Office of the Historian

15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance1

Washington, May 8, 1978

SUBJECT

  • US Policy Toward Afghanistan

The President has noted a report on Ambassador Eliot’s weekend conversation with Prime Minister Taraki.2 According to the report, Taraki said that the climate of bilateral relations will depend on US willingness to provide economic aid to his government. He said he will be asking for new aid from both the US and USSR.

In response to the above, the President stated that we should build a good relationship with the new Government of Afghanistan, but [Page 37] we should proceed in a cautious manner with respect to economic assistance.3

Zbigniew Brzezinski
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/77–3/79. Secret. ↩
  2. In telegram 3619 from Kabul, May 6, Eliot reported on his first conversation with Taraki. He characterized the meeting as friendly and expressed the U.S. desire to help Afghanistan retain its independence. Taraki emphasized that what had transpired in late April was a “revolution,” not a “coup,” and that Daoud was killed because he shot at his attackers, who otherwise would have taken him captive to be court-martialed and possibly executed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780193–1106) Carter may have read a condensed version of the telegram in the May 7 “Current Reports” compilation disseminated by INR. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Program Files for Soviet-Asia Relations, 1960–1978, Lot 90D320, Afghanistan, January–June 1978)↩
  3. Subsequent Embassy reports also noted the challenges of maintaining economic assistance programs with Afghanistan. For example, in telegram 5982 from Kabul, July 24, the Embassy reported that while the DRA wanted the U.S. aid program “to continue in all the areas which were involved before the revolution,” this would have to proceed slowly because the new government “did not have its act together.” The Embassy further explained that among the new government officials there was a deficit of experience and reliability required to manage assistance programs, an assessment shared by other Western powers and international aid organizations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780303–1012)↩