254. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Spiers) to Secretary of State Vance1
Afghanistan: The Soviets Settle In
Since their invasion in December, the Soviets have encountered more resistance and instability in Afghanistan than they anticipated. Yet, despite several thousand Soviet casualties and continued international criticism, there are no indications that Moscow is seriously considering any change in its basic policy of preserving a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. Its words and actions suggest that it hopes to ride out the present difficult situation, slowly—very slowly—rebuild the Afghan army and government, and avoid being forced to commit still larger numbers of Soviet forces to achieve its aim.
Insurgency Continues, Regime Shaky
Three months after the Soviet-engineered coup that brought it to power, the Babrak Karmal regime has still been unable to garner significant popular support and remains in power only because of the presence of Soviet troops. The insurgents continue to threaten major urban areas, while constantly ambushing and engaging Soviet and Afghan troops in the countryside. Within the government itself, there remains a bitter Khalqi-Parchamist rivalry, and recently, new rumors of coup plotting have surfaced. Internationally, the Babrak Karmal regime has failed to win any important recognition outside of the Soviet bloc and its hangers-on.
Although the rebels cannot stand up to concerted Soviet military strikes, their hit-and-run tactics have thus far made any Soviet gains temporary. Soviet forces can pacify an area or province, but once withdrawn, the rebels return. While the Soviets have been able to restore a semblance of order in Kabul after last February’s riots and general strike, they have only been able to do so by assuming more and more of the security burden themselves.2 Even with this greater Soviet role, however, there is no guarantee that Kabul and other cities will not erupt again.
[Page 690]The USSR’s growing military and security involvement has been necessitated by the continued disintegration of the Afghan forces. The Afghan army currently has little more than 30,000 men; it is questionable whether it could field more than 10,000 at any one time. Soviet military officials in Afghanistan have reportedly complained about the Afghan army’s disarray and have expressed grave doubts about its loyalty.
No Change in Sight
The current situation in Afghanistan—and the likelihood that it will continue for some time—raises the question of whether the Soviets are approaching the point at which they will have to decide to increase substantially their military commitment in order to eradicate the insurgency once and for all or pursue some sort of political solution that would allow them to extricate themselves from what is quickly becoming the Afghan quagmire. While there are indications that at least individual officials in the Soviet ministry of foreign affairs and military have grave doubts about the wisdom of the present Soviet course, there are no signs that Moscow is now seriously rethinking its policy. Indeed, the present situation in Afghanistan may well have confirmed the Soviet leadership in the wisdom of its decision to intervene in the first place on the grounds that if the USSR had not, the situation would be far worse.
Despite Moscow’s insistence that it is in favor of a political solution to the Afghan problem, the Soviets have rebuffed any initiatives requiring compromises on their part and have meanwhile stiffened their own maximalist position. In discussions in March with the French and British, for example, the Soviets insisted that the US and Afghanistan’s neighbors must “guarantee” that all outside interference in Afghanistan has ceased, and would not resume, before Moscow would even consider withdrawing its troops. Lately, they hinted that any solution must include the entire region and that “guarantees” of non-intervention must also include Iran.
Over the last two months, the Soviets have made it clear that the Afghan Marxist revolution is an historical fact and must be preserved and protected. Their public support for the Babrak Karmal regime as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan has been complete, though rumors abound that they are seeking a more effective Afghan puppet than Babrak. In reply to Western and Iranian proposals to discuss the “neutralization” of Afghanistan, Moscow has insisted that neither the “socialist” nature of the Afghan government nor its international status can be open for outsiders to negotiate.
At the same time, the Soviets are attempting to portray the Karmal regime as the effective government if Afghanistan capable of carrying [Page 691] out its international obligations, in a perfectly normal manner. In early April, the USSR agreed to a $150 million economic grant for Kabul, and appears to be encouraging the East Europeans to help alleviate the dismal Afghan economic situation and to give the illusion at least of socialist solidarity. Soviet propaganda has extolled the reforms of the Kabul regime and attempted to portray the rebels as, “bandits” controlled by reactionary mullahs and egged on by outside “imperialist” provocateurs. Hardly a week has gone by in which the Soviet media have not highlighted the visit of an Afghan delegation or senior official to the USSR or Eastern Europe. Similarly, the Soviets have given favorable play to the Cuban foreign minister’s recent trip to Afghanistan and have used the occasion to re-emphasize Kabul’s nonalignment.
Soviet Hopes
Although they underestimated the intensity of international and Islamic criticism, the Soviets certainly anticipated some trouble. However, they apparently expected it to be short-lived and no greater in duration and severity than after Czechoslovakia in 1968. In this they were wrong. But they may be heartened by signs of obvious differences in tactical approach between the US, the West Europeans, and Japan on issues of current political, cultural, and economic relationships with the USSR. Moscow is still probably counting on the stake of America’s allies in detente in Europe to lead them to accept the intervention as a fait accompli.
In terms of the regional response to the Soviet action, Moscow may also believe it has seen the worst. Relations with Iran appear no worse than they would have been if there had been no invasion, and, in any case, US-Iranian relations remain in shambles. Similarly, Pakistan has yet to embrace openly the rebel cause and is hesitating to align itself with the US. Moscow probably believes that this is a result of its policy of playing on Islamabad’s fear of Soviet retribution while offering reassurances and increased aid. Moscow probably also judges that the damage to its relations with India has been negligible because of New Delhi’s concern over increased US aid to Pakistan and its suspicions of China. Further afield, the Soviets are probably still calculating that they can eventually refocus Arab attention away from Afghanistan to the Palestinian and Iranian problems and, thus, on the US.
Military Commitment Remains
In any case, Moscow is not backing away from its military commitment in Afghanistan. During Afghan Foreign Minister Dost’s visit to Moscow in March, the Afghans and Soviets signed an agreement on the stationing of forces which provides for the “temporary” presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Presumably, this agreement is similar [Page 692] to those which the USSR has with Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviets have also proceeded with the construction of permanent barracks and garrison areas and are reportedly restructuring some of their units in Afghanistan in order to wage a more effective counterinsurgency campaign.
It can be expected that with the arrival of good weather, Soviets will step up their operations against the rebels. Operations will probably be concentrated in the eastern provinces where the insurgents have been most active. Closing the border with Pakistan to rebel movements will surely be one of the aims. While this offensive will result in considerable bloodshed on both sides, it will probably not be decisive. The resistance may be forced to subside momentarily to regain its breath, but its almost certain revival will continue the attrition of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
Limiting the Cost
The Soviets seem prepared to shoulder the Afghan burden for some time to come, but there are signs that they hope to accomplish their goals without significantly augmenting their forces. Since late February, Soviet troop levels have not greatly increased and now number 85,000 in Afghanistan and another 30,000 involved in the intervention, but held just across the border in the USSR. While they will probably augment these slowly over the next month or so, there are no indications they plan a massive increase. Unless the Soviets dramatically increase these forces—which they may have to consider if operations this spring and early summer falter badly—they remain unlikely to crush the insurgency quickly. However, for now, they seem in no hurry and appear to prefer to test their capability to do the job with their present forces for a full campaign season. Their current game plan for stabilizing the situation includes the start of a long-term effort to rebuild the Afghan armed forces, as well as limited combat engagements for Soviet troops which are enough to hold the major cities and to prevent general deterioration.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 3. Secret. Drafted by Limberg (INR/EEA), April 16. An unknown hand initialed for Spiers. A stamp on the memorandum indicates Newsom saw it on April 18.↩
- See Document 217.↩