Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

43. Memorandum From Ambassador Eilts to President Carter¹

Washington, November 21, 1979

This supplements my series of reports from the field (attached).²

INTRODUCTION

At your request,³ I visited Cairo, Jidda and again Cairo during the period November 13–November 20. While in Cairo, I met twice with President Sadat and also with Vice President Mubarak, Prime Minister Khalil and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali. In Jidda, I met first with Islamic Conference Secretary-General Chatti and, subsequently, had a four-hour conversation with Prince Fahd. In both capitals, I briefed the ambassadors on my mission and the results of my talks.

Both Sadat and Fahd asked that I pass on to you their warm regards and best wishes.

You had asked that I take up with Sadat and Fahd (a) the Iranian hostage situation, (b) the need for a thaw in Egyptian/Saudi relations in the interest of progress on the Middle East peace process, and (c) any other matters that they might wish to raise. With Chatti, you asked that I take up the Iranian hostage problem. This report is divided into three sections: (a) Iranian hostage problem, (b) Egyptian/Saudi relations, and (c) other matters.

IRANIAN HOSTAGE PROBLEM

My Two Talks With Sadat (November 14 and 18)

As we had anticipated, Sadat felt that there was relatively little that he could do with respect to the Iranian hostage situation. He characterized Khomeini as “mad.” He suggested that Fahd might be able to exert some influence on Khomeini, but acknowledged that because of Sunni/Shi’a cleavages, even Fahd’s prospects might be limited. He doubted that the Lebanese Shi’a leadership could do much, but thought it was worth a try and suggested the Saudis be asked about this.

I explained to Sadat that you were thinking of (a) a possible contingency action in the event our hostages were hurt, and (b) a possible punitive action against Iran after the hostages have been gotten out. While you had not yet made any decision, you would welcome Sadat’s views and also, should you decide to undertake one or another such action, his help. I specifically mentioned your hope that he might permit us to use the Aswan Airfield for staging purposes. Aswan, I noted, is somewhat remote and therefore out of the public eye.

Sadat said that he had been thinking a great deal about the Iranian hostage problem. He had been looking at maps to consider what kind of action he might take if he were in your position. He spoke firmly about the need to undertake some kind of punitive action against Iran in order to reestablish the United States’ credibility and national honor in the Middle East. If Khomeini gets away with his action, Sadat said, the position of the United States in the Middle East will be badly hurt. At my first meeting, Sadat had no specific ideas; at my second meeting, however, he suggested that after the hostages are out, the United States should level the Iranian oil fields as a lesson. Whatever you decide to do, Sadat emphasized on both occasions, should be done in the form of a one-time action rather than an American occupation of parts of Iran. A one-time, punitive strike, in Sadat’s view, will be understood by most of the nations of the Middle East, even though some will publicly protest. An American occupation, on the other hand, will be counterproductive in terms of Middle East attitudes.

Sadat wants you to know that, should you require help, any facility in Egypt is at your disposal. He mentioned Aswan and also Berenice as possible places to be considered.⁴ Should you wish to send an advance team for planning purposes, this can be taken up with Mubarak. Mubarak was present at both meetings and Sadat instructed him to handle the matter with all discretion. Mubarak told me, incidentally, that aviation fuel is available at both places. I stressed to Sadat that you have not as yet made any decision on this matter, but that I knew you would be very grateful for his understanding and proffered help.

Sadat also suggested that a second strike through Turkey might be useful, but acknowledged that the Turks may be reluctant. He had heard news reports of the move of the MIDWAY toward the Persian Gulf, applauded this show of force and suggested that a second carrier be sent to show the American determination.

Talk With Prince Fahd (November 17/18)

I conveyed to Prince Fahd your appreciation for what he has already done in connection with the hostage problem and asked if he had any further thoughts on what Saudi Arabia might be able to do with Khomeini in order to get the hostages released. I said nothing to Fahd about possible contingency or punitive action.

Fahd spoke scathingly of Khomeini and affirmed that Saudi Arabia has been trying, in an Islamic context, to point out how Khomeini’s action is hurting Islam’s international reputation. He said that he had earlier in the day sent Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal to see Yasir Arafat in Riyadh in order to press Arafat to continue the PLO effort with the Iranians. He freely acknowledged that the Saudis are making the point to Arafat that the PLO image in the United States and in the world at large will be immeasurably enhanced if it can somewhat succeed in getting the hostages released.

