124. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are a title page, a cover page, and a security information page.]
[Page 345]Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability ([classification marking not declassified])
Overview
The execution of Hafizullah Amin and the installation of the more pliable Babrak Karmal as President of Afghanistan, will not significantly alter the prospects for prolonged insurgency. Despite increased Soviet aid, the new regime will be a government under siege, continually attacked by fiercely independent, but poorly organized, Pashtun tribesmen. ([classification marking not declassified])
The Communist regime in Afghanistan and the Afghan tribesmen have been in conflict since the Communist seizure of power in 1978. Although the tribesmen are not unified, they will continue to keep the countryside in a state of instability. The regime, despite only a thin layer of public support, probably will maintain control of the major cities. Indeed, the Soviets and their puppet regime are likely to face the same long resistance that an earlier generation experienced when the Soviets required a decade to subdue the Muslim populations of Central Asia. ([classification marking not declassified])
For thousands of years, the topography and Afghan cultural mores militated against the formation of a strong central government and even against a strong union of the tribes themselves. The only characteristics common to the tribesmen are martial values, an egalitarian tradition, a theologically unsophisticated version of Islam, and a distrust for authority. ([classification marking not declassified])
Successful Afghan monarchs mustered popular support by drawing upon the people’s fears of invasion by a foreign power with an alien religion and bent tradition to their side through the skillful exploitation of such traditional values as defense of personal and tribal honor, attachment to religion, and intense dislike of foreigners. ([classification marking not declassified])
In contrast, the Communist revolutionaries have tried to overturn tradition rather than adapt it, to eliminate local autonomy, to destroy the elite class by confiscating its land, and to undermine the authority of the Muslim religious establishment. These actions have aroused the resistance of the fiercely independent Afghans. The present no-win situation—persistent insurgency and fragile Communist control of urban areas—is expected to continue. ([classification marking not declassified])
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- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C–367, 01 Jan–30 Jun 80. Secret. A statement attached to the cover page reads: “Information as of 16 October 1979 has been used in preparing the major part of this report. Information concerning the recent coup is reflected but does not change the basic judgments. The author of this paper is [name not declassified], Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, Office of Scientific Intelligence. It has been coordinated with the Offices of Political Analysis, Geographic and Cartographic Research, and Central Reference, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia.” Also attached to the cover page is a handwritten note that reads: “[name not declassified]: This is super—I want to get it to Pres., etc., ASAP,” signed “Stan Turner.” Turner forwarded the assessment under a January 3 covering memorandum to Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski, in which he wrote: “I believe it provides excellent background perspective to political events in Afghanistan today.” (Ibid.)↩