Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

115. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 29, 1979

SUBJECT

• Daily Report

Information

Watson on Soviets in Afghanistan: Ambassador Watson sees the Soviet move into Afghanistan as marking a major watershed in Soviet policy and constituting an unacceptable extension of the Brezhnev doctrine. Watson speculates that the Soviets opted for Amin’s removal in order to broaden domestic political support for the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and hoped to facilitate this with the introduction of Soviet combat troops. Any disadvantages of a military move into Afghanistan at this time, Watson asserts, were minimized by the current slump in U.S.-Soviet relations, and the deterioration of U.S. relations with Iran and, to a lesser extent, with Pakistan. Ambassador Watson expresses his hope that a way can be found to bring pressure on the Soviets and to make the political costs to them so high that they will find a way to withdraw their troops. If the price has been sufficiently painful for them, they may think again before undertaking another such adventure.² (S)

NSC Activity

Follow-up on the NSC Meeting³

State has transmitted messages on your behalf to the Heads of Government of Muslim countries, key non-aligned countries, key African countries and the Chinese as agreed at the NSC meeting.⁴ (C)

The messages to Muslim countries stress the threat to Islam from Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. (C)

The messages to the non-aligned countries urge that they must stand up for one of their own in the face of a Soviet takeover. (C)

The messages to the African countries emphasize that Afghanistan’s peace and friendship treaty is being used as justification for Soviet intervention and notes that several African countries also have such treaties. (C)

The message to Hua concludes by noting that we have parallel interests in the security of Pakistan and calls for close consultation on our policies, stating that Harold Brown will be prepared to discuss this issue during his visit.⁵ (C)

In all of these messages we urge the leaders to speak out and take appropriate action individually or with like-minded countries with which they are associated. (C)

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the White House⁶

1. Amstutz Views on Recognition of the Babrak Karmal Regime: Charge Amstutz believes U.S. interests would be best served in Afghanistan by breaking or suspending diplomatic recognition. In considering whether to extend recognition, his primary consideration is the illegitimate use of Soviet military force in bringing the Babrak regime into power. Unlike the indigenous Khalqi revolution that occurred in 1978, the present coup resulted only through the blatant intervention of the Soviet military. Additionally, a general U.S. practice in deciding on recognition has been whether the government exercises effective control of the country, a dubious proposition with Amin’s regime and of even greater doubt with the present regime. Finally, though only minimal information is available, Babrak’s press conference gives Amstutz little reason to believe any change has occurred with respect to U.S. interests or programs. While no “hasty action” should be taken in order to prevent any precipitous action against mission personnel by the Babrak regime, Amstutz believes that “we may have more to lose in U.S. prestige globally and internally too were we to maintain a mission.” (Kabul 8668, PSN 10651)⁷ (C)

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

3. Chinese Reaction to Soviet-Afghan Situation: In discussions with DCM Roy today, the deputy director of the Asian Affairs department expressed China’s vigorous opposition to what the Soviet Union had perpetrated in Afghanistan and urged the U.S. to offer its assistance to the Pakistanis and the other threatened countries of the area. The Chinese official stressed that the reaction of the U.S. and Western Europe would impact significantly on whether the countries of the region stood up to the Soviet threat or adopted a more accommodating attitude toward the Soviet Union. (Beijing 9475 NODIS, PSN 11236) (S)⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 12/26/79–12/31/79. Secret. Carter initialed “C” in the top right corner.
2. Brzezinski is apparently summarizing telegram 28119 from Moscow, December 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]; printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 247) In telegram 28126 from Moscow, December 29, Watson argued that the United States’s “principal objectives should be to (a) undo the Soviet action to the extent it can be done, which would mean the withdrawal of Soviet troops—probably not immediately attainable—and (b) exacting a political price for the Soviet action sufficient to dissuade the Soviets from undertaking other such adventures in the future.” He also outlined a number of possible steps including: unilateral actions such as increasing U.S. military alert status, launching a major propaganda program, bolstering the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; multilateral actions such as consultations with friends and allies, “demonstrative consultations with the Chinese,” action in the Security Council, strengthening security ties with key countries in Southwest Asia such as Turkey and Pakistan, working “with the Pakistanis and Chinese to support the insurgency in Afghanistan,” leading a global effort to boycott the Olympics; and bilateral actions with the Soviet Union including withdrawal of the SALT treaty from the Senate, “limitation or cancellation of grain sales to the Soviet Union,” tightening export controls, reviewing extant trade deals, and cancelling “visits and exchanges” between the United States and USSR. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brement, Subject File, Box 61, Afghanistan: 11/79–1/80)
3. See Document 107.
4. See footnote 4, Document 107.
5. The message to Hua was not found.
6. Secret. The author of the paper is not identified. In the top right corner of the page, Carter wrote: “Zbig. C.”
7. See Document 110. In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Do not recognize—Have Warren pursue this? In London.” See footnote 2, Document 107.
8. Telegram 9475 from Beijing is dated December 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2539)