Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

8. Record of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, November 6, 1979, 4:30–6:15 p.m.

NSC MEETING CHAIRED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE CABINET ROOM

ATTENDEES ARE

• The President
• Vice President
• Secretary Vance
• Secretary Brown
• General Jones, Chairman of the JCS
• Hamilton Jordan
• Jody Powell
• Gary Sick

The President opened the meeting by noting that the Iranian problem was one of the most difficult problems we have faced since he has been in the White House. American people have been captured, there was no government to work with and there appears to be no desire to negotiate. We face the prospect of the hostages being killed one at a time or perhaps all of them. The integrity of our nation demands some form of punitive action if this occurs. However, first it is important to do everything possible to save lives. If we succeed in getting everyone out of Tehran then it would be his intention to break relations with Iran. First we must consider how to get people out. Secondly, we need to consider what to do if a punitive action is required. The President thought seriously about this issue and was inclined not to take any action which would get us bogged down or a situation where extrication was difficult and any pullback would be viewed as a defeat.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested an agenda for the meeting. First of all a review of the negotiating situation with Iran and the international actions which are available to us. Secondly, the military options which fall into three categories. First of all a possible rescue operation for the hostages; second of all a retaliatory or punitive action as required; and, thirdly what might be required in the event of a fragmentation or breakdown internally within Iran. He noted that he had talked to Ambassador Sam Lewis during the day and was told that the Israelis were watching the situation with bated breath. It was a test of how we would react.

The Vice President interjected that this was this week’s test.

Secretary Vance reviewed the situation briefly. We had succeeded in reaching Ayatollah Beheshti in Tehran.² He felt that the sending of emissaries was a good idea and he promised to raise this idea with the Revolutionary Council. We had a plane standing by to fly the emissaries first of all to Athens where they could wait for a decision. There was a short letter from the President which they would take with them.³ The plane was large enough to bring back sixty hostages if they are released.

The President wondered whether bringing the Americans out of Iran would constitute breaking relations.

Secretary Vance said only if we say that we are breaking relations. We may simply say that we are going to take everyone out. If the Iranians ask for the Chargé to remain, Ramsey Clark has said that he will remain with the Chargé in Tehran.

Hamilton Jordan asked whether it may be presumptuous for us to send these emissaries off before we have an answer from the Iranians.

Secretary Vance said yes it was, however, we wanted to have them close at hand in the event the answer was yes. If they flew directly through, they could arrive in Tehran tomorrow morning and be in Qom around 10:00 in the morning. It is extremely important that public knowledge of this initiative remain quiet until we have their answer.

Hamilton Jordan noted that Frank Moore had told him that the word was already out on the Hill. It was a secret that was not well kept.

The President said he saw no downside to having the emissaries in Athens, if the answer is no they can simply come home.

Secretary Vance read through the instructions which were prepared for the two emissaries.⁴ The key part of the instructions involves two parts: first, a statement that the length of the stay of the Shah in the United States would be commensurate with the reasons for his admittance and the second phrase that the Shah will not remain permanently.

Dr. Brzezinski recommended that the second phrase was really not necessary since it was already implied in the first phrase. However, the emissaries could be instructed to explain that the first phrase really meant that the Shah would not remain permanently.

The President agreed and suggested that the emissaries could say that the Mexican government had extended an invitation.⁵

Secretary Vance noted that the Shah has expressed concern with the problems which have arisen about his presence and he did not want to be the cause of harm coming to the American citizens.

The President said that Ramsey Clark could tell that to Khomeini and quote the rather effusive Mexican invitation for the Shah to return.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he thought it important that the Iranians not interpret Ramsey Clark statement as a promise from the President that the Shah will leave. Rather they should say there is every reason to expect that the Shah will return. The less chance we give the Iranians to boast about their prevailing over the United States the better off we are.

The Vice President agreed. He felt that it was better to keep any promise very fuzzy because it would be used against us.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the less we give them the better.

Secretary Vance noted that we should not raise expectations that the Shah will immediately leave although he might be willing to. At the present time he has a tube implanted in him and also has cancer of the neck and could not easily be moved.

