Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

225. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Spiers) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, March 4, 1980

SUBJECT

• Soviet Motives in Afghanistan

In choosing to intervene in Afghanistan, the Soviets were primarily motivated by their own security concerns. In their pre-decision deliberations, they apparently underestimated both the strength of the insurgency and the intensity of the international reaction. Despite their miscalculations, however, we believe the Soviets are not now prepared to alter their course. Present efforts seem primarily aimed at stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, exploiting differences among the western allies, and limiting the damage which Afghanistan has done to overall US-Soviet relations.

By late 1979, Moscow was faced with a dire situation in Afghanistan. If it did not act, the best it could hope for was prolonged fighting, further regime coups, and political chaos; the worst, the establishment of an anti-Soviet regime that would develop ties with Iran, Pakistan, the US, and China. From the Soviet perspective, such a turn of events would have overturned a long tradition of Afghan dependence on the USSR and would have meant an unacceptable situation on the USSR’s southern border. Tolerance of such an outcome would have called into question Moscow’s willingness to back its clients elsewhere in the Third World. By early December, the Soviet leadership concluded that the only solution to the problem was military intervention, and that while such action would carry considerable political costs, the benefits of a stable and secure Afghanistan firmly in the Soviet camp were worth the price.

Miscalculation

In its deliberations, Moscow miscalculated. In terms of the military situation, the Soviets seem to have misjudged the strength and capabilities of the insurgents. While the Soviets probably calculated that their own troops would have to secure the major urban areas and lines of communication in Afghanistan until the Afghan army could be reorganized and equipped to fight the insurgency, it probably underestimated the time and manpower that would be needed even for this limited objective. Originally, Moscow may have hoped that 40,000 to 60,000 Soviet troops would be enough; present force configurations would seem to indicate that the Soviets now believe that it will need at least double that number, and that the Soviet, rather than the Afghan, army will have to bear the brunt of the fighting for the present.

Moscow apparently also miscalculated the intensity of the international reaction to its intervention in Afghanistan. In terms of US-Soviet relations, Moscow was probably ready to accept a bad press and the delay of SALT II ratification. However, the Soviets may not have anticipated the American actions either to curtail shipments of feed grains and export of high technology or to boycott the Olympics. Indeed, clandestine reporting indicates that the Soviets may have believed that the US was too distracted by the situation in Iran to develop a strong response.

The Kremlin also seems to have been taken aback by the strength of the West European response. While it no doubt expected them to denounce Soviet actions, Moscow may not have expected the West Europeans to give the US as much support as they have. Moscow was probably equally surprised by the nearly unanimous hostile Islamic reaction evoked at the Islamabad Conference in January.

In Afghanistan

Resistance in Afghanistan has evidently been stronger than Moscow originally anticipated. The Babrak government has not been more effective than Amin’s, and the internal situation has deteriorated since the intervention.

Despite the international reaction and the resistance in Afghanistan, the Soviets are adding men and equipment to their forces, building permanent barracks and are apparently planning for large operations against the rebels. The Soviets have yet to engage in major operations against the rebels, and seem unlikely to conclude that their intervention will not succeed in its limited military objectives of stalemating the insurgency before a spring offensive is tried.

Diplomatic Posture

Although the Soviet media and leadership have been quick to pick up on the theme of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan voiced in the West, there has been little or no deviation from their original position of December 27. Indeed, Brezhnev in his speech of February 22, seemed to add to earlier demands on the question of withdrawal when he said that the Soviets will only withdraw when the US and Afghanistan’s neighbors are willing to “guarantee” that all outside interference in Afghanistan has ceased.² On the face of it, Brezhnev’s statement was probably not intended as a signal of Soviet interest in negotiation on the issue. However, Moscow may have been impressed by the subsequent Western reaction to even such a slight shift in the Soviet position and is now attempting to play on this interest to imply reasonableness in the Kremlin.

Similarly, the Soviets have given little public play to the West European proposal for the “neutralization” of Afghanistan.³ They have not, however, dismissed it outright nor have they ruled out the idea of future discussion or negotiations. Indeed, in his discussion with Armand Hammer, Brezhnev reportedly expressed an interest in mutually acceptable solutions.⁴ Thus, it would appear that the Soviets are trying to dangle the prospect of a political solution to the Afghan situation in order, in the short run, to divide western opinion and policy, and, in the longer run, to keep open the possibility of a negotiated agreement that in effect would place a world seal of approval on the Soviet intervention and the resulting permanent satellization of Afghanistan.

At the same time, the Soviets are intent upon limiting the damage Afghanistan has wreaked on its relations with the West and the Third World. Moscow has repeatedly stressed that detente remains its basic policy line. Similarly, one Soviet article has tried to allay West European fears of an increased Soviet threat to the oil rich Persian Gulf by resurrecting its 1976 proposal that the security of the area be internationally guaranteed.⁵ Moscow has also attempted to deflect Arab displeasure by hammering away at the betrayal of the Palestinian cause allegedly inherent in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and longer term at the continuing threat which the US poses for the Middle East.

In the longer term, Moscow probably believes that it can eventually stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, and that, as it does, international pressure will decrease, much as it did in 1968 with Czechoslovakia. The Soviets probably have concluded that continued tensions in the Mideast will eventually allow them to recoup their losses, largely because the radical Arabs have few other options in terms of sophisticated arms and great power support. Moscow also probably believes that the very fact that it has secured its position in Afghanistan will enable it to exert more influence on Iran and Pakistan, and in time to undercut US and Chinese influence. To this end, the Soviets probably will try to refrain from overly antagonizing any of the parties involved. As their involvement in the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan grows, however, this moderate position will become increasingly difficult to maintain both as a result of fighting the war itself (which may inevitably come to involve Pakistan’s border areas), and as a result of having to justify that war to a worried home front.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Mar 1–15. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by W. Limberg (INR/RSE). [text not declassified]
2. See Document 216.
3. The Foreign Ministers of the nine European Community nations, meeting in Rome on February 19, issued a statement proposing a neutral Afghanistan under international guarantees if the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops. (Paul Lewis, “Europeans Propose a Neutral Afghanistan With Guarantees to Allow Soviet to Leave,” New York Times, February 20, 1980, p. A8) In addition, Vance visited Bonn, Rome, Paris, and London February 19–22 to discuss Afghanistan with European leaders. For his February 20 joint press conference with German Foreign Minister Genscher, see the Department of State Bulletin, April 1980, pp. 39–40.
4. Hammer, the head of Occidental Petroleum, had significant business interests in the Soviet Union. His meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow, February 27, was reported in telegram 3231 from Moscow, February 27. During the meeting, Brezhnev told Hammer that if the United States and Afghanistan’s neighbors would guarantee nonintervention in Afghan affairs, “we can come to a settlement,” provided that, subsequently, Afghanistan’s military capabilities would be limited to defensive needs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0629) The meeting was also reported in the New York Times; see Jane Seaberry, “Hammer Expects Crisis With Soviets to End Soon,” New York Times, March 4, 1980, p. D6.
5. Not further identified.