Fahd’s only other thought was the possibility of trying to organize a multi-national group of distinguished ‘ulama (Islamic religious doctors) who would go to Tehran to remonstrate with Khomeini about the damage that the Iranian action is doing to Islam’s good name. Such a group, Fahd noted, would be able to point to Khomeini that the Iranian treatment of the American diplomats is totally contrary to the Prophet’s handling of diplomatic envoys. Fahd acknowledged the potential difficulty caused by the Sunni/Shi’a cleavages and said he was not sure whether his idea is viable. He planned to discuss it before he left for Tunis the following day with Qudhi Harakat, one of the most learned Saudi religious doctors and a former Minister of Justice, in order to ascertain the latter’s estimate of the feasibility of such an idea. If Harakat believes it makes sense, Fahd said, he would try to enlist support for the idea at the Tunis Summit meeting. (I rather doubt that this idea is viable with a man like Khomeini and since, I understand, Fahd’s visit to Tunis was cut short because of the Mecca incident,⁵ he probably did not have the opportunity to raise it. Still, it is worth a try.)

I asked Fahd if he thought that the Lebanese Shi’a leaders might have any influence on Khomeini. Fahd noted that since the disappearance of the Imam Musa Sadr, there is no acknowledged Lebanese Shi’a leader. He frankly did not know whom to suggest, but said he would consider the matter further. Later in the conversation, he suddenly reverted to this theme and said he would be seeing Lebanese politician Saeb Salaam the next day and would ask him. (I am not sure Salaam can help much, since he is Sunni.) It might be worth following up on this with Fahd, although the prospects are limited.

Fahd had two other points on Iran. First, he was extremely curious about the Shah’s state of health. Did the Shah really have cancer and, if so, how serious is it? (I think his curiosity was prompted primarily by suspicion that we may have allowed the Shah in under a pretext of the need for medical treatment.) In asking these questions, he showed no signs of hostility toward the Shah, but also no particular affection. Second, after I had told him that the blocking of Iranian assets was prompted by the need to assure that American claims against Iran will be settled, Fahd wanted to know what the extent of these American claims might be. Again, he did not criticize our action, but I did sense an underlying uneasiness on his part over the freezing. Since I did not have specific information on either of these two points, I limited my comments to an assurance that I understood (a) the Shah is indeed seriously ill and (b) the American claims are sizeable, though I had no specific information on their exact amount. You may wish to consider instructing Ambassador West to provide clarification to Fahd on these two points.

Talk With Chatti (November 16)

Chatti, who has just taken over the function of Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, had relatively little to offer.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the hostage crisis.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 77, Presidential Advisory File, Sensitive X: 11–12/78. Top Secret; Eyes Only for the President. According to Carter’s personal notes, Eilts reported the contents of this memorandum to him on the evening of November 20. (Carter Library, Plains File, Box 1) Carter had returned to Camp David at 6:15 p.m. and he spoke to Eilts on the telephone from 9:29 to 9:51 p.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary)
2. Not found.
3. According to a November 13 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, Carter would give Eilts three tasks: First, Eilts was to talk to Sadat and Fahd about Saudi-Egyptian relations. Second, he was to get their advice on “how the Islamic world might be helpful in resolving the hostage situation.” Third, he was to mention to Sadat “the possibility of a retaliatory military action against some facilities in Iran; and in this connection ask Sadat a) for his assessment of the likely reaction of the Arab countries, notably oil producers, to such an action; b) whether Sadat would permit the use of the Aswan airfield by a limited no. of U.S. planes (perhaps even as few as only 2) for such a strike.” Brezezinski wrote point three at the bottom of the memorandum by hand. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 77, Presidential Advisory File, Sensitive X: 11–12/78) The portion of Eilts’s report not related to the hostage crisis is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, Document 312.
4. On November 30, Mubarak reiterated Sadat’s suggestion to Atherton. In a December 3 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Brown that Carter wanted Brown and Vance to explore this idea and report. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department 12/79)
5. On the morning of November 20, approximately 200 Islamic students attending the Islamic University of Medina, attacked and occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The attackers were led by Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al-Utaibi, who claimed to be motivated by opposition to the Saudi ruling family. After receiving permission from the ulema to bear arms in a holy place, the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) tried unsuccessfully to regain control of the mosque. Approximately 127 people died. Two weeks later, a coordinated assault by the Saudi military, under instructions from three French special operations commanders, defeated the students, leaving 250 dead and 600 wounded. By November 27, the Saudi Government had regained complete control of the mosque. Al-Utaibi was subsequently found to have been a member of SANG. Sixty-three people, including al-Utaibi, were publicly beheaded on January 9, 1980, for participation in the attack. For the U.S. reaction to the attack, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 201–205.