Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

125. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA 80–110003C

Washington, January, 1980

[Omitted here are a cover page and a security information page.]

Iran: Views on Afghanistan ([classification marking not declassified])

Summary

The Soviet-supported coup in Afghanistan has further damaged the already badly strained relations between Tehran and Kabul. After a two-month hiatus, Iran has resumed its propaganda attacks on the Kabul government, which it sees as a puppet of the Soviets and an anti-Islamic force in the region. Soviet efforts to allay Iranian concern about the coup apparently have failed; the Iranians have formally condemned the Soviet military intervention.² ([classification marking not declassified])

Iran’s pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party, on the other hand, is pleased by the changes in Kabul and hopes that the Soviets and Afghans will give greater support to the Tudeh. ([classification marking not declassified])

The secular leadership of the Iranian Government is unlikely in the near term to shift from its policy of not supporting the Afghan insurgents. Over time, however, it will be pressed to give more support to the insurgents by Iran’s religious leadership. The religious leadership is already providing some training and arms support for the rebels, and this is likely to increase. ([classification marking not declassified])

The Soviet-inspired coup and the Soviet military intervention will increase Iran’s concern about Soviet activities and intentions in Iran. Tehran will avoid a serious strain in relations, however, because it needs Soviet support in the UN. ([classification marking not declassified])

It is unlikely that the recent events in Afghanistan will encourage Iran to be more forthcoming with the United States on the hostage issue.³ Although some of Ayatollah Khomeini’s advisers may be inclined to find a face-saving way out of the crisis because of the Soviet action, Khomeini views both superpowers as anti-Islamic, expansionist forces and will probably see little reason why the coup in Afghanistan should require him to be less hostile to the United States. ([classification marking not declassified])

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 09–00438R, Box 1, Iran: Views on Afghanistan; An Intelligence Memorandum, PA 80–10003C. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: “This paper was prepared by [name not declassified] of the Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Iran Task Force, on [less than 1 line and classification marking not declassified].
2. On December 29, the Iranian Government released an official statement declaring the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan “a hostile act against Iran and all the Muslims of the world.” (Doyle McManus, “Iran Protests, Tells Soviets to Pull Out Troops,” Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1979, p. A1)
3. For a contemporary analysis of the impact of the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan on U.S. policy and the Iran hostage crisis, see, for example, Barry Rubin, “American Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979–1981,” Iranian Studies, vol. 13, issue 1–4, 1980, pp. 307–326.