167. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and cover page.]
Prospects for Soviet Operations Against the Insurgency in Afghanistan ([classification marking not declassified])
Key Judgments
Through a carefully prepared, massively staged military intervention, the Soviets have imposed a new Communist puppet government in Afghanistan and have occupied the key government and population centers and the main communications facilities with Soviet troops. By early January, the Soviets had six divisions and over 75,000 troops inside Afghanistan—with more apparently on the way—and were rapidly consolidating their control. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
We have no direct evidence of the Soviets’ expectations for the eventual size, nature, and duration of their military adventure in Afghanistan, but we believe that substantial Soviet forces will remain there for the foreseeable future. The most likely commitment would appear to be a force of some six to 10 divisions and as many as 150,000 men. Such a force could have been made available within a few weeks of the beginning of the invasion, but the deliberate pace of the buildup suggests that it will not be fully deployed until spring, when operations can resume at full intensity. A force of this size could ensure the survival of the Babrak regime, retain control over major population centers and lines of communication, and conduct limited pacification operations. Meanwhile, the Soviets are likely to make efforts to reconstitute the Afghan Army over the next one to three years with the object of making it effective enough to undertake a long-term pacification effort. ([classification marking not declassified])
In the unlikely event that the Afghan insurgency increases beyond the capacity of the force described above to contain it, or if the Soviets [Page 477] thought they could do the job quickly, they might decide on a major pacification effort. The manpower requirement for such an effort would be open-ended, probably taking far more than 150,000 men. The buildup of such a force could only be accomplished over a period of months. ([classification marking not declassified])
Soviet operations, which almost certainly will combine carrot with stick, may be able to intimidate or placate the insurgency to quiescence, and they can certainly remove it as a potent threat to the Babrak regime. Indeed, it is unlikely that even a much stronger insurgency could seriously threaten either the Soviets or Babrak’s government as long as the Soviets retain substantial forces in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the traditional militancy and fierce independence of the rebels, coupled with the severe difficulties that the mountainous Afghan countryside poses for military pacification operations, probably will make it impossible for the Soviets to eradicate the insurgency. ([classification marking not declassified])
Thus, the long-term outlook for the Soviets in Afghanistan is for a continued military presence with both Soviet and government forces harassed by at least low-level insurgent operations. The Soviet presence could provoke the insurgency to greater determination and closer cooperation. The rebels could continue harassing operations for the foreseeable future, withdrawing into high-mountain redoubts or to sanctuaries across the border to evade search-and-destroy operations. We can foresee almost no circumstance in which the Soviets will be able to eradicate the insurgency and permanently pacify the countryside, but, with a force of 150,000 men, they probably could reduce the insurgency to an acceptable level of annoyance. ([classification marking not declassified])
The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is likely to be of long duration. The Babrak regime is not likely to be either politically or militarily secure without the Soviet presence, and rebuilding the Afghan Army probably will take from one to three years. Eradication of the insurgency—if it can be accomplished at all—could take some years after that. In the short term, there is the threat of spillover into adjacent areas of Pakistan and Iran resulting from a Soviet decision to attack or pursue insurgents operating out of those countries. Given the dislocation of so many Afghan refugees, the refugee camps’ potential as a source of recruitment and supplies for the insurgents, and the Soviets’ publicly stated rationalization of the invasion as a response to external threats, the potential for spillover is high. ([classification marking not declassified])
[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. According to a statement on the cover page: “This assessment was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research and was coordinated with the Afghan Task Force, the Office of Political Analysis, the Strategic Warning Staff, and the National Intelligence Officers for Warning, General Purposes Forces, and USSR-Eastern Europe.”↩