188. Article in the National Intelligence Daily1
SPECIAL ANALYSES
AFGHANISTAN: The Babrak Government’s Bleak Prospects by [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA
After a month in power, the Soviet-installed government of President Babrak Karmal has little prospect of becoming more than a transparent cover for Soviet military occupation. There is evidence that Moscow is disappointed in Babrak’s performance, and rumors are widespread in Kabul that the Soviets are planning to replace him. In the near term at least, there is little chance that the Soviets could put together any government that would be viewed as more than a puppet and have any chance of staying in power if Soviet troops were withdrawn. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
Babrak’s Problems
Babrak’s regime has virtually no popular backing. Dissatisfaction is widespread in all major cities, and in some instances has resulted in public demonstrations. Attacks by individual Afghans against Soviet troops continue as do clashes between Afghan and Soviet Army units. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
There are numerous reports of passive resistance among Afghan civil servants, and one has indicated that 400 Soviets have been brought in to help keep the major ministries running. Support for Babrak within the ruling People’s Democratic Party is attenuated by a continued [Page 531] festering of longstanding divisions, aggravated by the pervasive Soviet role in the country. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
The government’s policies are designed to win wider popular support while pursuing basic goals of the Marxist regime. A major aspect of this effort has been to blame the late President Amin for the past hostility between the Marxist rulers and the people. The government has made much of Amin’s perversion of the “revolution” in his alleged efforts to turn Afghanistan over to the US and to destroy Islam. ([classification marking not declassified])
To correct Amin’s misdeeds, the government claims it has released 15,000 political prisoners and abolished the secret police. Many Afghans are aware that few prisoners, other than members of Babrak’s previously suppressed faction, have been freed. ([classification marking not declassified])
The President’s credibility has been further undermined by his appointing as a deputy prime minister the man who headed the secret police until last September.2 In fact, executions continue at about the same rate as under Amin, and the secret police have changed little except their name. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
Babrak also has tried with scant success to prove that his government is not anti-Islamic. His claim that his is the first government in 50 years to allow religious freedom is unlikely to impress a population that equates Marxism and the USSR with atheism and views many of the reforms the government advocates as antireligious. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
The cabinet still represents little more than the various groups that joined the first Marxist government established after the coup in April 1978. The three ministers who do not belong to the party hold minor positions. Moreover, because of their association with Babrak, they are popularly regarded as having been long-time secret Communists or Soviet agents. ([classification marking not declassified])
A recent deemphasis on the role of the party—it is now said to have only the “leading” role in the “revolution”—probably has been too slight to change the popular view of the government. The suppression of opposition by previous governments has left few organizations to join the “Fatherland Front” Babrak reportedly plans to form. ([classification marking not declassified])
There is little chance that nonparty figures of any prominence at any level can be persuaded to support the government unless there is [Page 532] a major shift in its orientation. Most such persons are either in exile or leading insurgent bands. ([classification marking not declassified])
The Marxists’ broad social goals are themselves a major cause of discontent, especially among the Muslim tribesmen and peasants who comprise almost all of the population. They regard programs designed partly to win popular support—such as increased education and land reform—as threats to their traditional way of life. ([classification marking not declassified])
Alternatives to Babrak
One figure whom the Soviets are said to be considering as a possible replacement for Babrak is Commerce Minister Jalalar, a non-Marxist who also served in the cabinets of former King Zahir and former President Daoud. He has no independent political following, however, and is one of those whose willingness to participate in Babrak’s cabinet has only convinced most Afghans he has always been a Soviet stooge. There is some evidence that he has been a Soviet intelligence source. ([classification marking not declassified])
Major General Qader, who was jailed by Taraki in August 1978, is another possible candidate. Now a member of the Revolutionary Council, he reportedly made a secret trip to the USSR in mid-January. ([classification marking not declassified])
As a former Defense Minister, Qader might be attractive to the Soviets because he evidently still has some following in the Afghan military and—if given more authority—might be able to stem its decline. Qader’s prospects probably have dimmed, however, in light of the anti-Soviet demonstrations in Herat last weekend set off by his public appearances there. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
No alternative leader would be any more effective than Babrak in attracting domestic support so long as his power is maintained with Soviet troops. The establishment of a government that is both responsive to Soviet security concerns and capable of winning even grudging tolerance from the Afghan people is a process that will take years and require extensive Soviet involvement and support. ([classification marking not declassified])
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.↩
- A reference to Assadullah Sarwari.↩