Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

165. Annex A From the President’s Daily Brief¹

Washington, January 14, 1980

PROSPECTS FOR INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

Whether the disparate Afghan insurgent groups can stand up to the Soviet military occupation forces depends on the degree of Soviet commitment.

The Soviets appear to have three options:

(1) To use Soviet forces primarily to secure urban areas and major roads and to rebuild the Afghan Army for the role of pacification in the countryside.

(2) To use Soviet forces directly in counter-insurgency operations in the countryside as a supplement to the Afghan Army wherever most needed.

(3) To use Soviet forces as the primary element in crushing the insurgents throughout the country.

We believe that the Soviets already have sufficient forces (80,000 troops) in Afghanistan to fulfill option 1, and in fact now control the urban areas and key roads. The longer task of rebuilding the Afghan Army to the point where it can challenge the insurgents in the countryside will be much more difficult. Even before the Babrak coup, the Afghan Army was well below strength due to desertions and low morale. If the Afghan Army cannot regain more of the initiative against the insurgents soon, the Army may continue to disintegrate and rural territory continue to fall to the insurgents.

We believe, then, that the Soviets will be drawn into an active counterinsurgency role as in option 2. The recent establishment of General Sokolov’s headquarters in Kabul and of a tactical air headquarters at Bagram airfield would seem to point in this direction. The introduction of more airpower, especially transport and gunship helicopters and close air support aircraft, or the availability of the latter from nearby airfields in the USSR, would presage such intentions.

A key question is whether limited Soviet counterinsurgency operations under this option would intimidate the insurgents into at least quiescence. The insurgents have probably not faced the ruthlessness with which the Soviets will destroy their villages, mosques, and farmlands, and have not been subjected to the massive firepower of helicopter gunships, jet bombers, and tactical missiles that the Soviets have on hand and will use.

We tend to believe that the insurgents are sufficiently mobile, elusive, and determined not to be cowed by such Soviet tactics, at least in the central, northern, and eastern portions of Afghanistan. In most of this area, the base altitude is about 15,000 feet. Helicopter performance is poor and aircraft are inhibited.

In the southern and southwestern areas, however, the terrain is generally flat and accessible. Here even the existing levels of Soviet forces are probably adequate to overpower the insurgents and establish firm control. Thus the insurgency is not likely to prevent the Soviets from establishing a secure base area from which they could conduct covert operations, infiltration, or military operations against either Iranian or Pakistani Baluchistan or both.

If the Soviets and the Afghan Army cannot establish adequate control over the mountainous countryside, the Soviets will be faced with the decision as to introducing substantially larger ground forces. The Soviets have few troops left in the border area and would have to bring in units from other parts of the USSR. Once these forces were in place, the Soviets could move against the insurgent strongholds countrywide, relying heavily on airstrikes against rebel concentrations but sending in units on foot against remote rebel bases.

Such actions would probably push tens of thousands of refugees, including insurgents, across the border into Pakistan and Iran and force many others to give up the fight. They would allow the Soviets to reduce the insurgency to nuisance levels, but at a very high cost. Still, we would expect the rebels to return to Afghanistan and renew the fight whenever the Soviets decided to wind down their involvement.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President’s Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The annex printed here was found in this form.