13. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
SUBJECT
- The New Afghan Government’s Relations with the USSR
Principal Judgments
1. The Soviets welcome a Communist dominated government in Afghanistan, but probably will be cautious in attempting to capitalize on the advent of the new regime because of its internal fragility and the delicate equilibrium of regional tensions in South Asia.
2. Moscow will work actively to keep the Communists in power in Kabul and to influence the new government’s decision-making process. The Soviets probably will offer increased economic and military assistance.
3. Because the new Afghan Government could face serious domestic threats in the near term, Moscow’s major immediate interest will be to help the regime consolidate its power. The Soviets in the near term probably will counsel restraint regarding any adventuristic policies at home and abroad.
4. Limited Iranian meddling in Afghanistan seems likely, given the Shah’s perception of a serious threat to Iran from the USSR via Afghanistan. Although Pakistan shares these worries, it is less likely to become involved unless the Afghan Government revives the Pushtunistan dispute over Pakistan’s western provinces.
5. The chances of a direct confrontation between the USSR and Afghanistan’s anti-Communist neighbors remain low, although they have increased slightly. Both Tehran and Islamabad will use the prospect of such a confrontation as an argument for increased US military and political support.
Introduction
On April 27, leftist military officers overthrew former President Daoud and installed a largely civilian government controlled by the leadership of the pro-Soviet Khalq Party (the Afghan Communist [Page 27] Party). The coup was executed in reaction to the government’s arrest of Communist leaders. Given Soviet contacts with Afghan leftists and the armed forces, it is possible that the Soviets learned of the coup in advance, although perhaps by only a matter of hours. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets tried to encourage or discourage the leftists, but Moscow and the Afghan Communists have been pursuing the long-term goal of establishing a Communist government in the country.
The New Government: Communist Background
The present movement dates from the early 1950s, when Afghan Communists aided by Communists in the USSR, Iran, Pakistan, and China, began a serious attempt to organize. The major impetus for its growth and organization clearly came from the Soviets, who trained civilians and military personnel in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and introduced Soviet military and technical advisers into Afghanistan. Soviet clandestine activities and propaganda also played a role.
Aside from a small faction that broke with the majority and formed a small pro-Chinese party, there has never been any significant ideological differences between Afghan Communists and the USSR. Afghan Communists, however, were never happy with the fact that Moscow considered its relations with the Afghan Government as more important than supporting the interests of local Communism. Kabul’s arrest of Communist leaders, purges of leftist officials, and restrictions on Communist political activity, for example, never interfered with Soviet-Afghan relations.
Infighting among the Afghan Communists themselves—on the grounds of personality rather than ideology—added to tensions, with rival Afghan factions vying for Moscow’s support and the Soviets attempting to resolve disputes. The present party is the result of the union last year—under Soviet pressure—of two competing Communist parties, and there apparently is still considerable tension between the two groups.
Consolidating Power
Afghanistan’s new rulers, despite their quick seizure of power and the absence of any current significant resistance, not only inherit the weak institutions that permitted the overthrow of the last two governments, but lack some of the assets that helped keep their predecessors in power. Central government authority is almost non-existent in some parts of the country, and even in those areas where Kabul exercises limited control, the government’s laws and policies have little impact on the lives of most of the people. Although most Afghans would not be favorably disposed to a Communist-controlled government, they [Page 28] have little interest in who rules in Kabul. Politics, including coups, involves only a small part of the population.
The popular reaction—either positive or negative—to a change in government has never been a critical factor in Afghanistan; control of key military units has been far more important. The last two successful military coups depended initially on the control of armored units and the air base near the capital. Neither coup was particularly well planned or executed, but in both there was little opposition once the city of Kabul was in the hands of the coup leaders. The new government will need to ensure the loyalty of key units. The process may be difficult.
A hastily organized attempt to overthrow the new government with a small force opposed to the new regime cannot be ruled out, but somewhat more likely would be a gradual buildup of anti-government activities among the tribes or among religious conservatives. Some increase in such activities seems almost inevitable; the seriousness of the threat from the tribes will depend largely on the actions of the new government and the extent to which the conservatives win support in the military.
Several potential problems could affect the new rulers’ ability to govern the country and cope with its fundamental social and economic ills. For example, a split could develop between the military and civilian leaders. In the civil sector, the probable removal of experienced bureaucrats in a purge of rightists and officials belonging to or closely connected with the family that has ruled Afghanistan since the 19th Century could quickly erode the regime’s ability to cope with unfamiliar problems.2 Within the ruling party itself, longstanding rivalries between its two factions could resurface, causing tensions or struggles that would deflect the leaders from government business.
