Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

246. Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

[appraisal number not declassified]

Washington, April 2, 1980

[Omitted here are a title page, a security information page, a cover page, and a table of estimated Soviet forces required to control Afghanistan.]

USSR: POST-AFGHANISTAN MILITARY INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES (U)

Summary

(S) The Soviets have committed some 105,000 troops in support of their military operations in Afghanistan. This force, albeit substantial, amounts to only a small portion of the total Soviet military force structure. Most of the ground and air units involved in the Afghan action have been drawn from the contiguous Turkestan and Central Asia Military Districts.

(S) Despite the already sizable commitment, as many as 50,000 to 60,000 additional troops may be required to achieve Soviet goals in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Soviets are believed to be willing to gradually commit these forces during the coming months.

(S) We do not believe that the Soviets can initiate and sustain a full-scale invasion of Pakistan with the force structure currently in Afghanistan, or with the projected force structure which may be committed there within the next 3 to 4 months. Nor do we believe that the Soviets would consider initiating such an attack until they have better secured their control in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a major Soviet invasion of Pakistan would require the movement into Afghanistan from the USSR of a much more substantial combat force than is presently near the Soviet-Afghan border. A considerable logistic buildup would also be required to support this force. Nevertheless, limited Soviet ground force cross-border incursions or “hot pursuit” strafing, bombing, or artillery bombardment of “Patriot” sanctuaries in Pakistan are possible during the next 3 to 4 months.

(S) The current and projected level of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan does not preclude a concurrent military move against Iran. Sufficient forces are available in the USSR near the Iranian border to execute either a limited attack, such as the seizure of Azerbaijan, or a large-scale invasion to seize most or all of Iran.

(S) We do not believe that the USSR’s current and projected level of military involvement in Afghanistan significantly degrades its ability to initiate direct, simultaneous military actions elsewhere. For example, presently only 5 of the USSR’s 173 ground divisions have been committed directly in support of Soviet operations in Afghanistan. Although there has been some minor siphoning off of troops and equipment from areas not contiguous to Afghanistan, the Soviet force structure opposite NATO, Yugoslavia, and China remains essentially intact and for the most part unaffected by the military incursion into Afghanistan. Furthermore, the USSR’s military presence in Afghanistan has not affected the capabilities of the military forces of other Warsaw Pact nations.

[Omitted here is the body of the appraisal.]

1. Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 1, Afghan Transport System. Secret.