187. Memorandum From President Carter to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)1

SUBJECT

  • Your Visit to Pakistan (U)

The following will be your objectives in your discussions with President Zia and senior Pakistani officials.

—Lay a solid basis for a further mutual understanding of the issues we face as regards Soviet behavior and intentions, global and regional responses, and our bilateral trust and cooperation. An important part of this exchange will be listening to Zia’s views.

—To convey to Zia a sense of the breadth and firmness of the U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. You should draw on my State of the Union message.

—To impress upon Zia that our support for Pakistan’s independence and security is enduring, based on our vital interests, and backed up not only by U.S. resources, but by a determined U.S. effort to mobilize broad international support.

—To reaffirm the present level of our proposed bilateral assistance through FY 81 and to convince Zia that it would be unwise, and detract from our central effort, to voice public disappointment with our assistance or to criticize U.S. unwillingness to negotiate a treaty.

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—To begin to define with Zia and his advisers the nature of U.S. responses in various contingencies arising from a Soviet-Afghan threat to Pakistan’s security.

—To present our firm view that it is essential to Pakistan’s security that Pakistan and India continue to expand their efforts toward normalization of their relations.

—To seek assurances that the Zia government will not test a nuclear device and to impress upon Zia how dangerous a test would be to Pakistan’s security and to the new Western relationship we are seeking to develop. And to point out that a satisfactory long-term relationship requires a settlement of the nuclear problem.

—To convey to Zia U.S. interest in a resolution of Pakistan’s internal political and economic problems so that Pakistan can address its security problems from a united base.

—To inform Zia of our intention to proceed with: submission of the Pakistan legislation on February 4; military supply talks in Islamabad following your meetings; discussions of the programming of our proposed AID funds; and continuing mutual efforts to muster broad support for Pakistan.

You should describe to President Zia why it is not feasible to convert the 1959 Bilateral Agreement into a treaty. You should impress upon Zia the relevance of the 1959 Agreement for the contingencies of a Soviet or Soviet-directed attack on Pakistan. You should also note my letter to President Zia 2 and point out that we are asking the Congress to affirm the 1959 bilateral. You can assure him that in the event of an attack threatening the independence of Pakistan, we would consider our vital interests to be engaged and we would consult urgently with both the Government of Pakistan and the Congress on steps to be taken, including the use of force. (S)

In discussing contingencies with Pakistan, you should raise (but not press at this time) the possibility of additional U.S. access to facilities or bases on Pakistani soil. However, in addressing possible large-scale Soviet incursions or assaults on Pakistan, you should note that it is in our mutual interest to begin discussions of ways in which U.S. forces, particularly naval and tacair, could be deployed in and near Pakistan in certain situations. You should also indicate that we would be prepared now to make an exercise visit of U.S. tactical aircraft and/or engage in joint air or naval exercises if Pakistan would find that a useful demonstration of U.S. resolve. (S)

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In responding to President Zia’s questions on contingencies involving an Indian attack on Pakistan, you should point out that Pakistan’s best security against a two-front war or an Indian attack lies in the normalization process with India, and the strength of its broad-range relationships with China, the United States, the Moslem world and the Non-Aligned. You should make clear that the interests of Pakistan, the U.S. and the West would be injured by closer Indian relations with the Soviets and we should all work to avoid such a course on India’s part. (S)

In your discussions of military assistance for Pakistan, you should emphasize that we are prepared to move quickly in providing equipment that can be made readily available and will immediately improve the situation along the Afghan border, strengthening the ground and air defense capability. While we will be willing to assist the Pakistanis in seeking financing from others for high-performance aircraft, these financing requirements should be considered in the context of overall defense needs and the priority for the immediate strengthening of defense on the border. (S)

You should inform President Zia that the amounts of our military and economic support assistance for FY 1980 and 81 are firm. You may also say that in considering our levels for FY 1982 and beyond, we will carefully assess Pakistan’s ongoing requirements. President Zia should also be apprised that we are making strong efforts, in support of their own activities, to enhance support for Pakistan from other Western and Islamic donors. On debt rescheduling, you can inform Zia that we are prepared to consider this question in concert with other creditors in conjunction with an upper tranche IMF stabilization program, if an emerging default situation seems likely. (S)

In addressing the nuclear question, you should seek assurances (in addition to the assurances on non-development of weapons and transfer of sensitive technology) that President Zia will not test a nuclear device while he is in office. You should stress that we will continue our dialogue with Pakistan looking forward to an understanding on the scope and purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear program. (S)

If you are asked about our objectives in Afghanistan and our view of the insurgents, you should say that our maximum goal is a neutral Afghanistan, free of Soviet forces, and our minimum goal is a protracted resistance that increases the costs to the Soviets and galvanizes world opinion against their aggression. (S)

You should note to President Zia our continuing interest in Pakistan’s political development, greater political unity and attention to the needs of minority groups such as the Baluchis. (S)

In your approach to the Pakistanis, you should keep in mind that, despite their assertions to the contrary, Pakistan deeply needs our [Page 530] support both in bilateral assistance and in mobilizing diplomatic and other resources. You should, therefore, be firm in presenting our actions and program of assistance in a positive light and avoid any sense of defensiveness about our participation in Pakistan’s security. (S)

Jimmy Carter
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 80, Sensitive X: 11/80. Secret; Sensitive. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, in which Brzezinski noted that Vance already cleared the instructions and recommended that Carter approve them as well. Carter approved and initialed “J.”
  2. See Document 159.