Secretary Brown noted that it was probably not impossible to evacuate him physically; we did medical evacuation all the time. However, it was a real political problem.

The President asked what the Shah had agreed to.

Secretary Vance said that the Shah had agreed to have his doctors talk to Iranian doctors about his medical state but not to see him.

The President said that the instructions were all right with the one deletion.

Secretary Vance went on to note that the Pakistanian Ambassador went to Qom today to see Khomeini. The Algerians are probably willing to weigh in as well. He also noted that there was a man named Hosan ala Hosani in Lebanon who was reputed to be very close to Khomeini. [1 line not declassified] Although they could also approach him through Sarkis.

Stan Turner said it would be better to go through Sarkis and the State connection since he would have to have a Presidential Determination to do it.

The President noted that he could have a Presidential Determination in fifteen minutes.

Dr. Brzezinski noted he had just received a report that Mr. Valeriani of NBC has a story about the emissaries going to Iran which he planned to use this evening. Hodding Carter was trying to dissuade him of using it.

Secretary Vance noted that Valeriani was a good man who would listen to reason.

The President said that Hodding Carter and Jody Powell and Secretary Vance if necessary should talk to him to try to stop the story. He wondered if other networks had the story as well. Everyone agreed that the indications were that they did not.

Secretary Vance went on to brief that the Pakistanis had been very helpful and that their Ambassador would go to Qom to talk with Khomeini. The Turks had chickened out. They were unwilling to offer their Embassy as a refuge for our Chargé. The UN Secretary General is calling in all the Islamic Ambassadors to indicate the seriousness of the international implications of the Iranians’ actions.

Stan Turner gave a brief report on the group holding the hostages. They are called the Tunidi Islami. They were originally Islamic fanatics totally devoted to Khomeini. In more recent times they have been infiltrated by the leftists to a considerable degree though they have retained Khomeini support. Recently they got into the Radio Tehran broadcast and criticized the talks that Brzezinski had in Algiers with Bazargan and Yazdi. They are clever and well organized and their objective seems to be to try to bring down the moderates in the government. They have no history of violence that we are aware of. It does appear that Khomeini gave permission for the occupation of the Embassy. The chances of negotiating with them do not appear to be good. He also noted the Kharg Island oil terminal had been shut down this morning and that presently no oil exports were coming out of Iran.

The President inquired about the results of the students’ press conference in Tehran.

Dr. Brzezinski said it was largely more of the same.

Stan Turner added that they had said that any action aimed at freeing the prisoners would lead to killing the hostages.

Secretary Brown said that led to the discussion of a possible rescue operation. They had examined this option and considered that the chances of carrying it off successfully were very small.

General Jones noted that his Israeli counterpart Eitan was currently visiting in Washington and the subject of a rescue operation had come up naturally during lunch. Eitan considers the situation in Tehran far more difficult than Entebbe⁶ because of the urban environment, the distance from the airport, and other complications.

At this point General Jones displayed a number of pictures of the Embassy compound in Tehran and its surroundings showing how difficult it would be to come through the city on the ground. Such an approach could be impossible and Khomeini could put millions of people in the streets. In general they thought that helicopters was the only way to come in. We are not sure exactly where the hostages are located, though there are reports that they are being held in the basement of the Embassy. It might be possible to bring three helicopters down on the Embassy grounds at night in the open area. It would [be] necessary to bring in at least 120 people, 30 of which would go immediately to the residence area. There are high buildings around the Embassy where people could shoot down into the compound. Therefore, they recommend three additional helicopters coming in after the initial three to help secure the compound. They had examined the area around Tehran looking for isolated airfields which were unlikely to be armed or manned. They had discovered one very slightly used airfield about sixty miles south of town which had originally been used as a C–130 base. They felt that aircraft could land there and the helicopters could cycle in and out of town from that airfield. The likelihood that this could be done without the Iranians knowing it in advance was near zero even if they did not know where the operation was going to be conducted. Tehran cannot easily be reached from the sea. It would probably require staging from bases in either Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Marine helicopters are not equipped to be refueled in the air, therefore, it would be necessary to use Air Force helicopters. Six of these are in Britain, others are in United States and Okinawa, which would require a long movement in order to bring them into position. This would effectively ruin any chance for a lengthy practice session. They were currently examining ways in which helicopters could be moved into position without in any way connecting it with this operation such as an exercise in the Mediterranean. If an operation were conducted during daylight hours, they would probably have to confront the Iranian air force. It was estimated that fifty percent of the Iranian air force could be airborne, if they discovered the helicopters in the air or sighted the C–130s. The area is 500 miles from the Persian Gulf so it would greatly stretch the ability of carrier based aircraft to provide air cover. It might be possible to accomplish that from Turkey or Dhahran.

