Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

258. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 30, 1980

SUBJECT

• Assistance to the Afghan Rebels: A Vigorous Dissent

At your suggestion, I have looked into the question of whether our aid to Muslim forces in Afghanistan is effective. I discovered that those involved in this effort seem to be enthusiastic, motivated, and convinced that everything reasonable and possible that can be done is being done. I sharply disagree. The reason that our “operators” in this area are relatively sanguine about their efforts is that they accept two basic restrictions—i.e., supply only weapons of Soviet manufacture and work exclusively through the Pakistanis—which I consider unnecessary and unwise. (TS)

It is literally impossible to exaggerate the significance of the outcome of Soviet efforts to crush the Muslim resistance in Afghanistan. If the Soviets succeed, as seems likely, this action will become a powerful precedent within the bureaucracy which will inevitably ensure that we will be faced with other Afghanistans down the road in the 1980’s. Particularly sensitive will be Central America and the Caribbean. Could a United States government, for example, look the other way while a Soviet or a Cuban force of thousands landed in Nicaragua, Honduras, or perhaps even Venezuela, in order to save a self-described progressive government that was going down the drain? Chervonenko, in his recent speech in Paris, said in referring to Allende that the USSR could tolerate no more Chiles.² The implications of that remark are sobering, to say the least. (TS)

It is therefore crucial for us to do everything that we possibly can to make the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan extremely costly to the Kremlin. The Mujahidin, if they had the right kinds of weapons, could considerably impede Soviet mobility and “air-cav” tactics, which give the Soviets an enormous tactical advantage over the resistance forces. Men on horseback are no match for men in helicopters. (TS)

Our efforts thus far have been tentative, piecemeal, and inadequate. The Soviets wiped out 372 insurgents in a single operation the other day. We will be seeing many more such reports in the months ahead if the Mujahidin are not adequately supplied. We should keep in mind that SA–7s are hard to get and very expensive and it is for this reason that we are only planning to supply the Muslims with 85 of these weapons, literally a drop in the bucket. (TS)

At the same time, we must also keep in mind that the Pakistanis are not eager to provide weapons to those who could become future security problems. Punjabis have an inbred reluctance in arming Pathans. They know that the gun pointed against Kabul today might be pointed against Karachi tomorrow. (TS)

Furthermore, we have a natural opening in Zia’s public criticism of the US for not providing greater support to the resistance forces. We should take him at his word. This is especially the case in that political opposition to Zia is mounting and opposition leaders are now calling for rapprochement with the Soviets and the cessation of support for the Mujahidin. All our eggs should not be in Zia’s basket. (TS)

How to Operate. There are 53 Afghan refugee camps along the Pakistan border. We should have at least three agents in each of those camps; ostensibly for refugee relief purposes, but principally to ensure that the Mujahidin are getting the weapons they need. A similar effort should be made in eastern Iran. We should not restrict ourselves to the use of American citizens for this purpose. In addition, we ought to explore and take advantage of traditional gun smuggling routes, which have been used in that part of the world for centuries. There should never be a shortage of the right kinds of weapons in the marketplaces of Peshawar. (TS)

The Right Weapons. Taking into account Afghan tactical needs, as well as maintenance and delivery constraints, we should make it our business to supply the Mujahidin with the following light, easily transportable weapons:

—American anti-helicopter missiles, such as Red-Eyes or Stingers (this would be in addition to the 85 SA–7s. The Mujahidin obviously need hundreds of anti-helicopter weapons).

—Disposable anti-tank weapons (LAW).

—Standard caliber (7.62 mm) rifles (we have huge stocks of M–14 rifles which are no longer used by the US Army and which would be ideal for the resistance fighters).

—Light mortars, which can be easily disassembled and used effectively by men on horseback.

—Simple short-wave two-way radios. (One of the greatest difficulties of the Mujahidin is that they cannot coordinate their operations).

—Small mines (which could be extremely effective in closing lines of communications, thereby forcing the Soviets to expend additional efforts in defending those LOCs).

The Public Line. We could do the above without changing our public line (i.e., we do not comment about matters of this kind) in the slightest. The Soviets have already accused us repeatedly of supplying the rebel forces and have, in fact, used this as their justification for invading Afghanistan. They and their Afghans will make the same amount of noise, which will have roughly the same propaganda effect, whether we are supplying the Mujahidin effectively or ineffectively. I vote for supplying them effectively. How the world turns may ultimately depend on our ability to do so.

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski’s Geographic Files, Box 17, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—Afghanistan, 1/5/80–10/1/80: Soviet Union. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thornton, Odom, Ermarth, Welch, Gregg, and Owen. In the upper right corner, Brzezinski wrote: “DA—Hold a meeting on this, use Carlucci/Komer/Newsom. I tend to agree with MB. We should do more. ZB 5/2/80.” No record of a meeting per Brzezinski’s directive was found. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Aaron saw it. In a May 2 memorandum to Brzezinski (attached but not printed), Thornton characterized Brement’s position as valid but problematic. Arguing against a rapid increase of weapons transfers to the Afghan insurgents, Thornton cited geographic restrictions, increasing (and unwanted) U.S. visibility in the covert action, and the fact that U.S. goals with regard to the Afghan insurgency remained poorly defined. Thornton suggested that Brzezinski hold more meetings to determine the future course of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Both Ermarth and Welch wrote memoranda to Brzezinski, May 2, supporting Brement’s position. Those memoranda are also attached but not printed.
2. Telegram 12604 from Paris, April 17, reported on the speech delivered by Chervonenko, Soviet Ambassador to France. Regarding Afghanistan, Chervonenko hewed to standard Soviet positions that the crisis there was not relevant to U.S. national security and that the Soviet military presence was necessary so long as Afghanistan was threatened by external aggression. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800191–0155)