The mechanics of this coup were similar to those of the one in 1973, but the result may lead to a much more fundamental change in Afghan political, economic, and social life. The killing of Daoud and members of his family and the immediately stated intention of the new rulers to eliminate “every member of the family of the autocratic demagogue” are ominous signs. Even if further violent reprisals are not envisioned by the government, the removal of traditional elites from official positions will adversely affect the operation of the bureaucracy and government.
The new government lacks the legitimacy derived from tribal status that reinforced both the monarchy and the republic. Since the early 19th century—except for a short-lived government overthrown in 1929—Afghanistan has been ruled by the acknowledged leader of the domi [Page 29] nant family in the dominant tribe of the Pushtun ethnic group. Although some of the leaders of the new government—including Prime Minister Taraki—are Pushtuns, they have no claim to prestige and respect on the basis of their position in the tribal hierarchy.
This lack of experience and tribal status need not be fatal, but will make it more difficult to deal with other problems. The new rulers are trying to overcome this weakness. Their slaughter of Daoud’s family and their denunciations of misrule by Daoud and his ancestors and relatives is designed both to eliminate rivals and to discredit the entire concept of selecting rulers on the traditional basis.
Probably more important will be the policies of the new government. Their initial pronouncements, especially support for Islam and national independence, are a clear indication that the new leaders are aware of the risks of running counter to the xenophobia and deeply religious sentiments of most of the population. Some observers believe that the Communist leaders are basically nationalists despite their longstanding ties to Moscow. If so, they might pursue a policy aimed at preserving at least some opening to the West.
Any direct attack on religion in Afghanistan would be risky. Right-wing Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, may increase their activities and further assassination attempts are likely. Although the government denies that it is Communist, popular suspicion of the government will grow as word spreads that the Communists—i.e., the atheists—are in power.3 Past efforts at modernization have brought strong reactions, and any major effort by a Communist government to tamper with tradition or institute strong central government control could bring widespread popular unrest, despite the normal lack of interest in politics by most of the populace.
Iran and Pakistan
The probability of at least limited foreign meddling in Afghanistan is high. The Shah of Iran has long argued that the Soviets are attempting to encircle Iran, and to use their position in Afghanistan to break up Pakistan, thereby allowing them the use of southwestern Pakistan as an outlet to the Indian Ocean. The Shah sees the recent coup as confirmation of his worst fears, and it is highly likely that he will order some kind of clandestine operation against the new government. Iranian capabilities are limited, however, and probably would become a threat to Kabul only if the government already faced significant resistance [Page 30] from the tribes or the religious conservatives, or had become embroiled in a confrontation with Pakistan.
Although Islamabad would be less inclined than Tehran to intervene in Afghanistan, an Afghan-initiated confrontation with Pakistan appears more likely. Moscow, however, would try to discourage Afghanistan from embarking on any confrontation at least until the Taraki government consolidates its power. The Afghan Communists may well see a revival of the Pushtunistan dispute, which involves the status of western Pakistan, where Pushtuns predominate, as a way to win domestic tribal support or distract attention from any increasingly repressive measures introduced in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Communists have tended to press the issue, and have been critical of Daoud’s accommodation with Islamabad. As Communists they would expect stronger support from Moscow against Pakistan than previous Afghan governments, and probably would receive it. There already have been a few indications—such as the flying of Pushtun flags in Kabul after the coup—that the new government does see Pushtunistan as an issue it can use. Moreover, a few of the leading supporters of Pushtunistan in Pakistan are Communists.
Pakistani reaction will depend on how hard Kabul pushes the issue. The Pakistanis are capable, in the absence of more aggressive action, of putting up with propaganda on the issue although they would reciprocate in kind. If the Afghans become too strident or too active, Pakistan can close the main roads across the border, interrupting a large part of landlocked Afghanistan’s foreign trade. Such a move would increase Afghan dependence on the USSR for a trade route. There is some evidence that a serious tribal rebellion in 1975 was instigated by the Pakistanis when they decided Daoud had gone too far in supporting separatists in Pakistan. Should the Afghans become too active in support of separatists, Pakistan might resort to punitive and preemptive raids into Afghanistan. The possibility of a Soviet reaction, however, would probably deter the Pakistanis from a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan.