Secretary Vance noted that the Turks would probably turn us down.

General Jones added that any advance tip-off would permit them to get the hostages out of the area to unknown locations.

Secretary Vance said that he could not see how we could get in without giving them time to kill the hostages.

The Vice President noted that they would probably see the helicopters coming perhaps an hour before they arrived.

General Jones said that even under the very best of circumstances the chances were great that there would be some casualties.

Dr. Brzezinski said that casualties are to be expected in this kind of a situation. He noted that this group is not organized and communications are not good. Their warning system might not function. There was a good chance of conducting the operation with surprise.

Secretary Brown said that they might very well have strategic warning if the planes landed in Saudi Arabia. It would mean many hours to organize a staging operation from there. Moreover, it was a five hour flight time from there to Tehran.

The President wondered whether an attack team could go in with empty spaces in the helicopter to carry out some hostages.

Secretary Brown said that they needed to put a great number of people in, in order to be able to hold the airfield.

General Jones noted that a helicopter holds twenty-five persons. There is a 120 man team to go in and only 3 helicopters could land at once. The operation was a very high risk. It would require up to one to two hours on the ground inside the compound if everything worked perfectly. It was also a question of how to assure that they would get all the hostages back.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that there [were] some advantages since an undisciplined mob might very well panic when faced with disciplined troops. An operation of this nature should be undertaken only if the hostages were being killed.

Hamilton Jordan noted that they could start killing one person per day or one person per hour which would put us in a very difficult position.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the military should be encouraged to refine this option. If they start killing hostages, we will need to do something.

Stan Turner suggested that we should stage a carrier to the Eastern Mediterranean.

General Jones noted that we would probably want to have a CVA in the Persian Gulf.

Hamilton Jordan noted that there would be strong chance that a third country would observe our movements.

General Jones agreed noting the chances of our being observed in a commercial airport like Dhahran were very high.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered how quickly the Saudis could react and transmit the information to Tehran, even if they observed it.

Stan Turner noted that it would be possible to put the refueling aircraft in Cypress, at Akhatia airbase by prepositioning a carrier and an LPH in the Eastern Mediterranean with helicopters on board; they could be much closer to the area of operations.

Secretary Brown generally agreed and said that the way to go in was to overfly Turkey. That should pose no problem since the Soviets do it all the time even without permission.

The President said that they should do more work on the plan. To him it looked more like the Egyptian raid on Cyprus.⁷

General Jones noted that successful raids are always rehearsed many times and this [did] not offer an opportunity for detailed preparations, however, they would go ahead and flesh out the plan.

The President said that if they killed the hostages we must be able to conduct a punitive operation which would blast the hell out of Iran.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if we could look at the punitive options.

Secretary Brown referring to the earlier discussion noted that we could defend the compound for an hour.

Hamilton Jordan noted that the press would not keep quiet on this end and that was the biggest risk to warning them we were up to something.

The President said the Iranians were not idiots. They would not be sitting and waiting for us to take them out. They would move the hostages out of the Embassy to other locations. He wondered whether the civilians were in fact coming out.

Secretary Vance said we don’t know at this point. We have no one to talk to, however, normal scheduled airline flights are continuing.

The President wondered if the British could pass word to our people.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if we could ask the companies to tell their people to get out.

Secretary Vance said he would check. He thought that that had been done but he was not sure.

