Office of the Historian

6. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, November 6, 1979, 9–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Iran

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Secretary Cyrus Vance
    • David Newsom

  • Defense

    • Secretary Harold Brown
    • W. Graham Claytor

  • JCS

    • General David Jones

  • Energy

    • Secretary Charles Duncan

  • Justice

    • Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti

  • CIA

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner

  • White House

    • The Vice President
    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • Hamilton Jordan
    • Jody Powell

  • NSC

    • Colonel William Odom
    • Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The SCC met to review the situation in Iran. The following issues were addressed:

1. Public statement. A statement was approved for immediate release from the White House press office.2 (U)

2. Emissaries. A Presidential letter is being drafted. The two emissaries (Ramsey Clark and William Miller) should be positioned as close as possible to Tehran in order to be able to respond quickly if we get an indication that they will be accepted by the authorities in Qom. (S)

3. Contacts with Foreign Governments. Secretary Vance briefed on the efforts being made to mobilize support from Islamic nations who may have influence with the Khomeini regime, our contacts with the Turkish Government about possible refuge for our Chargé, and our approach to the Red Crescent (through the ICRC) to visit the hostages at the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran. (C)

4. Energy. The Department of Energy, together with State and the NSC, will examine the following: (1) the feasibility and desirability of triggering IEA allocation mechanisms in the event of an embargo or reduced production by Iran; (2) explore the possibility of arranging compensatory oil supplies from other oil producers which would permit us to reject any oil threats by Iran; and (3) Secretary Duncan and Chairman Miller will consult with the leaders of U.S. oil companies about steps they could take to minimize the effects of any oil cutoff by Iran. It was estimated that the U.S. share of Iranian production amounts to about 700,000 barrels per day. If Iran successfully shuts off these supplies, it would take several months to be felt in this country, but the effects would eventually be serious. (TS)

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5. Contingencies. Before the meeting tomorrow, a very small group will examine each of the following cases:

(1) Rescue. The SCC saw no way for us to intervene militarily to rescue the hostages without seriously risking their lives. We would expect the Iranian military to oppose any such intervention. The most likely means would be to secure an airfield and conduct a helicopter raid into the embassy compound.3

(2) Retaliation, if some or all of the hostages were killed. A number of economic responses are available, including seizure of Iranian assets, cutoff of trade (including food), and cessation of supply of spare parts for the military. Militarily, we could: blockade Iran’s oil shipments; strike or seize a site such as the Bandar Abbas military base in the south, Kharg Island oil loading terminal, or the three islands which Iran occupies at the mouth of the Persian Gulf; we could attempt to destroy the F–14s and/or other military assets by air strike; we would consider renewing direct support to the Kurds; and we could potentially kidnap a leading Iranian figure as a counter-hostage.

(3) Disintegration. Our previous plan to defend the oil fields was predicated on the assistance of the Iranian military. This must now be reconsidered. (TS)

6. Iranian Students. For tomorrow’s meeting, the Department of Justice will provide a report on the numbers of Iranians in various categories (including illegal aliens) in the United States, investigations which may currently be under way, and the steps which might be available to us. (TS)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 105, SCC 195 Iran. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.↩
  2. The White House issued the first public statement on the hostage crisis on November 9, after Carter met with members of the hostage families. Carter referred to the strong feelings, frustration, and “deep anger” felt by all Americans, feelings that he shared, as a result of the hostage situation, and asked U.S. citizens to “exercise restraint” and “refrain from any action that might increase the danger to the American hostages in Tehran.” For the full text of the statement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 2102–2103.↩
  3. As Carter and Sick later recalled, Brzezinski called Brown to inform him that Carter wanted the Joint Chiefs to move ahead on a rescue mission contingency plan. (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 459, and Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 213–216) By November 4, Jones activated a small ad hoc planning cell under Major General Vaught housed within the Joint Staff Special Operations Division, J–3. Vaught reported directly to Jones. (Holloway Report, July 23, 1980, pp. 9, 26)↩