45. Telegram From the Consulate in Frankfurt to the Department of State1
11239. Pass to IWG. Subject: (S) Debriefing of Hostages.
1. (S) Entire text.
2. The treatment of the hostages varied from harsh to mild, with the women receiving considerably worse treatment than the Marines. During lengthy interrogation, three of the women were threatened at gunpoint and all but Gross were verbally threatened. One woman was subjected to a form of Russian roulette. The military hostages were not threatened. In contrast to harsh treatment during interrogation, the women’s physical needs were met. The Marines feared their lives were in danger during the first day but were less fearful in the following days. The women, in contrast, were not concerned the first day but became increasingly fearful as the days progressed.
3. The captors relayed no oral or written personal messages to the hostages. Although some asked if they could communicate with their families, they were told they could not.
4. All the hostages were given a few hours of revolutionary propaganda just prior to their release. The students showed them one one-hour movie and one video half-hour tape of the revolution and students’ demonstrating. They also had photographs of SAVAK’s atrocities and books on the revolution. The films had a significant impact because the hostages had spent two weeks without communicating.
5. The assault on the Embassy appeared to be well-planned in advance. The students brought bolt-cutters with them to cut the chain of the front gate. While many of the Iranians appeared to be students, as they claimed, several among them appeared to possess a high degree of organizational ability and set up separate guard groups and shift schedules. There was a high degree of discipline and orders were usually strictly obeyed. It is possible that a handful of students had been trained in logistics and psychology of conducting a hostage terrorist [Page 113] incident. They employed such interrogation techniques as playing one hostage against another, and telling them the U.S. had abandoned them. While the hostages could not discern all the leaders or a chain of command or fixed command post, there appeared to be a firm leadership within the compound. The students would not identify who was in charge when asked, but the Iranian who appeared to be the chief interrogator claimed to have been trained by the PLO. He gave his name as “Mehdi.” He claimed to have operated in the U.S. for the PLO and also claimed to have been incarcerated in an Israeli jail for three years for PLO activities. He claimed to be from the Isfahan area and gave his PLO name as Abu Ali.
6. There were several religious leaders in the compound but none appeared to play a leadership role. Khomeini’s son however played a major part and reportedly visited the compound often; he had much authority and was responsible for having Joan Walsh released from 36 hours of solitary confinement. The students stated firmly that they would do whatever Khomeini told them.
7. The hostages believe that the remaining hostages will be freed when Khomeini orders it.
8. All cryptographic equipment was reportedly destroyed in the communication center. All files of the following offices were not repeat not destroyed: DAO, Embassy Political Office, Ambassador’s suite, and MAAG offices. The students highlighted the following documents:
—Precht/Laingen letter dated August 2, 1979, Secret “Eyes Only” concerning ramifications of Shah’s entry into U.S.
—Airgram drafted by Mike Metrinko re sabotage of oil fields.
—RSO Golacinski’s report of counterfeit money in Iran which a walk-in provided to RSO and was under investigation. The students convoluted this report into a plot by the United States to destroy the economy of Iran.
—Metrinko memcon with a relative of General Bolibzan, a figure in Kurdistan whom the students feel is fomenting revolt there. [5 lines not declassified] The students were extremely intent on identifying intelligence personnel and claimed that those so identified would be executed.
9. The students were defensive about being labeled terrorists. During the press conference at the Tehran airport, the Iranians appeared concerned that the students were being portrayed as abusing the hostages. The Iranians took pictures the first week, asking the hostages to smile and look comfortable. The day the Pope’s emissary arrived was the only day the women were untied all day and given a snack. When [Page 114] the Red Cross visited, the women were afraid to tell them they had been threatened.2
10. The hostages believe the two remaining women were kept because they are Farsi-speaking officers. Charles Jones remained in the C&R vault for two hours after the takeover so it is believed the students thought he was an intelligence officer as well.
11. The hostages believe that publicity of their treatment would have a very negative impact on the remaining hostages.
12. The captors appeared to be aware of U.S. public opinion but did not seem dissuaded by it. Instead, they exaggerated or falsified U.S. news stories. They told the hostages that Americans were beating and raping Iranians and that four Iranian students had been killed in San Francisco.
13. The cessation of oil imports, blocking of assets was raised with one hostage but the students used it to try to convince her that the U.S. had abandoned them.
14. The hostages were told by the students that the return of the Shah to Mexico would do no good.
15. The hostages could not determine what the students’ reaction would be to the Shah’s return to Mexico but were generally pessimistic about the possibility of the remaining hostages’ early release.
- Source: Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Release of Hostages—Under Secretary Newsom. Secret; Immediate; Stadis. Sent via SY Channel. A stamped notation on the top of the first page reads: “Mr. Newsom has seen, Dec 2 1979.” Two other telegrams from Frankfurt provided details of the hostages’ experiences. (Telegram 11217 from Frankfurt, November 21; Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Hostages Released—Escaped; telegram 11261 from Frankfurt, November 22; Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Release of Hostages—Under Secretary Newsom)↩
- For the Papal emissary’s visit, see footnote 7, Document 19. Representatives of the Red Lion and Sun Society visited the hostages on November 9. (William Branigin, “Security Council Urges Release of Americans,” Washington Post, November 10, 1979, p. A1)↩