217. Editorial Note
In the last week of February 1980, a general strike and large-scale protests in Kabul and other Afghan cities posed the greatest challenge to Soviet control of the country since the intervention in late December 1979. Determined to maintain order in Kabul, the Soviet military moved troops, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters into the center of the city, February 22, in an attempt to break up protesting crowds who were shouting “God is great,” and “death to the Soviets.” ([text not declassified] February 22; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, NIDs) Later that day, Radio Kabul announced the Afghan Government had declared martial law, blaming the “subversive acts” in Kabul on “foreign agents and mercenaries and British, American, Pakistani, and Chinese lackeys.” An intelligence assessment prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, which reported this statement, observed that the protest “further undermines the legitimacy of President Karmal’s regime, sets back the USSR’s timetable for dealing with the insurgent threat in the countryside, and considerably complicates Moscow’s efforts to deal with the negative international consequences of its intervention.” ([text not declassified] February 23; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, NIDs)
Four days later, February 23, another intelligence report prepared in the CIA noted that the shopkeepers’ strike was still at 80–90 percent of its original strength and that the Afghan Government was reported to have made widespread arrests in Kabul, especially targeting minority Hazara tribesmen believed to be at the forefront of the protests. At the same time, the Soviet military had set up checkpoints “along most of the roads leading into the city.” ([text not declassified] February 23; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordi [Page 598] nator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, NIDs)
[text and 2 lines not declassified] (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, PDBs) An article in the President’s Daily Brief, February 27, [text not declassified] referenced an old adage regarding two of the major Soviet news organs [text not declassified]: “There is no news in the Truth (Pravda) and no truth in the News (Izvestia).” The Soviet news outlets alleged that the strike was forced upon Afghan shopkeepers by foreigners and that the rebellion was “past its peak.” (Ibid.) An annex to the same PDB noted that the Kabul rebellion had likely hastened discussions in Moscow regarding next steps in Afghanistan. The annex predicted that the Soviets would opt to send in more troops—possibly in conjunction with another change in Afghan leadership—to deter future rebellions. (Ibid.)
In telegram 826 from Kabul, February 27, the Embassy reported: “While the citizens of Kabul remain tense and nervous, the city has returned to a semblance of normality,” and that the “rumor mill doubts” that Karmal was still in charge because of his absence from public view. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800101–0667) In a concluding analysis, a memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, February 28, noted the strike “demonstrated the ability of anti-Marxists to close down the capital, which previously had not witnessed any previous unrest,” while also illustrating the weakness of the Afghan Government and its complete reliance on the Soviet military to guarantee its position against the Afghan resistance. ([text not declassified]; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, NIDs) An article in the President’s Daily Brief, February 28, surmised that the strike went according to plan and more unrest in Kabul could be expected, while Afghan forces would be “increasingly loath to act against their fellow countrymen.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—February 1980, PDBs)