14. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
10030. Subject: Soviet Perspective of Afghan Coup.
Summary: Soviet reaction to Afghan coup has been cautious but increasingly positive. It is extremely hazardous to predict Moscow’s future policies toward Afghanistan as a result of the coup. Much will depend on such unknowns as Soviet assessment of (A) the internal Afghan political situation and (B) Indian sensitivities about “outside” threats to Delhi’s efforts to “regionalize” and “normalize” inter-state relations in South Asia. Based on past experience, we believe the Soviets will work to help insure the survivability of the new regime and, in the longer run, its consolidation of power. At the same time, Soviets will be alert to broader strategic/regional considerations (e.g., relations with India) and need to weigh these in assessing how far they should go in assisting the Kabul regime. In the end, the durability of the new pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan will depend chiefly on indigenous factors and not primarily on the Soviet Union. End summary.
1. The public Soviet reaction to the Afghan coup has been cautious, primarily limited to straight news items, but increasingly positive in tone. The caution is undoubtedly based on a Soviet intention to deflate widespread suspicions that Moscow instigated, had prior knowledge of or directly participated in the coup, and may also reflect genuine Soviet uncertainty about the new regime. The Soviet press on May 5 gave special prominence to Taraki’s condemnation of allegations in the international press that “foreign interference” contributed to the success of the coup. We expect to see progressively more favorable coverage of the Afghan coup in the Soviet press, with emphasis on foreign and domestic support for the Afghan regime and the enhanced prospects for social-economic progress produced by the “revolution”.
2. Moscow of course can only be pleased by the sudden seizure of power in Afghanistan by men who have long been avowedly “socialist” [Page 34] and pro-Soviet. In deciding its course of action, Moscow will have to bear two main considerations in mind:
—The Soviets will not want their activities in Afghanistan to set back the USSR’s broader strategic-political interests in South Asia, which center fundamentally on good Indo-Soviet relations. The Soviets realize that Delhi’s main foreign policy goals are to “regionalize” and to “normalize” inter-state relations in South Asia, while minimizing the potential for involvement in the region by outside powers.
—Moscow will not want to encourage, through excessively overt Soviet identification with the new Kabul regime, a “marriage of convenience” of potentially anti-Communist/anti-Soviet elements including nationalist, anti-Communist and Islamic forces in Afghanistan, which could coalesce and threaten the new regime with a “counter-revolution.”
3. What will be Soviet short term objectives? It is hazardous to attempt to predict shifts in Moscow’s policies as a result of recent events in Afghanistan. Much will depend on the Soviet assessment of the internal Afghan political scene, the degree to which the new regime turns out to be pro-Soviet and/or genuinely non-aligned. Past experience leads us to conclude that in the short run Moscow will mainly be interested in helping to insure the survivability of the new leftist regime and its consolidation of power. Moscow knows that this will be no mean feat for the new rulers in Kabul, given the background of recurring coups and violence in Afghan political history, and the degree of conservative and anti-Communist sentiment prevalent in Afghanistan. We anticipate that the Soviets will continue and probably increase economic and military aid, and work behind the scenes to bolster the new regime through material support and political “advice”. The Soviet “advice” probably will stress the importance of continuing unity among the leftists and military factions that have seized power as the only hope to establish the permanence that has eluded all Afghan regimes in recent history. We believe that the Soviets will also encourage the new regime to move quickly and dramatically to show economic and social “progress” (e.g., confiscation of Shah dynasty property). Internationally, the Soviets will seek to “consult” closely with New Delhi on the Soviet reading of events in Afghanistan in order to reassure the Indians of Soviet bona fides and to dispel possible Indian apprehensions of excessive “outside” involvement in Afghanistan. Soviet propaganda will selectively highlight the recognition and welcoming of the Afghan regime by other countries, particularly those in the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement. Moscow will work through international organizations and its bilateral relations with other (particularly non-aligned and fellow “socialist” countries) to mobilize aid for Afghanistan. We agree that the Soviets are not likely to encourage the [Page 35] Afghans to heat up the Pushtunistan issue in the short run, unless of course, this would be viewed as helpful in assisting the regime to consolidate its control internally.
4. What will be Soviet long run objectives? If survival and consolidation are the short run imperatives, we believe that in the long run the Soviets will hope to encourage a steady strengthening of the Khalq Party’s base in Afghanistan so that the party and not individuals will provide a firmer foundation for future continuity and control. We anticipate that the Soviets will also encourage the institutionalization of state-party control mechanisms down to the grass roots level which are characteristic of all Communist regimes. As this process builds, the Soviets will tout developments in Afghanistan as a triumph of “progressive forces” and the “world revolutionary process.” In this long run perspective, the Soviets may also see Afghanistan as a regional “model” for other “progressive” forces in the region seeking to capture power in their respective countries (this is a role which Soviet party theoreticians like to attribute to Angola and Ethiopia in Africa, Vietnam in Asia and Cuba in Latin America).
5. More on the Indian angle: Embassy New Delhi is, of course, in a far better position to assess India’s sensitivities to a more direct Soviet participation in the consolidation efforts of the new Afghan regime.2 We would note that the Soviets have willingly and quickly sacrificed short term losses in relations with the U.S. and other countries to reap what they see as long term gains through direct and massive support to new “progressive” regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. It seems from this vantage point, however, that the Indians would be very irritated if Moscow attempted in the long or the short run to involve itself in Afghanistan (as it has in Angola and Ethiopia) in a way that would indicate a Soviet intention to draw Afghanistan into its own sphere of influence. It is noteworthy that the Desai government’s moves to improve relations with the U.S. and China have made nature of Indo-Soviet relations all the more delicate. By irritating Delhi through “over-involvement” in Afghanistan, the Soviets would risk harming Indo-Soviet relations and increasing the possibility for better Sino-Indian and Indo-U.S. relations: a result which would be viewed here as most detrimental to Soviet strategic interests in South Asia and in Asia as a whole. In our view, the degree to which the Soviets directly assert [Page 36] themselves will therefore be significantly influenced by Soviet perceptions of possible Indian objections.
6. In sum, in our view, the durability of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, particularly in the short run, will depend chiefly on indigenous factors in Afghanistan and not primarily on the ability of the Soviet Union to influence directly events on the unpredictable Afghan political scene.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Program Files for Soviet-Asia Relations, 1960–1978, Lot 90D320, Afghanistan, January–June 1978. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Kabul. Also sent for information to New Delhi, Islamabad, Tehran, Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, Karachi, Lahore, USLO Peking, Hong Kong, Ankara, Jidda, USUN, USNATO, Geneva for the U.S. SALT delegation, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- Reporting from New Delhi, the Embassy suggested that India was not well informed regarding the political orientation of the new regime in Afghanistan. For example, in telegram 7475 from New Delhi, May 11, the Embassy paraphrased Indian Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta’s hope “that the new Afghan Government means what it says about non-alignment and good relations with its neighbors.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780200–0473)↩