Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

255. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 19, 1980, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Dobrynin’s Call on Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary of State
• EUR—George S. Vest
• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

SUMMARY: Dobrynin came in to turn down our proposal to have arms control talks in connection with TNF. Other subjects covered were Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, SALT, Soviet harassment of our representatives in Leningrad and future travel plans of the Secretary. End Summary.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

2. Afghanistan.

Secretary asked Dobrynin to clarify what was indeed the Soviet position on Afghanistan. Dobrynin said that the Babrak Government had a good proposal (publicly announced by the Afghanistan Government on April 17).² The first step would be a discussion among the three neighboring countries—Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan—about their borders. The Soviets supported that idea because, after all, there had been historically much trouble about those borders. The decision could create a peaceful atmosphere and if some countries wanted to guarantee the results such as the Soviets, the U.S. or European countries, the Soviets would be prepared for it. A second step would be to enlarge the discussions leading to a pact of non-interference, disarmament, etc., among the three neighbors, and of course there could be guarantees for this as well. A third step, which seemed not likely to be acceptable, might be to enlarge the discussions and to talk about the military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Secretary pressed two questions—would the Soviets be willing to withdraw their forces, and can the Afghanistanese choose their own government? Dobrynin thought that the Soviet forces would most naturally withdraw after the conclusion of Step I although this might happen in the course of the discussions to Step II as well. (With further questioning, Dobrynin on this point was evasive.) He emphasized that border crossing on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was and is a large problem, but he thought that once the border was agreed and sealed it would create a situation where the Soviets could withdraw. He then turned to his proposal and urged, what was wrong with discussing the Afghanistan idea? The Secretary responded that the Afghanistan Government in no way represented the Afghanistan people, and returned to his point asking, can the Afghanistanese choose their own government? Babrak is no real representative. He pressed then the question—does an Afghanistan Government have to be acceptable to the Soviets? Dobrynin responded that obviously the Soviets did not want a hostile government, but otherwise were quite open about the form of government. The Secretary responded then that Dobrynin was insisting on a Soviet-installed government. Dobrynin replied that, you say it so.

Dobrynin gave a long comment on the nature of Afghanistan, the social changes. He said that it is a land that where for decades there has been fighting and discontent. This has been particularly true in more recent years where the landlords’ holdings have been exploited after centuries of depression. The Soviets he said had had problems of a similar nature in the Asiatic areas of Russia, which had continued right on through until 1930. There were similarities here—of race, of peoples who move back and forth across borders, of the relationship between peasants and landlords. Today in Afghanistan he recognized that perhaps not many of the people are in favor of the Russians, but they are in favor of the social changes in recent years. A real civil war is going on in Afghanistan between the old and the new, and it is not all that simple to define. If the main U.S. concern is that the Soviets are pushing to the Ocean, the Soviets could settle this by giving guarantees because they don’t have that objective. If it is a question of borders and the future of Pakistan, then why not have it talked out along the lines of the Babrak proposal?

The Secretary said of our concerns that Pakistan was a buffer state and we could live with it, but now it is not, and the Soviets have 85,000 troops there.³ The fact is that the Soviets are on the borders of Pakistan—that much closer to the Indian Ocean and we cannot be certain of what are the Soviet intentions. Would the Soviets accept a non-aligned government in Afghanistan? Dobrynin said yes, but it must not be hostile to the Soviets. The Secretary again questioned, do you accept the concept of a buffer state in Afghanistan? Dobrynin said yes, but remember that over the past 15 years there have been changes in the social structure and land reforms so that a buffer state would not be simply a reversion to the period of Daoud. The Secretary asked whether the 3-step proposal of Dobrynin had to take place step by step, or if some could take place at the same time. Dobrynin replied that it is probably simpler to proceed step by step, but there was no objection to a mixture. Sticking to his primary point, he repeated that the Afghanistanese are interested in the first step and the Soviets therefore support him.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, CV—AD, 4/19/80. Secret. Drafted by Vest. The meeting took place in Vance’s office. The main points of the discussion on Afghanistan were relayed in telegram 107514 to Bonn and other posts, April 23. (Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Memcons: April, May, June 1980)
2. On April 17, the Afghan Government announced its intention to attempt to normalize relations with Iran and Pakistan. News reports quoted unnamed Western diplomats who characterized the move as a Soviet-directed attempt to mitigate the international boycott of the Soviet-hosted Olympics and to dampen worldwide condemnation of Soviet policies in Afghanistan. See Kevin Klose, “Afghanistan Seeks to Open Talks to Mend Ties with Iran, Pakistan,” Washington Post, April 18, 1980, p. A26.
3. An unknown hand bracketed “Pakistan,” and wrote “Afgh” above it and placed a question mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph; a suggestion that Vest had inadvertently confused the two countries.