210. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
2551. Subj: Ambassador’s Meeting With Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub Khan. Ref: (A) State 39978.2
1. (S—Entire text)
2. I had a lengthy meeting with Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub Khan on February 15, following his return from Washington and Islamabad. After commenting favorably on the discussions between Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq and Brzezinski and Christopher, Khan told me in confidence that Zia would probably call him back to Pakistan from his post in Moscow in the next two to three months to assume a post in the government in Islamabad (strictly protect his confidence).3 The most important part of Khan’s remarks was his suggestion that the key to the situation in Afghanistan was to have some influential and neutral intermediary talk with the Soviets to get them to accept some idea of an international commission of neutral nations to guarantee Afghanistan’s border, which step should enable the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. The main points of our conversation follow:
3. In reference to the Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan, Khan said that this “sanctuary” was basically limited to providing shelter for the refugees and that the refugees were receiving modest amounts of money to sustain themselves. There is no organized military effort and no training. If Pakistan did more than this there would be major consequences. The Soviets, he said, know what we and the U.S. are doing in this respect, but we do [not?] “connive.” The Soviets claim that the mainstay of the insurgency in Afghanistan comes from the “sanctuary” and that Pakistan is the focal point of this activity and not merely a subsidiary to the rebellion. In fact, however, only 20 percent of the insurgents in Afghanistan could ever reach the “sanctuary” in Pakistan. Eighty percent of the Afghanistan insurgency is internal and it can not be effectively helped by the “sanctuary.” If the Soviets actually [Page 585] believe what they claim, i.e., that the “sanctuary” is a major part of the problem, then it would follow that they must destroy the “sanctuary” in Pakistan and would have to attack Pakistan. Khan thinks the Soviets have a more realistic understanding of the situation, however, and therefore considers this a remote contingency.
4. Khan thought the Soviets had three options in Afghanistan. One would be to help Babrak Karmal consolidate his position. The second would be to change leaders. The third would be to continue their military build up in Afghanistan to control the country. Khan thinks that the Soviets would like to follow the second option; namely, to put in the best moderate leaders acceptable to the tribesmen and form a government which could manage these people and eventually establish a political base with grassroots support in the country. Under these circumstances, if there was some proposal put forward by a party acceptable to the Soviets (Khan specified that it could not be the U.S.) for an international commission which would guarantee that there would be no threat to the Soviet Union’s southern border, then the Soviets could withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. Khan said that this course was not unknown in Soviet history and that they have withdrawn militarily, while assuring the establishment of a regime friendly to them.
5. Khan commented that the Soviets have seriously miscalculated the local Afghanistan situation. Daoud was removed from the top and there was no grassroots support for the regimes which followed. The situation in Afghanistan was quite different than that which prevailed in Iran where the Shah was hated and where he did not have deep grassroots support. In contrast, the revolution in Afghanistan is stuck in the mud. Tribal resistance can only be broken by working with the tribes themselves. Nevertheless, the Soviets decided to go into Afghanistan, encouraged by the wave of anti-American opinion in neighboring Iran, the shakiness of Saudis and the burning of the American Embassy in Pakistan. All of these factors gave the Soviets the feeling that they could pull it off. They also seriously miscalculated President Carter and felt that the liberal foreign policy establishment in the United States would not act, especially in order to avoid a double crisis situation. The Soviets were surprised by President Carter’s sharp turn in foreign policy. They, also, seriously miscalculated the international condemnation of their invasion of Afghanistan. For the past 100 years there has been no real threat from Afghanistan. Now, the Soviets have stirred up a hornets nest. They have accelerated events that they dread. For example, closer relations between U.S. and China and Japan, respectively. When the hostage situation in Iran is settled and there is an improvement in Iranian/U.S. relations, the Soviets will be in an even worse situation. In sum, the Soviet attack on Afghanistan has coalesced many nations behind the U.S.
[Page 586]6. In Khan’s view, the key to the situation in Afghanistan is for someone to try to talk with the Soviets and to get them to accept some idea of establishing a commission of neutral nations to guarantee Afghanistan’s borders so that the Soviets can withdraw and give them time to build up a stable regime in Afghanistan with which the Soviets can live. The establishment of such a commission would allow the Soviets to save face. The problem here is their belief that revolutionary processes are irreversible, which makes it difficult for them to back out. Khan said “We ought to line up some friend acceptable to the Soviets to help them save their face and pride.”
7. It is completely coincidental, but of interest, that immediately after my meeting with Khan, I had a long scheduled meeting with FRG Ambassador Wieck who also floated the idea of an international commission. Wieck, speaking personally, proposed that the U.S. try to structure a commission composed of Third World countries to arrange a “neutral policy” for Afghanistan. Wieck was deviously thinking out loud and indicated that what was really needed was a neutralist scheme for the whole region involving Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, possibly, India and other states. Perhaps, he suggested, this would be a very good role for Indira Gandhi to play. In any case, any approach, Wieck suggested, should have Indira Gandhi’s support so that we will not be viewed as the perpetrators of the plan. Wieck also referred to Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan. Wieck mentioned that the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom told a group of British Parliamentarians that the Soviets would withdraw, if the West would guarantee non interference in Afghanistan.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1–3/80. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 39978 to Moscow, February 14, the Department, noting that Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub participated in the discussions in Islamabad with Christopher and Brzezinski, directed the Embassy to approach Yaqub informally to get his views on those discussions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800079–0135)↩
- Khan stayed on as Pakistani Ambassador to the Soviet Union through September 1980, after which he was assigned as Ambassador to France.↩