General Jones noted that for a retaliatory attack Kharg Island was probably the most critical facility in Iran. Originally they thought it would require very little to seize the island. Later today however they had discovered that there were about 250 soldiers, another 250 air defense personnel, and several hundred (up to 500) military personnel involved in a hover craft program there. Our tactics could be to either seize the island or to impose a blockade. We cannot effectively block the entire Persian Gulf since it is impossible to discriminate between ships and their destinations. Moreover, Kharg Island is not so easy to blockade; it is very close to the coast and there are many aircraft.

Secretary Brown noted that Kharg Island provided a bargaining lever. We could show the Iranians that if they take our oil we can block theirs. This is a very dangerous process, however. He wondered whether it would not shut off other oil in the Gulf. How would the Soviets react.

Dr. Brzezinski said the reaction would depend on circumstances. If we did something like this right now, it would be extremely bad and the reaction around the world would be extremely critical. However, later if killings occur they might possibly consider it alright particularly if they saw Iran disintegrating.

The President wondered about an aerial attack on the island.

Secretary Brown said that would be more permanent since it would destroy the installation.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that seizing the island provided a bargaining lever. We would have land and people in our own custody which permits us to bargain.

Stan Turner noted that you could not simply count the piers and put the island out of operation for quite a while.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered how long it would take us to mount that kind of attack.

Secretary Brown said a week.

General Jones noted that we can lean forward and cut down the time. At present our Marines are completing an exercise in Spain, but moving them to the Eastern Mediterranean or into the Indian Ocean would send a strong political signal.

The President felt that occupying Iranian territory would arouse the opposition of the entire world.

General Jones noted another option where the small islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs near the mouth of the Gulf [which] were occupied by the Iranians several years ago and their sovereignty was contested by several of the Emirates in the UAE. They were lightly inhabited and lightly defended and they had limited strategic value except for the psychological value of being very near the mouth of the Gulf.

Hamilton Jordan wondered whether Kharg Island was important to Khomeini and his group.

Secretary Brown said that it might not be in the first instance but in fact a whole livelihood and economy depended on the oil exports from Kharg Island.

The President noted that with regard to closing off the oil from Kharg Island we could stand it. He was not sure, however, that the French, British, Japanese, and others could stand it especially if other oil producing nations closed down their own operations as a sign of sympathy.

General Jones noted that the small islands at the entrance of the Gulf represent the exact opposite extreme of Kharg Island. Kharg Island is of enormous practical and economic significance. The small islands are largely of symbolic importance. Another possibility are air strikes particularly against the U.S. F–14s in Iran. However, he noted that many of these F–14s were in shelters which we built specifically for their protection. Therefore, we could expect to get some of them but not all. Another possibility is Bandar Abbas a town in the south where most of their navy is located. However a strike on their military forces would be most likely to turn against us the people who would be most likely to be helpful later on.

Hamilton Jordan wondered if it was beyond imagination to do something like kidnapping Khomeini’s son.

Secretary Brown said that getting Khomeini himself might be easier.

Stan Turner wondered about the possibility of simply mining the waters around Kharg Island.

Dr. Brzezinski said the results of that would be to simply punish our friends. He thought that there was more merit in taking the little islands inside Gulf.

The President said they would probably simply say take them and not worry about it.

Dr. Brzezinski said he thought it would bother them. They have a strong territorial instinct. Going after Kharg Island would create a worldwide oil crisis.

Secretary Brown said the three small islands would provide no bargaining lever.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that if they only kill a few hostages we need a bargaining leverage; if they should kill all of them we need a punitive action.

Secretary Brown said they will probably kill all of the hostages if we do anything at all.

Secretary Vance noted that there were also economic steps that we should look at.

Secretary Brown noted that we could possibly seize an Iranian ship.

The Vice President suggested looking very closely at the economic steps. He found this to be an outrageous precedent. He wondered what was the legal status of an act such as this of taking diplomats hostage. Was it an act of war?

Dr. Brzezinski said it was contrary to a great many agreements to which Iran was a party but it was not a casus beli unless they begin killing hostages. He wondered if we should consider taking it to the United Nations Security Council and seeking a denunciation of Iran’s action.

Secretary Brown said the Third World would be against us.

