Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

226. Memorandum to the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (Clarke)¹

Washington, March 5, 1980

SUBJECT

• Station Chief’s Assessment of the Insurgency in Afghanistan

1. In reviewing the Chief of Station Kabul’s latest assessment on the insurgency in Afghanistan and its prospects for the next six months, we found that we totally agreed with some of the conclusions made by the COS but disagreed with others.²

2. Analysts on the Afghan Task Force have long believed that the insurgents were too weak to topple the government by defeating the Afghan Army in military action. The insurgents can harass and pressure Afghan Army units in the field but do not have the leadership, training, experience, or firepower to engage the Afghan Army in set-piece battles. The danger has always been the potential for unraveling from within, and it was that danger that brought the Soviets into Afghanistan.

3. The Soviets have thus far not enjoyed any meaningful successes against the insurgents, but that is likely to change now that the weather is improving and the Soviets can use their firepower more effectively. The Soviets have begun a major new offensive in eastern Afghanistan and the preliminary evidence suggests they are successfully pushing the insurgents back in several provinces. This is not unexpected. We knew the rebels would avoid set-piece battles with the stronger Soviet forces and that appears to be what they are doing. We believe the insurgents will retreat rather than fight pitched battles. They will move deeper into sanctuaries inside Afghanistan and across the border into Pakistan.

4. The Soviets are likely to further intensify their attacks on insurgent bases over the spring and summer months. This will result in their consolidating their control along key roads and around major cities and in pushing the insurgents back. But, it is questionable if these will be lasting successes. We believe the insurgents will avoid the Soviets when they hold the edge but will reoccupy territory as the Soviets withdraw. In short, the insurgents will fight when they have the advantage and not when the other side holds the edge. We doubt that the Soviets can completely secure the roads and the countryside in six months.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C–367, 1 Jan–30 Jun 80, Afghanistan. Secret. The author of the memorandum was not identified. Attached but not printed is a covering note from Clarke to Turner, stating: “[less than 1 line not declassified] doubts that the Soviets will be able completely to secure the roads in the countryside in six months time.”
2. The referenced assessment was not found.