248. Analysis Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research1
1. AFGHANISTAN: SOVIETS FAIL TO ESTABLISH FULL CONTROL
Three months after coming to power, the Babrak Karmal regime has failed to win significant support from the people of Afghanistan. Soviet military tactics, though often brutal, have failed to discourage popular resistance. Even the introduction of additional Soviet forces may not assure suppression of the resistance during the spring and summer months.
Signs of coup plotting against Babrak Karmal and his Parchamist faction have recently reappeared in both clandestine reporting and [less than 1 line not declassified] messages. These indications of a continued intra-party struggle between the Khalq and Parcham factions reconfirm the instability of the Babrak government, as do further military and police defections. Information that Soviet advisors have attended conspiratorial meetings indicates that they may be reassessing the viability of the Parcham leadership.
The constant barrage of government propaganda does not appear to have won converts. The armed resistance to the Kabul government and the Soviet invaders has grown significantly since December 27, as previously passive onlookers throughout the country have been won over to the Mujahedin rebel cause. Increasing supplies of weapons and ammunition from cross-border support organizations may partly account for the escalated nationalist activity in many areas. Participation by experienced Afghan army defectors bringing weapons with them has also strengthened the resistance movement.
Although Soviet forces are now deployed throughout much of the country, the government, which for some time has had little authority in the central Hazarajat region, is on the verge of losing control in several more provinces. Soviet military engagements have failed to [Page 674] produce decisive victories, with the possible exception of Kabul, where severe repression of demonstrations in February appears to have discouraged further anti-government activities. The massive offensive in Konarha province retook one military outpost, temporarily relieved the insurgent siege of another, destroyed many villages and sent thousands of refugees into Pakistan. But the Soviets suffered significant casualties in the process and reportedly continue to do so as the rebels have again assumed the offensive in that region.
Both Soviets and Mujahedin hope to profit, although in different ways, from increased mobility in the spring and summer. The Soviets will be able to move heavy equipment into areas previously blocked by winter snows, while the nationalists will be able to disperse higher up into the mountains.
The Soviets clearly have the advantage of far superior fire power and the dreaded MI–24 helicopters. However, they are spread thin and reportedly suffer from at best indifferent morale and discipline. The nationalists, who can blend into a supportive population, appear to have excellent morale and are dedicated to their cause. Thus, the months immediately ahead promise serious fighting, much suffering for the population, and a continued flow of cross-border refugees.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 26, 4/1/80–4/4/80. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon.↩