123. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

28134. USSALTTWO. Subject: Afghanistan: Assessment of Soviet Motives.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Begin summary. This report, which elaborates the initial thoughts on the Soviet move into Afghanistan which we reported in more restricted channels, attempts to analyze both the immediate objectives and the possible longer-range purposes behind the action.2 The obvious immediate aim was to replace Amin with a ruler who might stand a better chance of gaining popular support for the Marxist regime, thus bringing the insurgency to an end. But this objective would not, in our view, in and of itself have justified the Soviet move, given the seeming risk to other Soviet foreign policy interests. We assume, then, that other factors also heavily influenced the decision. Among these, in descending order of probability, would be:

—fear that hatred of Amin and growing insurgency might eventually produce the collapse of the Marxist regime—a development to be prevented at whatever cost because of its potential impact on Eastern Europe;

—similarly, a concern that defeat of the regime by forces of Islamic fundamentalism, which if combined with similar forces in Iran and Pakistan would have potentially dangerous implications for the Soviet Union’s own Moslem population;

—a desire to construct a “cordon sanitaire” around China—based on Soviet control over Mongolia, Indochina, and Afghanistan and continuing good relations with India; and

—at a later point in time, the beginning of a drive toward the Indian Ocean through Pakistan, or possibly toward the Persian Gulf through the Baluchi area of Iran.

[Page 341]

We find no credible evidence of a split within the Soviet leadership on the decision to move into Afghanistan. They must have agreed that many outside factors combined to make the time propitious for the move: increasing doubt about the SALT treaty, the NATO theater nuclear force decision, the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations, and the termination of U.S. military aid to Pakistan, among others. While we are not prepared to conclude that the Afghan decision represents a permanent turning away from the policy of détente, we believe that, given the present slump in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Soviets concluded that no real progress was to be expected in any case in the months ahead. End summary.

3. There is much which argued against the Soviet armed intervention into Afghanistan. The move seems likely to worsen Moscow’s relations with Pakistan, Iran, and other Muslim states, not to mention China. It will seriously strain the very fabric of the policies of détente with the West and especially with the U.S., jeopardizing in the process the SALT treaty. There is even the danger of becoming bogged down in an Indochina-type guerilla war (though we recognize that parallels with Vietnam are very imperfect).

4. Why, then, did they do it, when the potential damage to Soviet foreign policy interests was so great? We do not pretend to have the answer, other than to make the perhaps obvious observation that the Soviets must have considered all these risks and concluded that the potential benefits outweighed them.

Soviet objectives

5. The Soviets apparently have multiple objectives. The most immediate one would be related to the situation within Afghanistan itself, with Moscow moving to remove Amin and carry out its long-held plans for broadening the regime’s base, installing a leader who can gain more popular support for the DRA in hopes of quelling the insurgency. Their massive troop support suggests that they are prepared to launch a major offensive themselves against the insurgents if Babrak is unable to gain that needed support from the population.

6. Beyond the immediate situation, however, we would imagine several ideological and geopolitical considerations which entered into the decision. While some of them are in the worst-case category, they are perhaps worth mentioning as an aid to analysis:

Amin’s lack of popular support and inability to come to terms with the Muslim insurgency risked the eventual fall of a Marxist-oriented government from power. Once installed in an area contiguous to the Soviet Union, no “Socialist” regime has fallen from power in recent times; the Soviets may have determined not to allow Afghanistan to become the exception, fearing the impact of such an “ideological” [Page 342] defeat on the nationalist aspirations of the other Communist countries in the Socialist Bloc.

—Potentially more dangerous than a simple defeat of the DRA would have been its defeat by forces of Islamic fundamentalism, which pose a threat to the Soviets not only in ideological terms but also in geopolitical terms. The outcome of the present turmoil in Iran is far from clear, and despite the loss of U.S. influence in that country the present trends are not necessarily favorable for the Soviet Union. The move into Afghanistan could have been intended to forestall similar chaos there. A prevailing tide of Muslim fundamentalism on the Soviet Union’s southern borders could well be perceived by the Soviet leadership as providing the catalyst for arousing at some future time nationalistic aspirations in the six Soviet Central Asian republics with their population of some 50 million Muslims.

—The China factor must also be considered, given Soviet paranoia about the long-term threat from China. It seems to us that Chinese fears of a Soviet encirclement strategy are overdrawn, yet the concurrent strengthening of Moscow’s position in Indochina with the fresh move into Afghanistan will no doubt strengthen Chinese concerns. Taken together with the existing Soviet military presence in Mongolia and the continued wooing of India, the makings of a “cordon sanitaire” around China are present. We would see the Afghan move, if it is directed against China, as basically defensive, but we cannot exclude the possibility that the Afghan operation is a dry run for an eventual move into Sinkiang. At the moment, however, we would place this as very low on the scale of probabilities.

