Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

54. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting¹

Washington, November 23, 1979, 10:10–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher
  • David Newsom
  • Harold Saunders

• Defense

  • W. Graham Claytor

• JCS

  • General John Pustay

• Justice

  • Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti

• CIA

  • Frank Carlucci

• OMB

  • John White

• White House

  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom
  • Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The SCC(I) met to discuss a proposed finding by the DCI (attached) [1½ lines not declassified] to influence Khomeini and others to abandon or moderate anti-American positions and to reduce their ability to incite anti-American violence or threats to U.S. interests. (S)

Mr. Carlucci described the range of activities contemplated, including broadcasts critical of Khomeini’s policies as violations of Islamic teachings, providing a forum for opposition figures to address the Iranian people, stressing that present policies are leading Iran down a road to disaster, publicize links between some present leaders in Iran with SAVAK, and warn of leftist efforts to exploit religious leadership. (S)

Mr. Christopher questioned whether the actions envisaged were in fact compatible with the objective of reducing anti-American positions by Iranian leaders. The Attorney General and all others noted that the finding as written was sufficient to allow for such activities, particularly since it calls for “reducing the ability” of Khomeini and others to incite violence. Their ability could not be reduced without taking some of the steps called for in the finding. (S)

Mr. Carlucci noted that we might be backing into a major political decision to overthrow Khomeini by this finding. He noted, however, that Khomeini is already accusing us of worse than what we are proposing. In the acts proposed in this finding, the U.S. hand will not show. We will need to coordinate [less than 1 line not declassified] for specific technical access to broadcast and other facilities. (S)

The finding was approved, with State reserving its position until the issue could be discussed with the Secretary. (U)

Mr. Newsom provided a brief summary of the debrief of hostages.² Those released warn that we should not try to make a case about forged U.S. documents since the Iranians have many genuine documents that they can produce. They appear to be focusing their “spy” charges on Mike Metrinko, a Foreign Service Officer who maintained contact with Kurdish leaders prior to the fall of the Shah, and on Ann Swift, a Foreign Service political officer. They do not appear to have identified Agency people, [1 line not declassified]. (TS)

[5½ lines not declassified] Damage assessment is proceeding, and we are attempting to match faces (on TV, etc.) with individuals who were in charge or who conducted interrogations. An older man named Mehdi apparently ran the operation. (TS)

Two of the hostages were particularly susceptible to indoctrination about the crimes of the Shah. The decompression period in Wiesbaden was invaluable in helping to deal with this problem before the hostages met with the press. The Marines felt that the Code of Conduct did not adequately prepare them for this type of situation and they were unsure what to do. (S)

Attachment

Presidential Finding³

Washington, undated

Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning Operations in Foreign Countries Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

I find the following operation in foreign countries is important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this finding to the concerned committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings as necessary.

SCOPE

DESCRIPTION

WORLDWIDE

Using any and all possible means, including tasking or encouraging the network of agents or other contacts in foreign countries, clandestine radio broadcasting and the use of media placements, to cause the distribution or broadcast in foreign countries of non-attributable propaganda for the purposes of: influencing the Ayatollah Khomeini, other Iranian religious and political leaders and anti-American segments of the Iranian populace to abandon or moderate anti-American political and economic positions and to protect the safety of U.S. nationals and U.S. property in Iran; and reducing the ability of the Ayatollah Khomeini and other anti-American religious and political figures in Iran to incite anti-American violence, or to stimulate policies and activities hostile to the interests of the United States and to the safety of U.S. nationals and property, in Iran and other countries.4

Jimmy Carter

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box I020, SCC Meetings, Minutes—SCC 1979. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Document 45.
3. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In a November 23 memorandum, Brzezinski asked Carter to approve the finding, noting that it “does move toward a decision to support overthrow of Khomeini.” (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box I020, SCC Meetings, Minutes—SCC 1979)
4. On December 7, the CIA asked for and received NSC approval of an economic propaganda campaign that would fall under this Presidential Finding. The proposal was for the placement of information in influential European media venues emphasizing Iran’s growing monetary and trade problems, encouraging foreign ship owners to cut back on services to Iran, stressing the certainty of a drastic decline in Iranian oil production, and pointing to the severe heating oil shortage that threatened Tehran. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 31, Subject File, Iran 12/1/79–12/7/79)