The Vice President said he was not so sure. For instance in cases of piracy and terrorism there were only a few extreme nations who would not condemn those actions.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the reaction by Iraq and Kuwait were both interesting. Both nations were quite concerned and this might be reflected in any UN debate.

The Vice President said he would like to have a legal analysis of the situation. He suspected that something like this had happened many times before.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we should take a much closer look at the military option. First of all we should look at a simple punitive act which would be effective but would not get us engaged in a long military campaign. Secondly, we should look at other actions which would provide us with leverage to deter future action by Iran. He believed that seizure of the three islands provided interesting possibilities. At this point there was a lengthy break in the meeting while the President met with Ramsey Clark and William Miller, the two emissaries who were due to leave for Tehran that evening.⁸ When the meeting resumed The President suggested that if the Iranians say yes to our emissaries we should do nothing to upset that process. Ramsey Clark believes that movement to the UN would be a good thing but that we should avoid going to the UN for the moment unless they turn us down on the emissaries.

Ramsey Clark also recommended calling in the Iranian Chargé as an interpreter and placing a call from the President to Khomeini appealing to him on religious grounds if the Iranians will not let our emissaries come in. With regard to the United Nations, we should focus on the violation of international law.

Secretary Brown noted that by holding up all actions we would lose time in the event we should need to retaliate.

The President noted that in the meantime we should simply explore the possibilities.

Secretary Brown noted that we would be meeting tomorrow morning to consider whether to move the helicopters, carriers and other items. He took it from what the President had said that we will do nothing if the Iranians agree to accept our emissaries.

The President said that was correct. Since these men had put their lives on the line we should do nothing to endanger their mission. The President wondered, however, whether there was no way we could move the carrier without that fact appearing on the front page of the New York Times.

Secretary Brown said that the carrier was due to arrive in Mombasa on November 9th; if it did not show up that would attract attention. He thought that if we did it verbally we could probably turn the carrier around without it appearing in the news for perhaps two to three days.

Jody Powell said he thought this was one case where it was justified for the press secretary to tell a lie.

Dr. Brzezinski said we should defer a decision until tomorrow. If they do not accept our emissaries then it would be appropriate to turn the carrier around.

Secretary Brown said that we could make up a story why the carrier was late in arriving in Mombasa. He then suggested considering what we would do in the event of a break up of Iran. He noted that any attack on the Iranian military as a punitive gesture would make much more difficult actions that we might want to take in the event the country came apart.

The President said we had not adequately assessed the possibilities of an embargo on Iran assets and economic steps that we could take. They were very vulnerable on this score. If we had to move, we should move on a broad front including economics. To the extent possible we should avoid the loss of life. Economic options were potentially much better than bombing.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if the United States could get away with only economic steps if American citizens are killed. After a long pause the President said that he doubted it. We would probably have to take some punitive action but he wanted to do something which would avoid heavy costs and lengthy problems of trying to extricate ourselves.

Stan Turner interjected that we really ought to try to isolate Iran and blockade it.

The President agreed and said that we should insist that our European allies cooperate with us on an air blockade as well as naval blockade. They might not agree but we should go to the mat on this one.

Jody Powell noted that our blockade as leverage is alright but if it is designed as a punitive action where would we end it.

Dr. Brzezinski said we may need both. Even if they kill the hostages we will still need leverage to prevent further action against U.S. citizens remaining in Iran.

Hamilton Jordan wondered if the American citizens were truly identifiable.

Secretary Brown wondered whether we should look at the pipeline which carries Iran’s refined product from the refinery to the market place.

The Vice President noted that the weather is getting cold and this might be a real vulnerability.

Secretary Brown said it would be interesting in several ways since it would conceivably make them rely on us for refined products.

Hamilton Jordan wondered how much lead time it would take to conduct an air strike of that sort.

The President wondered how long it would take if we wanted simply to bomb refineries.

General Jones noted that the Carrier Midway is about five days away. Another alternative would be to bring in B–52s from Guam which could be done in about 48 hours or 72 hours at the most. They could not land at Diego Garcia. We had intentionally kept the runway at Diego Garcia too narrow for the use of B–52s, however, refueling aircraft could operate from Diego Garcia. In any event we would probably want the Midway in or near the Gulf in order to fly fighter protection for the B–52s. Another alternative would be to bring F–15s into Saudi bases.