—A key question is whether the Soviet action will be self-contained in Afghanistan, or whether there are broader objectives. There may be only a plan to help the Afghanis seal off the border with Pakistan, to prevent use of Pak territory by rebel reinforcements. But some Pakistani officials have long feared the revival of historic Russian ambitions to move toward the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

—The turmoil in Iran, as well as the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations might even tempt the Soviets to move through Afghanistan and Iranian Baluchistan to the Straits of Hormuz, thus establishing a controlling position on access to the Persian Gulf and Iranian oil. Should Iran begin to disintegrate into autonomous regions, a Soviet move into the Kurdish areas, thereby extending Soviet Azerbaijan, might also be tempting. Again, we consider such moves improbable in the near term, but we are unable to dismiss the possibility altogether.

Timing, decision-making and the leadership factor

7. We assume that the Soviet leadership, in preparing the Afghan operation, considered the overall shape of their foreign relations. We assume further that, while contingency plans may have existed earlier, [Page 343] planning for the operation began in earnest about a month before it was carried out—i.e., during the latter part of November. At that time, the Soviets may have perceived:

—That SALT II was at death’s door anyway.

—That prospects for obtaining MFN treatment from the U.S. in the near future were non-existent.

—That NATO was not going to heed Soviet warnings about the dangers of the impending decision on long-range theater nuclear forces.

—That the U.S. administration was committed to a defense build-up, whether or not SALT was ratified.

—That the U.S. was actively expanding its military presence in the region and, if it succeeded in obtaining basing for the Rapid Deployment Force, would be in a better position later to oppose something like the Afghan invasion than it is right now.3

—That the present slump in U.S.-Soviet relations would last at least until after U.S. elections, with or without Afghanistan.

—That the just-ended first round of Sino-Soviet negotiations showed that relations with China were no better, but also no worse.

—That the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations would tend to minimize the impact of Iran’s negative reaction and, at a minimum, prevent Iran from turning to closer relations with the U.S. in reaction to the move into Afghanistan.

—That the U.S. cut-off of military aid to Pakistan would leave Pakistan little alternative but to accommodate to the Soviet move.

—That the weakness of India’s caretaker government would minimize the likelihood of a sharp shift in Indian foreign policy as a result of the Soviet move, while the good prospects for Mrs. Gandhi’s return to power give the Soviets hope for continued good relations with India over the longer run.

8. In sum, the world scene as viewed from the Kremlin offered no overriding deterrent to moving now. Action would stave off future dangers, and circumstances combined to minimize the losses. Yet taking this major step still would have been a hard-fought decision, and it is tempting to speculate that one or another constellation of leaders in the Politburo gained the upper hand and decided to move on their own. There is, in fact, speculation in Moscow that runs along the lines that Brezhnev would not have concurred had he been in the thick of [Page 344] decision-making in recent weeks, given his presumed concern with U.S.-Soviet relations and SALT.

9. We have no credible evidence, however, that this was not a collective decision wholeheartedly adopted by the entire Politburo. Brezhnev has been active at least on-and-off of late, and so far as we know the ailing Kosygin is the only member of the top leadership who would have been unable to take part in planning for the Afghan operation.

10. If our theory is correct, then along with the Afghan decision the leadership must also have taken some basic decisions on such matters as détente and the shape of U.S.-Soviet relations in the immediate future. While we are not prepared as yet to conclude that this represents a permanent Soviet turn away from the policy of détente, it rather plainly suggests that Moscow does not expect any real progress in relations with the U.S. in the months ahead.

Watson
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800004–0424. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London and USNATO. Also sent for information to Warsaw, Amman, Baghdad, Beijing, Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Cairo, Damascus, Islamabad, Jidda, Kabul, Leningrad, New Delhi, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, Beirut, U.S. Mission Geneva, U.S. Mission Berlin, and USDel MBFR Vienna.
  2. Likely reference is to telegram 28119 from Moscow, December 28, which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 247. See also Document 101.
  3. Carter established the Rapid Deployment Force under PD/NSC–18, “U.S. National Strategy,” August 24, 1977. Carter announced on October 1, 1979, in an address to the Nation, that he would direct the Secretary of Defense to “enhance the capacity” of the Rapid Deployment Force. (Public Papers: Carter 1979, Book II, p. 1804)