166. Article in the National Intelligence Daily1
BRIEFS AND COMMENTS
USSR: Brezhnev’s “Interview” on Afghanistan
Brezhnev’s “interview” yesterday in Pravda is the most comprehensive denunciation of the US by a Soviet leader in many years and signals Moscow’s conviction that it cannot reach a modus vivendi with the Carter administration, at least in the near future. ([classification marking not declassified])
In condemning the “latest irresponsible actions” and “the extremist position” of the US, Brezhnev warned his Soviet audience to expect further US efforts to “poison” Soviet-American relations. Although Brezhnev did not announce any Soviet countermeasures, he further warned that US actions would, “like a boomerang,” come back to hit the US, “if not today, then tomorrow.”2 ([classification marking not declassified])
Brezhnev’s efforts to separate the US from its West European allies continues a trend in Soviet policy that has been especially prominent since the Afghan crisis erupted. In alleging that the US has shown itself to be “an absolutely unreliable partner” and in assuring the West European governments of Moscow’s desire to continue political and military detente, Brezhnev hoped to provide incentives to the West Europeans to dissociate themselves from US actions and to continue [Page 475] economic relations as before. Brezhnev also announced Moscow’s position that the stance taken by NATO in December makes negotiations on long-range theater nuclear forces “impossible.” ([classification marking not declassified])
On Afghanistan, Brezhnev characterized the threat that prompted the invasion as a “serious danger” to Soviet security; his failure to repeat earlier descriptions of the intervention as “limited” suggests a decision to prepare the Soviet public for a long, hard campaign. This impression is reinforced by his reference to “tens of thousands of insurgents” in Afghanistan as well as by his claim that the White House has announced “its decision to expand” aid to the Afghan rebels. ([classification marking not declassified])
One of Brezhnev’s major objectives in the “interview” was to assure Soviet audiences on the domestic impact of US measures. He claimed “plans for providing bread to the population will not be affected by US actions,” an assertion that will be read by his audience as confirmation that meat supplies will be hurt.3 Brezhnev appealed to Soviet patriotism, recited the failure of past foreign efforts to test Soviet “mettle,” and warned that US actions have a “dangerously destabilizing impact” on the world situation. [less than 1 line and classification marking not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1979, NIDs. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.↩
- In telegram 789 from Moscow, January 16, the Embassy argued that Brezhnev’s remarks in Pravda provided an opportunity for the United States to challenge the Kremlin’s attempts to assure Soviet citizenry and world opinion that the intervention in Afghanistan was the right decision. This endeavor would include demonstrating that the Soviet Union had not acted in a way befitting a “responsible superpower and a fit partner for negotiating major arms issues and for mutually advantageous cooperation;” that the intervention “gravely damaged” Soviet efforts to stymie U.S.-Chinese cooperation, to “pacify” Western Europe, and to continue “neutralizing” regional powers such as Turkey and Iran; that only a significant change in Soviet behavior could prevent a “major new arms race with the U.S.;” and, finally, “to get across that Moscow cannot have it both ways and will have to give up its ideological aspirations to support ‘national liberation’ if it wants to advance other important Soviet interests.” The Embassy further argued that this message should come in the form of a Presidential speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder) The text of Brezhnev’s interview is printed in full in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXII, no. 2 (February 13, 1980), pp. 1–10. Excerpts were printed in the New York Times January 13, 1980, p. 16.↩
- In telegram 708 from Moscow, January 14, the Embassy reported “the predominant mood of the ‘man-on-the-street’ in Moscow toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan appears to be one of puzzled apathy. Some sources, however, report the existence of grumbling because the invasion occurred at a time of widespread shortages of food and consumer goods.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800024–0718)↩