Dr. Brzezinski said we would make a decision on the Midway tomorrow.

Stan Turner said that hitting the refineries would hurt us as well but others disagreed and said that partially supplied Iran’s needs, not our own.

The President noted that if they should kill sixty American citizens we must punish Iran. One way to do that would be to cut off the supply of diesel fuel and kerosene. We might also declare an embargo.

The Vice President recalled something that Secretary Duncan has said at the SCC in the morning⁹ that a very high proportion of ARAMCO and other American companies’ oil was going to Europe since it was more profitable there. He thought it was an excellent idea to call in these companies and tell them that we expect them to make up any shortfalls in our own production. We should see just how American they really are.

Secretary Vance said that Ambassador West believes that the Saudis would be pleased to make up any difference in the event the Iranians should embargo us.

Secretary Brown wondered if they would be still interested if we should take out a refinery in Iran.

Dr. Brzezinski said we were having an SCC meeting at 8:30 in the morning and Secretary Duncan was to present a report on the energy situation and the implications.

The President said that we need a way to punish Iran without punishing the rest of the world.

Hamilton Jordan said that if the Iranians begin killing one American at a time the American people will expect us to try to rescue them even if the chances are only one in a hundred.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that kidnappers normally don’t kill all of their hostages. They are not trained. This group particularly has no combat training. As the meeting broke up the President approved notifying the press that an NSC meeting had been held. The group agreed that it probably would be a good idea for the President to call Khomeini directly in the event the Iranians turn down our offer of emissaries.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 97, Meetings File, 11/6/79: NSC re Iran. No classification marking. Brzezinski was also in attendance.
2. In a telephone call of November 6, Precht informed Beheshti that the United States wanted to send Clark and Miller to Tehran or Qom to discuss “all questions outstanding between our two governments once the Americans have been released,” and that the emissaries were bringing a letter from Carter to Khomeini. Precht also asked that a representative from the Red Lion and Sun or one of the Islamic embassies visit the hostages. Beheshti agreed to take up the issues with the Revolutionary Council. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 30, Subject File, Iran 11/1/79–11/10/79)
3. See Document 7.
4. The instructions stated that the primary objective of the emissaries was to secure the early release of all U.S. citizens detained in Iran, and that the secondary objective was to meet with religious authorities in Iran and “hear their views on ways to overcome the difficulties in our relationship.” The instructions also stated that the United States had admitted the Shah for medical treatment and that he would not engage in any political activity, that the U.S. Government had little information on his U.S. assets, that the U.S. Government was not involved in Kurdistan and supported Iran’s territorial integrity, that some resolution with Iranian authorities had been achieved on military supply issues, and that the U.S. Government exercised no control over the U.S. press. (Telegram 290407 to Clark and Miller in Istanbul, November 7; Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iran NODIS Cables Nov 1979)
5. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 166.
6. On July 4, 1976, Israeli commandos rescued approximately 100 hostages held by pro-Palestinian hijackers at the Entebbe airport in Uganda. The rescue focused on rapid air assault, extraction, withdrawal operations, and information from released non-Jewish hostages. All 7 hijackers, 3 hostages, 20 Ugandan soldiers, and Lieutenant Colonel Yonatan Netanyahu, leader of the assault force, were killed.
7. On February 19, 1978, 58 Egyptian commandos failed to rescue 16 hostages taken by 2 terrorists who had assassinated Youssef Sebai, chairman and editor of Egypt’s semi-official daily newspaper, al-Ahram, and Sadat’s friend. The terrorists held the hostages aboard a hijacked Cyprus Airways DC–8 at the Larnaca airport. Egyptian commandos attacked the plane but were fired upon by Cypriot national guardsmen. The Egyptians took shelter, then surrendered, and the hijackers gave themselves up. Fifteen Egyptians died, and their plane went up in flames.
8. Carter and Vance met with Clark and Miller in the Oval Office from 5:40 to 6 p.m., then returned to the Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary)
9. See Document 6.