9. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Military Options for Iran

This is to update you on my investigations following the SCC this morning.2

Unless the JCS is told firmly to go forward with staging for an operation with something like DELTA, they will not get down to the tough issues and work them out. I worked over the things General Jones brought to the NSC meeting this afternoon, and they merely reveal two significant problems:

—the long time it takes to get helicopters and forces into position near Iran;

—the lack of intelligence on the situation on the American Embassy compound.

Given these problems, the probability of achieving surprise is very small, and the probability of large numbers of casualties at the embassy is large. Thus, I am forced to recommend against military options based on what I know now.

Reluctantly, the JCS planning group is developing a number of additional possibilities. To overcome the intelligence gap, they may recommend sending in observers who could pass as Germans, or Hungarians, or some other nationality. Means for communicating their reports, however, are not easy to find. To overcome the transportation gap, they may recommend sending DELTA covertly as civilian tourists to some staging point in Europe. They would travel individually, and they would regroup at a U.S. air base. Their equipment would go by separate means, a transport flight to the base.

I would be supportive of these moves if the JCS believes discovery of the DELTA move is unlikely. The intelligence effort seems imperative in any event.

You may know more as a result of the NSC this afternoon.

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You also should know that I told Ham Jordan, at his request, that the military options do not look good and that I would recommend against them at present.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 27, Iran 11/78–11/79. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information.
  2. See Document 6.