194. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s and Mr. Christopher’s Meeting with Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
- U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John West
- Jane Coon
- Gary Sick
- John Trattner
- Jerry Schecter
- Isa Sabbagh
- Eugene Bovis
- Prince Saud
- Mr. Mansouri
- Ambassador al-Hegalan
- Abdul Aziz Thunayyan
Prince Saud opened the meeting with a brief discussion of his experiences at the Islamic Summit in Islamabad.2
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
Prince Saud wondered what are the Soviet interests in Afghanistan.
Dr. Brzezinski said that he was prepared to accept the fact that the Soviet motives were limited to Afghanistan itself.3 The Government there was losing its ability to govern and he thought that replacement was the probable motive for the politburo members. However, the rationale for entering Afghanistan is irrelevant; the results are to create a strategic dynamic which is not limited to Afghanistan. The effects of the invasion are of global significance regardless of their immediate interests. It represented a strategic challenge. They have turned a buffer state into an offensive wedge. These acts are very serious. History shows that acts of limited objectives sometimes lead to general outcomes. After all in World War I the parties began with very limited objectives. The United States has been bogged down with the Iranian hostage issue, with the Arab-Israel question, the Mecca problem, Paki [Page 548] stani problems, etc.4 The Soviets may have seen this array of problems and decided that this was the moment to act, but we must be aware of the objective consequences of their actions. What the Saudis did in Islamabad is of historic significance. It is the first time that a group of nations has confronted the Soviets apart from the United States. The Islamic states represent a greater challenge to the Soviets than the United States. You represent a revitalized religious renaissance which is on the move. There are sixty million Moslems in the Soviet Union who are increasingly aware of their identity and who are experiencing an intense feeling of Moslem identity. This makes the Soviets fearful.
Prince Saud said that’s true. In the region there is a feeling that the Soviets did not act due to reasons of self-defense. These were offensive intentions, not defensive. They are going to try to consolidate Soviet power and gain back lost ground. The timing was determined by their need to capitalize on the present situation. He noted that in Lebanon we may have reason to expect some sort of conflict perhaps like 1967. The Soviet military posture in the Middle East is not an attempt to resolve the Israeli problem but to bring contradictions between United States and the Arab world more to the front. The regional nations see the Soviet aims; even Iran does, though not the students. The regional states want to oppose the Soviets despite the immense dangers, such as Pakistan. It was not an easy decision to help Afghanistan especially since they were not sure of the backing they would have from the United States and others. They took the decision since they are aware that they are next. However, this situation should not be viewed as a crisis rather it is something people in this region live with every day.
Dr. Brzezinski wondered if that same reasoning applied to Iraq and Algeria.
Prince Saud said yes. They see the Soviets as aggressive and imperialistic. Public opinion and government opinion in the region all oppose the Soviet tendency to take what they want by force. The regional states will do what is necessary and they are confident that the US will help. They need to understand how the US will do it.
Mr. Christopher wondered what his views were on the results in Pakistan. On the favorable side, Mr. Christopher thought that recent talks were successful in standing up to Soviet aggression. However, we had presented what we thought was a sound approach which involved going to Congress and getting a firm commitment as well as providing nearly half a billion dollars in assistance. We are not sure [Page 549] we understand why the Pakistanis would not accept this as a major first step.
Mrs. Coon noted that the Pakistanis were anxious to reaffirm the security commitment.
Mr. Christopher wondered if the aid was too small or too big. We had spent six or seven hours discussing this issue at the highest levels of the Pakistani Government and were still uncertain of what their reasons were.5
Prince Saud said that the Pakistanis think the aid is not sufficient to meet the challenge. They fear the Soviets and India. In order to resist they have legitimate defense needs to defend themselves. You said that the United States would oppose the Soviets, however, they do not see the US as willing to enter into a direct conflict in this area. For example, to have troops available to defend Afghanistan. Maybe this was not mentioned by them. But they are looking for a clear view of the extent of backing by the US Government. They have no other source to back them. They wanted to have US aid sufficient to have the capability to resist the Soviets.
