Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

247. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[memorandum number not declassified]

Washington, April 2, 1980

The Supply of Weapons to the Afghan Nationalist Forces ([classification marking not declassified])

The Afghan insurgents have been relatively successful in avoiding the Soviet offensive in eastern Afghanistan over the past month. While casualties have been high, many insurgents have been able to escape over the border into Pakistan or to fade into the rugged, mountainous terrain. From there, they have mounted successful guerrilla operations aimed at isolated Soviet or Afghan units, lines of communications, and districts not heavily defended by Soviet or Afghan Army forces. In other parts of the country, insurgent activity continues at a high level, and little of the countryside is under government control. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])

The nationalists’ ability to sustain such operations will depend on the continued availability of weapons and ammunition. Needs for equipment vary widely throughout the country, often depending on the Soviets’ ability to disrupt supply links across the Afghan border and on the strength of the Afghan or Soviet forces in the area. Nationalists in the southwestern provinces, who for the most part face undermanned Afghan army and police units, are said to have enough weapons but are short of ammunition. In contrast, in Konarha Province, where insurgents have faced a Soviet assault, they reportedly do not have enough weapons, and those that they do have often have proved ineffective against tanks and assault helicopters. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

So far, the insurgents have obtained the bulk of their weapons—mostly rifles, mortars, machine guns, and occasionally tanks and armored personnel carriers—from retreating or deserting Afghan troops and by ambushing supply convoys. They also obtain weapons through the local arms market in western Pakistan, where they purchase locally manufactured or imported weapons and arms stolen from the Afghan or Pakistani armies. ([classification marking not declassified])

Afghan soldiers still with their units have been a continuing source of material, particularly ammunition. Soldiers regularly cache part of their allotment of ammunition and sell it to the insurgents for cash; the Afghan Army has long had difficulty paying its soldiers on time. Local government officials have struck bargains with nationalist groups, providing food, medicine, and other supplies as well as freedom of movement through government checkpoints in exchange for protection for their families. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The insurgents also receive small amounts of arms from a variety of outside sources, but so far this aid has had a minimal impact on the capabilities of the nationalist forces. ([classification marking not declassified])

—Pakistan has probably provided the most aid so far, although we have little information on the types or amount of equipment it has given the insurgents. Most of the equipment delivered to date apparently has been ammunition, mines, rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades. The Pakistanis have promised additional aid if the exile groups form a viable, united resistance effort, and they reportedly plan to support at least one nationalist group that has already demonstrated above-average leadership and fighting abilities. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

—The Afghan government claims the Chinese are providing arms and training for Afghan insurgents, but we have been unable to document such aid. [less than 1 line not declassified] some assistance has been moved across the Afghan-Chinese border to insurgents in Badakhshan Province, [5½ lines, classification marking, and codeword not declassified]

—The Iranians have provided little material aid to the insurgents, although some humanitarian aid has been given to refugees on the Iranian side of the border. Afghan [7½ lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]

—Aid from other Middle Eastern states has also been limited. The Saudis reportedly have provided money for rebel arms purchases, but insurgents inside Afghanistan claim that much of the funds has lined the pockets of Pakistani intermediaries and Afghan exile leaders. The insurgents reportedly have requested arms from Egypt [1 line, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]

—Exile leaders have apparently purchased some small arms in Western Europe through arms dealers [6½ lines, classification marking, and handling restriction not declassified]

The insurgents almost certainly will continue to try to avoid pitched battles with Soviet or Afghan government forces. They have not been deterred by the Soviets, however, and if anything the insurgency may be more pervasive than at any time since it began. In order to achieve a measure of success against any large-scale Soviet assault they require a continuing supply of weapons, mines, and ammunition. [less than 1 line not declassified] the single most effective Soviet weapon has been the MI–24 helicopter, and few Afghans have weapons to combat them. A shortage of antitank weapons has also hampered nationalist operations. ([classification marking not declassified])

To this end, the insurgents would appear to benefit most from the introduction of man-portable, easy-to-operate weapons such as the Soviet SA–7 or the US REDEYE surface-to-air missile, heavy machine guns, antitank weapons such as the French MILAN or the US LAW, and nonmetallic antitank mines. Coordination of insurgent assaults could be improved with the delivery of additional communications equipment; some insurgent groups have set up effective tactical nets when they have had the equipment. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])

The insurgents have a continuing need for money, medical supplies, food, and clothing. Gas masks or other antidotes against chemical weapons might also be useful in combatting Soviet or Afghan chemical attacks. ([classification marking not declassified])

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Insurgents. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. A typed statement at the bottom of the page reads: “This memorandum was prepared in the Regional Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Research. Comments and/or queries may be directed to [1 line not declassified].” In a covering memorandum to Brzezinski, April 9, Turner noted: “Pursuant to the tasking arising out of the Special Coordination Committee meeting on 28 March, I am submitting an analysis on the Afghan resistance in terms of its effectiveness and how much aid it is receiving from various sources. As to the question raised at the SCC meeting as to whether it would be advisable to make public the fact that we are providing that aid, I would strongly advise against such a course of action; the Middle Eastern countries who are participating in this effort are already increasingly leery about published reports of outside aid to the Afghan resistance, and any open, explicit admission of this assistance, or any allusion to their role therein, could be fatal to the continuation of this assistance.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–031, Sep–Dec 1980) The summary of conclusions of the March 28 SCC meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 47, Security Framework: Minutes of Meetings: 1–4/80.