The Soviet View
The Soviets welcome the establishment of a pro-Soviet, Communist-controlled government in Afghanistan. In itself a major gain for Moscow, this development is significant also as the first leftist victory in a year otherwise marked by the establishment of moderate and conservative governments in South Asia.
Moscow’s interest in Afghanistan predates the Bolshevik revolution. Over the last quarter century, the Soviet Union has made a considerable investment in its southern neighbor. Afghanistan was the first recipient of Soviet aid, and is still among the 10 largest recipients [Page 31] of Soviet military and economic assistance. The Communist victory protects this investment and ensures that at least for the near future, Moscow will remain—and probably improve—its position as the most influential foreign power in Kabul. The Soviets applauded Daoud’s coming to power in 1973, but in recent years had grown concerned over his efforts to rid his government of leftists and achieve greater independence from Moscow.
Since Moscow’s relations with Afghanistan’s Communists have not always been close, the Soviets will move to strengthen their ties to the recently re-united Afghan Communist party. The Soviets will exploit these ties to influence any reorganization of Afghanistan’s party, military, and administrative institutions. They will proceed cautiously, however, in order to avoid creating undue anxiety in Afghanistan.
Although Daoud’s removal will calm some Soviet concerns, it will also cause alarm about Soviet policy elsewhere in the region, particularly in Iran and Pakistan. The Pakistanis and Iranians suspect that the Soviets engineered the coup, and the Pakistanis are again fearful of a “Delhi-Kabul-Moscow” axis, noting that India and the USSR quickly recognized the new regime.4 Both nations will use the events in Kabul to try to elicit increased US military and political support.
The Soviets profess to favor a calm and stable subcontinent with governments friendly to the USSR. Tensions and instability—the Soviets allege—create openings for greater Western or Chinese influence. However, Moscow’s previous successes in South Asia have been largely due to its exploitation of these same regional rivalries.
Moscow would favor the eventual creation of a Marxist state in Afghanistan along the lines of a Cuba or Vietnam. At this point, however, the Soviets are probably more concerned with the new government’s stability in power and with minimizing the damage to Soviet interests elsewhere in the region than in the ideological and institutional purity of the new regime. The Soviets probably would be satisfied with a left-leaning, strongly pro-Soviet government with distinct nationalist colorings. Moscow almost certainly will press for greater support of Soviet positions on international issues, such as the Asian collective security system, and will expect the new government to refrain from any new initiatives toward Peking. However, it probably will not in the near term press the government to launch any far-reaching, radical reforms that run the risk of alienating large segments of the population.
Moscow likewise will counsel caution regarding Kabul’s regional initiatives. Aware that several members of the new government have [Page 32] identified themselves in the past with Pushtun or Baluch causes, Moscow is almost certainly worried that the new regime might too quickly seek radical solutions to its border disputes with Pakistan and Iran. Moscow’s hesitation would be based on its fear of jeopardizing its attempts to improve its relations with India, Pakistan, and Iran. Moscow probably would not approve any Afghan attempt to use the Pushtunistan issue before the Taraki government consolidates its power at home.
Should Kabul nevertheless become embroiled in the Pushtunistan issue or other foreign entanglements, however, Moscow would support it. Particularly in the event of internal or external threats to the stability of the new Afghan Government, Moscow would increase military aid, including the number of Soviet advisers in the country. It is highly unlikely that Moscow would introduce Soviet troops. In the event of a successful counter-revolution in the near term, Moscow probably would be restrained in its reaction, trusting that Afghan dependence upon Soviet military and economic aid would eventually convince any new government of the need for a continuing close relationship with Moscow. Moscow can be expected to continue and very likely increase its sizable economic and military aid programs in Afghanistan.
[Omitted here is an annex, “Past and Present Soviet Policy,” which traces Soviet interest in and influence over Afghanistan from 1921.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 39: New Afghan Government’s Relations with USSR. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A typed note on the first page reads: “This memorandum was prepared by the CIA’s Office of Regional and Political Analysis in consultation with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State.”↩
- A reference to the Mohammadzai family.↩
- Reporting from Kabul described the new regime’s self-identification in more moderate terms. For example, in telegram 3311 from Kabul, April 29, the Embassy noted that the new regime was “still avoiding the use of obvious Communist claptrap.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780184–0066)↩
- The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the new Afghan Government on April 30. India recognized the new Afghan Government on May 2.↩