Mr. Christopher said to Prince Saud you know our country. When we reverse course sometimes that is done in increments. We have a long series of problems to overcome particularly the nonproliferation issue. We tried to persuade them that a half billion dollars is not insubstantial. We talked ourselves blue in the face and we came away perplexed.
Prince Saud said they are afraid the US will throw them in front of the bear and not help them when the chips are down. They also have a problem justifying their policy internally. They also recognize the turnaround by the United States but they wonder if assistance will come in time and be sufficient in quantity.
Mr. Christopher wondered if they wanted to turn off our turnaround.
Dr. Brzezinski said he thought not. We are able to match their commitment to fight with our willingness to assist them in case of massive intervention by the Soviet Union in accordance with our constitutional processes. Did the Islamic Conference agree to supply aid to Pakistan?
Prince Saud said yes and there will be more when others see the US commitment.
Dr. Brzezinski said if the Soviets intervene massively we will not stand by. They now understand that. If intervention comes in a limited [Page 550] way we want to be able to help on a limited basis. Some suggest that we do not have the power. In fact we have the capacity to do a lot of damage. In Baluchistan, for example, US air power could be quite decisive. Also our conventional capability in the region is substantial. We are not obliged to respond in a way where the Soviets choose the time and place of their own choosing. There are other places in the world where we can do things where we have a preponderance of power. We do not necessarily have to match the Soviets gun for gun in this area. We have the means and our country has the will. We are no longer a country paralyzed by the Vietnam war. We are ready to demonstrate that we mean what we say. Like the Soviets the imperialist Germans said they were trying to avoid encirclement but their diplomacy was so inept they did not succeed and brought the whole world against them.
Prince Saud said they think they can succeed in making the Soviets not succeed.
Dr. Brzezinski said as far as Afghanistan is concerned it requires continuing discussion.
Prince Saud said that if we could help with the Indians that would be a good thing.
Dr. Brzezinski said we sent Mr. Clifford to India and his age was the equivalent of the two of us put together.6
Prince Saud said that the Pakistanis worry a lot about the Gromyko visit to India. They hope that the Indians can be persuaded. We the Saudis have no influence. They buy some oil from us and some other Arab countries. Even Iraq sends them some oil. We will do what we can but you must also act.
Dr. Brzezinski said that Mrs. Gandhi feels deeply about the shabby treatment she got from the US press.
Prince Saud said that is the same way that General Zia feels.
Dr. Brzezinski said the press has not paid much attention to General Zia, except during the Bhutto affair and the Bhutto incident was not a beautiful period of Pakistani history. Mrs. Gandhi is a different situation. There was a long love affair with India in the United States and there has subsequently been a disillusionment especially among the Left intellectuals. The conversation continued after the group sat down to lunch. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the Afghanis are very tough. He had visited a refugee camp. However he feared that the Soviets would be more effective than the British had been a hundred years ago when only one out of ten thousand men returned from an engagement.
[Page 551]Prince Saud noted that most of the Afghanistan army is joining the rebels.
Dr. Brzezinski said that we don’t have as good information as we need about the rebel situation, however, we have good information on Soviet dispositions. Thus far the Soviets have not engaged in the resistance with full scale fighting, rather they have focused on the lines of communications. This is a good time for weapons to go in before the Soviets launch a counterinsurgency effort in a big way.
Prince Saud said that the people in Afghanistan are capable of using sophisticated equipment. They need training on communication, recoilless rifles. Surface to air rifles [missiles?] would take care of part of their problems. He wondered if we have SA7s by chance.
Dr. Brzezinski said by chance we do. The Egyptians also have Soviet equipment. The Algerians are fearful of getting involved.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 2/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Prince Saud’s home.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 184.↩
- An unknown hand crossed out “interests” and wrote “motives.”↩
- The “Mecca problem” likely refers to the attack by Islamic dissidents on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, November 20, 1979.↩
- See Document 193.↩
- See Document 190.↩