security Affairs

  • JCS

    • Lt. General John Pustay

  • CIA

    • Director Stansfield Turner
    • Robert Ames, NIO for Near East & South Asia
    • Charles Cogan, Chief, Near East

  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

  • NSC

    • Colonel William E. Odom
    • General Jasper Welch
[Page 698]

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Special Intelligence Items: Afghanistan/Pakistan

Turner gave a brief update on the program for Afghanistan. Per the SCC’s instructions last week he has offered to help the Pakistanis solve the bottleneck between the Afghanistan border and Islamabad with a C–130. The Pakistani reply has not yet been received. To Harold Brown’s question of why they do not use one of their own C–130s, Turner replied that they prefer an outside source to prevent their own military from knowing about the program.2 (S/S)

It was agreed to report to the President for his approval the CIA offer of a C–130 if the Pakistanis desire it.3 (S/S)

Dr. Brzezinski next raised the issue of making support for the Afghanistan freedom fighters a publicly respectable undertaking rather than a covert activity which we and other countries feel obliged to deny. He argued that by maintaining the covert posture, we are allowing the Soviets to argue cogently the support for the insurgents as wholly illegitimate while their support for insurgency elsewhere is wholly legitimate. (S/S)

Some argued that Zia cannot politically afford an overt program. The Saudis will also protest abandoning the covert mode. Finally, for the U.S. to take the public lead, the effect would be to “de-Islamicize” the program. It was also argued that the present support programs might be jeopardized. (S/S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should not “go public” unless Zia and the Saudis approve, but it might be worth exploring with them. Also, one might encourage other Islamic countries, such as Morocco, to support the public stand that Egypt has already taken. (S/S)

Both Christopher and Harold Brown recommended that we no longer deny support for the Afghanistan insurgents but that we refuse to comment on the matter.4 Both have resorted to that answer to queries recently, and they find the no comment line very effective. (S/S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 112, SCC–305, 4/23/80, Security Framework Follow Up. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote: “Zbig, J” at the top of the page. The portion of the summary of conclusions on base facilities and military exercises in the Persian Gulf area is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 74.↩
  2. Carter underlined the last sentence and wrote: “not logical” in the margin. The summary of conclusions of the April 14 SCC meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box 112, SCC 302, 4/14/80, Security Framework.↩
  3. Carter wrote: “I don’t favor this—particularly if Pak military” after this sentence.↩
  4. Carter wrote: “ok” in the margin.↩