211. Translation of a Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Vance1
Having read your letter of February 8 I would like to tell you frankly the following.2
One could only welcome the recognition in the letter of the crucial importance of relations between our countries for the general world situation and the apparent desire to search for ways of overcoming the serious situation prevailing now in these relations.
However, the attempt to evade consideration of the real causes complicating the international situation, efforts to reduce the whole matter to the recent developments in Afghanistan depicted, for that matter, in a completely distorted light, and the raising of various kinds of other far-fetched questions—all this in no way demonstrates a real intention to rectify the current situation.
Indeed, it is impossible, without sinning against the truth, to dispute the fact that the exacerbation of the international situation by no means began at the end of last December, but rather much earlier. We also pointed out to the US side the reasons for this exacerbation much earlier.
Among these is the decision on deployment in the US of the MX mobile ICBM system which was made almost immediately after the SALT II Treaty was signed in Vienna.
There is also the artificially created “mini-crisis” on the question of a “Soviet brigade” in Cuba.
There is also the urgent establishment of the “Rapid Deployment Force” designed for armed intervention in various parts of the world.
There is the long-range program of permanent defense spending increases and arms build-up imposed by the US on its NATO allies.
Finally, there is the decision to deploy new US missiles on the soil of Western Europe, which creates a serious threat to the security of the USSR and its allies.
And what has become of the SALT II Treaty? Incidentally, in taking the decision to develop and deploy MX missiles the US Government [Page 588] stated that this decision would promote the ratification of SALT II. Without addressing now the substance of the MX missile question—which is a subject for a special discussion—one cannot fail to observe that in fact the decision on the MX missile is being implemented while the SALT II Treaty has not been ratified. In pressing its NATO allies to agree to the deployment on their soil of new American missiles, the US was also saying that this would facilitate the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Even putting aside, once again, the question of the invalidity of such linkage, the picture remains the same: the decision on the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe has been adopted and is being implemented, but the Treaty has not been ratified.
Try to see all this through our eyes. Can these facts be seen in any way other than as a departure by the US from the principle of equality and equal security which was reconfirmed in Vienna, as evidence of a policy line now pursued by the US to break out of the existing military and strategic parity between the USSR and the US, to rush ahead in an effort to gain military superiority for itself?
No references to events in Afghanistan can conceal this turn in US policy—a turn from detente to a new aggravation of international tensions, to a new round of the arms race.
In your letter you mention the need for our two states to show restraint and moderation in international affairs and in relations with each other. Well, the thought itself is correct. We, on our part, are also in favor of this. It is important, however, for the United States also to adhere to such a course in international affairs and not treat them with such astonishing light-mindedness as it now does.
As for Afghanistan, our position on this question has been set forth more than once with utmost clarity, specifically as you know in the answers by L.I. Brezhnev to the questions of the Pravda correspondent as well as in our contacts with the US side.3
Facts do not cease to be facts because the US side does not want to admit that acts of aggression against Afghanistan have been and continue to be committed from the territory of Pakistan. Also indisputable is the fact that in providing assistance to Afghanistan in repelling external aggression, the USSR has acted in full accordance with the UN Charter and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRA.
We have also spoken on more than one occasion as to when and under what circumstances the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will be carried out. I would only like to stress that if the US really wanted this to occur sooner, it could, of course, take measures [Page 589] to stop the aggression against Afghanistan. So far, the practical actions of the United States go exactly in the opposite direction: everything is being done to expand armed incursions into the territory of Afghanistan.
You say in your letter that the US has no interest in seeing a government in Kabul hostile to the Soviet Union. In fact, however, the United States is exerting every effort toward uniting counterrevolutionary Afghan groups under foreign auspices and even toward the virtual establishment of an illegal Afghan “government in exile” in the territory of Pakistan.
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
So, as you see, there is nothing we must justify before the United States, but the list of complaints which we have the right to present to the US happens to be a rather long and impressive one.
Of course, the serious damage to the international situation and Soviet-US relations already inflicted by the actions of the United States can hardly pass without a trace. But it is alien to us to be guided by emotions in our policies. We would be prepared, if the United States is also willing, to seek opportunities to return to the path of cooperation between our two countries and with other states for the sake of improving the international situation, strengthening peace and universal security.
If, as your letter says, Soviet-US relations are now at a “critical juncture,” then the choice of which way to proceed is up to the US. Our choice is clear. We would like to hope that the US will also make the only sensible choice—in favor of detente and peaceful coexistence.
I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will understand correctly the motives by which I was impelled in speaking in such a frank manner. We would welcome any constructive considerations and ideas in support of detente in Soviet-American relations which you might offer on your part.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, CV-Gromyko Letters, 2/16/80. No classification marking. The translated letter is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 261.↩
- See Document 202.↩
- See Documents 166 and 186.↩